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Abstract 
The aim of the thesis is to examine and estimate the effects of military expenditure, 
institutions and conflict on economic development. 
The military expenditure and economic growth nexus is re-analysed in the con- 
text of threat and security dimensions. In particular the proposed empirical model is 
a non-linear one that is characterised by the external and internal threat levels. The 
findings are that when the internal and external threat levels are below threshold 
values, a rise in military expenditure results in a fall in growth. Conversely, when 
the external and internal threat levels are higher than threshold values, a rise in 
military expenditure results in a rise in growth. The regression analysis starts with 
a widely-used single cross-section methodology that is likely to suffer from omit- 
ted variable and endogenity problems. These problems are solved by using panel 
fixed-effects methodology with instrumental variables. 
The functionality of institutions and their indispensability in the stages of de- 
velopment are studied. The problem of the unquantifiable aspect of institutions is 
solved using proxies and indices taken from the literature. As a result, a general 
index is constructed that encompasses the main variability in different institutions 
using a principal component analysis. The findings are in line with the recent lit- 
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erature on institutions and economic growth. In particular, economic institutions 
appear to be critical for both socio-political instabilities (SPI) and economic growth. 
Also, accounting for institutions, (SPI) and income inequality (Gini) have a negative 
impact on economic growth. Further, the critical result is that the interaction term 
of SPI and Gini causes a further reduction in economic growth. 
In a theoretical model of inequality, property rights and conflict, it is shown that 
there are circumstances where increased inequality between agents causes a lowering 
of average output of the economy in a high conflict environment. Moreover, even 
though the productivity level of an average agent is constant, in the presence of high 
inequality and high conflict their utility decreases. 
To Zeynep... 
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Chapter 1 
Prologue 
The United Nations (UN) defines an index for human development. ' This index 
encompasses three elements: income per capita (average income), life expectancy, 
and education. Positive economic growth could assure that one of the above elements 
-average income- increases and hence it is a necessary condition for most individual's 
living standards to improve. In the analysis of stages of development it is common 
to analyse the first stage. The main reason for this is the simplicity involved in 
analysing per capita income change for each country. In recent years, studies have 
gone further to analyse this more thoroughly by examining the effect of each stage in 
development. These emerging studies mainly claim that positive growth in income 
per head is only the "necessary" condition (Gonzalez, 2007). 
Recently, together with human development, the term "human security" has 
been explored more frequently than "state security". That is because in the second 
half of the last century state security had become less of a concern due to increased 
stabile relations among countries. The concept of human security and development 
'It is known as the Human Development Index (HDI) 
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may not necessarily overlap with state security and development due to differences 
in aggregate and individual income levels: for instance both internal conflicts and 
poverty may arguably affect individual levels more than the whole nation, (Ogata, 
2005) and (Smith, 2008). Therefore, the question "how do the living standards of 
individuals improve? " is crucial and in this thesis we consider the main obstacles 
to this together with the security in state/ government and individual levels. In 
particular, the role of government in development stages is investigated. 
Hence, the central part of this thesis is set around government; its ability to pro- 
vide security, its institutions, its expenditures, and its capabilities and limitations 
in shaping the economy. The analysis is characterized by the effects of government 
on different levels of development. The thesis focuses on three substantial themes: 
conflict, economic growth, military expenditure and investment, (chapter 3); con- 
flict, economic growth, political and economic institutions, (chapter 4); and conflict, 
property rights, and inequality, (chapter 5). 
The thesis in total consists of 6 chapters. Chapter 2 surveys the empirical liter- 
ature on the effects of military expenditure on growth. This area has been widely 
analysed and discussed, but it has not been easy to draw together all the dimen- 
sions of the research. Therefore, the first part of chapter 2 outlines the main findings 
from earlier research and then the remainder of the chapter 2 provides an overview of 
the meta-analysis methodology that is then used to assess the overall quantitative 
results of the empirical literature on military expenditure and economic growth. 
Thus, the extant literature surveyed in the first part is re-examined by conduct- 
ing a meta-analysis to draw impartial conclusions and to find the new avenues 
for 
future research. Empirical studies may investigate the same issue or relationship 
3 
but they differ widely in the methods applied, the sample used and the other ex- 
planatory regressors controlled for. These differences among empirical studies can 
partly explain the reasons for reaching different effects. A meta-analysis first defines 
effect-size statistics to compile quantitative research findings of earlier studies. This 
numerical index allows meaningful comparisons among different studies, that have 
looked at the same issue with alternative research designs. In military expenditure- 
growth studies another important issue arises is the inconsistency of finding, that in 
effect question the existence of a genuine relationship between military expenditure 
and growth. Hence, this is further explored in this chapter. 
Chapter 3 re-examines the channels through which military expenditure affects 
economic activity, i. e. economic growth. The aim in this chapter is to study thor- 
oughly the demand for a high level military expenditure and its effect on civilian 
economy through economic growth. We make use of various econometric techniques 
to quantify the effects using data from the last four decades. As widely discussed in 
the literature the relationship is complex and simple models have failed to address 
the vital issues surrounding it. The relationship has been analysed mainly by either 
further augmenting different theoretical models or testing ad-hoc hypotheses using 
simple partial analyses. Then there are broader analyses that have taken into ac- 
count the interdependence among the variables of interest. The studies that consider 
the interdependence among economic growth, military expenditure and investment 
suggest accordingly the econometric specifications. These types of models are con- 
sidered to be better in explaining the military expenditure and economic growth 
nexus and subsequently many studies have applied this methodology. The starting 
argument of these studies is that a rise in military expenditure comes with a cost. 
However the net cost of military expenditure on growth is obscure whilst the cost 
4 
of threat or uncertainty is well-known. Decisions to reduce military expenditure or 
other security related spendings is challenging for the government. The government 
tendency towards some levels of military expenditure is justified by policy makers 
as well. This leads to a critical question for this chapter; "what is the natural level 
of military spending? " if there is any. This question will be the main hypothesis 
that is tested in this chapter. 
Chapter 4 is devoted to institutions. Many empirical studies have estimated 
some variant of Barro-type growth models using different proxies for institutions to 
establish possible channels between economic growth and institutions. Firstly, the 
conceptual theories surrounding institutions are briefly reviewed. Then, the main 
hypotheses set out in the existing research are used as the basis for the econometric 
specifications. Institutions are very broadly defined and categorized formally and 
informally. The issues aimed to be analysed in this chapter are formal institutions, 
institutional environments, conflicts and their influence on economic development. 
In the earlier literature the main focus has been the decisive effect of social tension, 
weak property rights and their effect on growth through investment. Politically 
driven violence especially has been a major concern; in turn this type of activity 
disrupts and damages the economy. Therefore, political instability and institutional 
stability indices are constructed and tested to examine their role on the growth ex- 
perience of countries. Our empirical approach is to first study the economic determi- 
nants of socio-political instabilities and then test various specifications to examine 
the possible links between instabilities, inequalities and economic growth. 
The final substantial chapter (chapter 5) is a theoretical one, looking at the issue 
of property rights, conflicts and average output. We consider this in the absence 
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of well-defined institutions and high variation in productivity levels among agents 
that may undermine average output via accelerating conflict. Besides, under these 
circumstances the utility of individual agents is considered whilst dispersion among 
agents' ability to produce widens. In the state of no enforced property rights, when 
accounted for heterogeneity in technology levels among agents or groups, relatively 
less productive agents invest more at a decreasing rate in offensive capital, con- 
versely, productive agents allocate more of their scarce resources to both productive 
and "unproductive defensive" activities. Further, productive agents aim to pre- 
vent their output from appropriation while less productive agents try to maximize 
its utility by means of other activities. Hence; under imperfect property rights with 
high returns from conflicts, agents will allocate their resources as follows; a relatively 
less able rational agent invests in "unproductive offensive" activities and a relatively 
more able agent invests in productive and "unproductive defensive" activities. The 
rationale behind this is that the unproductive (or less productive) agent may not 
have anything to defend and the productive agent may have no interest other than 
defending his own claims. Furthermore, the Ramsey model is extended to include 
imperfect property rights. The important extension of the model is the introduction 
of agents with a heterogenous ability to produce output. In the absence of appro- 
priative activity, i. e. with property rights in place, then each agent will enjoy only 
what they produce. By contrast, with imperfect property rights agents can appro- 
priate one another's output and each agent can only retain a proportion of their own 
output which is determined by contest success functions. 
It is reasonable to expect 
a more able agent to choose a production and defensive 
line. In such circumstances, 
the role of productivity on welfare is examined. 
To some extent, chapters 3 and 4 look at two different types of instabilities. 
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The first instability problem arises as a results of conflict, which can be both in- 
ternal as well as international. What is important is that in the event of either 
inter-state or intra-state conflicts government's spending on military expenditure 
increases sharply and then it starts to decline gradually. Hence, after controlling 
for the internal and external threats, the effect of military expenditure on economic 
growth is assessed. The second is caused by inefficient institutions. It is argued 
that inefficient institutions may give rise to both economic as well as social insta- 
bilities. Thus, there is an established link between internal conflicts and inefficient 
institutions. In addition, inefficient institutions might intensify the occurrence of 
internal turmoil. It is documented that the role of government in both types of 
instabilities is vital. In a state of internal conflict, the expenditure on military is 
seen to be the one of the paths that government takes to solve. Whereas, chapter 
4 and 5 jointly focus on institutions and inequalities. In chapter 4 the main issue 
investigated is the institutional environment, whilst chapter 5 looks at the role of 
a priori specified institutional environment on the economic outcome together with 
economic inequality. 
Finally, chapter 6 contains concluding remarks and highlights potential issues 
for the future research. 
Chapter 2 
Military Expenditure and 
Economic Growth Literature: A 
Meta-Analysis 
"When reviewing an empirical literature, it seems that many economists be- 
come Bayesian, holding strong priors formed on the basis of theoretical con- 
siderations. " 
(Stanley, 1998), [p. 724]. 
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2.1 Introduction 
Growth in per capita income is assumed to have a positive direct impact on a 
country's economic well-being and it is the main driving force of economic welfare. ' 
It is this aspect of growth that encourages more studies to examine growth-enhancing 
and growth-deteriorating factors. In this context, the effect of military expenditure 
on growth and hence on welfare is not easy to establish. 
Barro (1991) models the effect of government expenditure on growth. ' How- 
ever, he deducts the expenditure on education and military and suggests that these 
spendings may enter into production or influence property rights. Education and 
military expenditures account for human capital and security respectively. Human 
capital has direct impact on growth, 3 whereas military spending (milexp henceforth) 
has not been investigated in this way. Milexp and (national) security are two sides 
of the same coin, ' thus, an association established without considering the security 
dimension would not provide the complete picture. 
The role of the military is to safeguard the country from possible threats and 
this makes it complicated since if there is no hazard either at present or in the fore- 
seeable future then spending more on military will be a bad allocation of resources. 
Therefore, it is important to define explicitly and assign the determinants of milexp 
'This view has been debated in recent growth-welfare literature, see chapter 5 section 2. 
2The possible effects of government expenditure on growth has been investigated widely and 
most of the results show either no effect or negative impact, also some have looked into disaggre- 
gated government expenditure and found no definite outcome. See for instance Nijkamp and Poot 
(2004). 
31n the theory of economic growth, both in neoclassical and endogenous models, human capital 
is one of the factors of production. 
4This remark is, at least, perception of government. 
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to be able distinguish between security and rent-seeking related spendings. 
Furthermore, many earlier studies utilise the same linear relationship with differ- 
ent control variables and/or econometric specifications. Investment, in particular, 
is used as the `other' control variable in growth regressions in order to attest the 
possible link between milexp and growth. As investment and growth are intrinsically 
linked, the questions that are explored together with the effect of milexp on growth 
are: what is the link between investment and milexp and is there a trade-off? 5 In 
fact both of these questions are broadly explored in the literature. However, the 
milexp and threat relationship has still more to offer for the correct establishment 
of milexp and growth nexus. Besides, unlike the investment decision, milexp is not 
purely an economic decision; arguably it is a strategic decision too. 
The collapse of the communist bloc and the end of the Cold War has considerably 
reduced demand for milexp and now the big spenders relative to their GDP are the 
countries which are experiencing regional or internal conflict. ' The demand for 
milexp for each country may differ; it may go up in the presence of wars, regional 
conflicts, internal or external uncertainties, the possibility of future threats or it 
may be completely due to the political requirements of the present regime. Figure 
2.1 shows the world regional military expenditure in which regions like the Middle 
East and Africa show a higher trend in milexp over the period of 1960-2002. 
The figure depicts milexp for the seven regions in the world and the world average 
milexp. The world average milexp has been in the range of 3.0-4.5% of GDP over 
last 40 years. What should be recognised is that throughout this period the Middle 
'Further, if there is a trade off then one can expect a knock-on effect on growth through 
investment. 
'See figure 2.1: Comparisons of Regional Military Expenditure. 
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East region has been devoting more than the world average and, most importantly, 
North Africa and Sub-Saharan Africa now exceed the world average, whereas in the 
beginning of the period they were well below it; in particular Sub-Saharan Africa 
was the lowest spending region.? In addition, the peak indicates the Gulf War 1. 
The high spenders, Middle East and North Africa, show huge variation over the 
years but not for the rest of countries in the sample; on average, the figure indicates 
very little variation over the years for the rest of the countries. 
71t should also be noted that the most of sub-Saharan 
African countries had their independence 
from Europeans around 1960s and also the economic decline started in early 1975. 
In the graph it 
should be noted that there is a clear rise from 1974 onwards and 
this level seems to be maintained 
until 1984. Since then there have been variations in milexp, 
but it has never declined to its pre-1974 
levels. 
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Figure 2.2: Comparisons of average global military expenditure, threat, democracy 
and growth 
At the global level, figure 2.2 illustrates the world average trends in military 
expenditure (Mil), growth of income per head (GDPGr), democracy (DEM), inter- 
national wars (1W), and civil wars (CW). The data is averaged over each 5-year 
between 1960-2000.8 Human Security Report (2005) states that the number of in- 
ternational wars and conflicts have declined over the last four decades, while internal 
conflicts have plagued many less developed and developing countries. Further, the 
biggest danger is the possibility of internal conflict spreading to the neighbouring 
countries. Under such circumstances, the whole region faces some levels of uncer- 
tainty. The importance of regional stability is addressed in detail in the study by 
Collier and Hoeffler (2002). 
8The data sources for military expenditure, growth per head, democracy, and wars are taken 
from SIPRI, Penn World table version 6.1, Polity III and COW data sets respectively. 
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During the last few decades, some countries manage to solve internal conflict 
and bring peace and stability but others continue to suffer from it. It is argued 
that there are many factors that have influenced the persistence of internal conflict. 
These include socio-political as well as economic factors. In particular, incessant 
problems like threats to ethnic minorities' identity or their democratic rights; un- 
even distribution of wealth and disproportionate gains between different parties of 
working classes during a state of economic boom; deprivation and poverty are among 
the reasons. The list can be extended, however each country may have concerns over 
one or two of these problems and perhaps some may have all of these issues or more. 
Together with the aforementioned issues, external threats to national security 
may well justify the motive of milexp. The concern for scholars however is that most 
of these countries are either less developed or developing countries; therefore, the 
financing of milexp comes with a possibly higher opportunity cost than developed 
ones. Further, between 1960-2000 the average global milexp was about 3.5% of 
GDP, 9 whereas for the countries with at least one international war, the average 
spending was 6.6% and for the countries with at least one internal war 4.2%. 
The security issue is of major importance to all nations. The decision to increase 
milexp as a result of possible threats to a nation's security raises the need to find 
new ways of finance. Possible routes of financing can be: (i) printing money, (ii) 
reducing other expenses, (iii) borrowing internally or externally, and (iv) increasing 
the tax rate. The decision as to which one of the above to pursue in fact has different 
implications on the economy and will require further analysis. Each country may 
possibly be doing one of the above. The decision to take the first path would cause 
9Based on the the data from SIPRI publications from various years. 
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inflation; the second could result in a trade-off between foregone spending; the third 
would lead to a budget deficit; and the final one might reduce private investment 
(see Dunne et al 2003). The vast literature in this area focuses on the opportunity 
cost of milexp that is the option (ii) and only a few studies have considered (i) and 
(iii). 
Given the above discussion, this chapter reviews systematically the literature on 
milexp and growth nexus. The review has two parts: the first part makes use of the 
conventional narrative review to discuss the literature in order to recapitulate the 
findings up to now and critically evaluate the studies. The second part employs a 
quantitative meta-analytic method for the review of literature on milexp and growth. 
Conducting a meta-analysis allows for re-assessing objectively the main conclusions, 
and quantifies the findings from the extant literature to reach the net combined 
effect of milexp on growth. 
2.2 A Review of Military Expenditure and Eco- 
nomic Growth Literature 
The earlier literature on milexp and economic growth has analysed the relationship 
in two groups; the first group of studies takes milexp as an explanatory variable in 
various economic growth regression analyses in which the results are inconclusive. 
The second group of studies looks into the determinants of milexp and employs a 
simultaneous equation approach to study the effect of milexp on economic growth. 
Since there is no formal theoretical model, most of the findings of these studies differ 
as to the approaches, time periods and the samples. 
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One of the main arguments in the literature is that milexp diverts the limited 
resources away from the civilian economy, (Deger, 1986). The concern is about 
the opportunity cost of milexp. This means the resources allocated to milexp could 
have been more productive and beneficial for a country's development in the civilian 
sector. Therefore milexp may have an adverse effect on other economic variables 
which are confirmed to be main determinants of economic growth, i. e. investment 
and education. However, in the presence of a threat, spending on investment and/or 
education may be more costly to the development of a country. In other words, if 
there is any hostile behaviour created within or outside the country against individ- 
uals or their property, this may discourage possible investment within the country 
and perhaps lower the economic activity and potential future growth. 
The question that needs to be clarified is as follows: Do countries need to decide 
between the opportunity cost of `milexp and insecurity' or `milexp and investment'? 
Considering the budget constraints a government faces, there is a clear opportunity 
cost between milexp and other government spendings. However the cost of war is 
not only economic and this may be the reason for a government to spend more on 
milexp despite the opportunity cost associated with it. Thus milexp may 
be chosen 
at the expense of investment to attain or retain a secure country so that growth can 
foster and be sustained. 
Insecurity is not only the problem of developing countries, but also of the 
de- 
veloped world. However in developing countries, one may think 
that the problems 
they face are very different than the developed countries. The structure of the gov- 
ernment is often very fragile, whereas in developed countries 
there is already a well 
functioning legal system and a strong institutional structure. Hence, the problem 
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will solely be to maintain it, which will not be without any economic cost, see Hall 
and Jones (1999). 
To be able to spend on milexp in the presence of war or threat, the country's 
level of income may play an important role. It is hard to imagine a country having 
a high level of milexp when the country has been in a war for too many years and 
its physical and human capital have been destroyed without any time to replace it. 
This may be the case for some African countries, as they have had too many years 
of wars either international, civil or ethnic. In addition, they were already suffering 
from severe poverty problems. Subsequently, they may need to borrow to be able to 
spend more on milexp, which results in balance-of-payments problems. Arguably, 
oil-rich Middle East countries (MECs) do not confront such problems since they 
can afford the high level of milexp. This may explain why relatively high milexp in 
MECs has been persistent over the last 40 years but not in African countries. 
The other argument is that milexp may positively affect growth through aggre- 
gate demand, (see Benoit 1973,1978); this aspect of milexp is related to capacity 
utilization and that when an economy is in a phase of recession an increase in mil- 
exp will boost the economy. In other words based on Keynesian multiplier effects, 
when there is idle capital an increase in defence spending will cause an increase in 
government spending which will have a multiplier effect on aggregate demand. A 
rise in aggregate demand then stimulates the economy and consequently growth. 
Benoit (1978) studies 44 Less-Developed Countries (LDCs) to look at the milexp 
and growth relationship empirically and he finds a positive link between these two. 
Therefore Benoit (1978) suggests that milexp can affect growth in two directions: 
i. e. negatively by taking away the resources which may be better used in civilian 
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economy and positively by providing jobs and increasing employment, involving in 
infrastructure, training and research and development, (R&D). In the case of LDCs 
the benefits of milexp offset the negative ones. In terms of developed countries, 
for instance the US, in the late 1960s during the Vietnam War, increases in mil- 
exp affected the economy negatively because the economy was already fully utilised, 
(Gordon, 1993). 
Deger (1986) criticises the methodology and conclusion of Benoit (1973,1978), 
which was a fairly intuitive and informal one. There are also some critiques about the 
sample of Benoit's study being biased towards LDCs (see Biswas and Ram (1986)). 
However Benoit's study induced more research and the subsequent research has 
been greatly influenced by the postulates of Benoit. Lim (1983) employs the Harrod- 
Domer growth model and modifies it to include milexp to re-examine Benoit's study. 
He expands the sample from 44 LDC's to 54 for the period of 1965-73 and uses OLS 
estimation. Lim (1983) assumes that milexp and investment are negatively related 
and introduces Foreign Capital Inflow (FCI), where FCI may control investment 
and milexp together. Thus positive relationships do not mean that milexp would 
not crowd out investment. Based on the results obtained from his estimations he 
concludes that there is a negative effect of milexp on growth. 
Faini et al. (1984) also start with a discussion of Benoit's study in the light of a 
demand side Keynesian model using national account equation and define capacity 
utilisation rate and absorptive capacity limit. 10 They show milexp can influence 
'°One of the reasons that Benoit suggests for having positive correlation between milexp and 
growth was the increase in aggregate demand. In an economy where the capital is not fully utilised 
increase in government expenditure (through increase in milexp) results unemployed resources to 
be used and make profit, which affects growth positively. Faini et al. 
(1984) attest a model where 
they actually introduce this argument in their econometric specification to test. 
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investment negatively, hence growth of output, through absorptive capacity. They 
carry out ordinary least squares (OLS) fixed effect estimation method using data 
from 69 countries over the period of 1952-70 and the results indicate an increase in 
milexp reduces growth. 
There are also methodological issues. Deger (1986) suggests that using a single 
equation might not be able to explain the complex relationship between economic 
growth and milexp. The interrelationship between these variables would have been 
better captured by using simultaneous equations models (SEMs). Based on this, 
Deger (1986) sets out three equations; the dependent variables in each equation are 
growth, investment, and milexp. Deger (1986) claims that interrelation among these 
variables makes it difficult to assess their total effect on each other and thus SEMs 
should be performed to account for these direct and indirect effects. She employs 
a three-Stage Least Squares (3SLS) and estimates the model for 50 LDC for the 
period of 1965-73 and in the growth equation she finds that investment and milexp 
has a positive effect on growth, but in the investment equation there is a negative 
relationship between milexp and investment. When considering all three equations 
together the overall effect of milexp on growth is negative. 
The problems with cross-country estimations give rise to case studies with time 
series analysis. In a case study of India, Deger and Sen (1983) investigate a possi- 
ble spin-off from milexp to the civilian economy. The economic spin-off takes two 
forms: creating effective demand and increasing productivity through technological 
progress, which should influence economic development positively. The reason for 
choosing India as a case study is that India was at the time pursuing self-sufficient 
industrialisation policies and was involved in the production of armaments. Thus if 
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there is a positive spin-off running from milexp to the manufacturing sector, which 
is essentially growth promoting, India should be one of the countries showing a pos- 
itive relationship between milexp and potential defence capacity sector, that is, the 
metal and engineering industries. They estimate each potential defence capacity 
sector on milexp. In overall, the results are insignificant. 
Cuaresma and Reitschuler (2004) carry out a case study for defence spending in 
the US. They employ two different growth equations to analyse whether the effect 
of milexp on growth is linear or non-linear. They estimate a threshold value for 
milexp to test the assumption of a non-linear relationship between economic growth 
and milexp . 
If milexp is below the threshold value, then there is a positive effect 
on growth and vice versa. 
Firstly, a simple growth equation is estimated assuming a linear relationship 
between growth and milexp for the period from 1929 to 1999 using OLS, in which 
economic growth is the dependent variable and explanatory variables are savings, 
the growth rate of labour force, the growth rate of exports, and the growth rate of 
defence spending. All variables are positive and statistically significant 
(including 
the population growth rate)" with the adjusted R2 of 0.88. Based on these result 
they obtain from linear model estimation there is a positive relationship 
between 
economic growth and growth rate of milexp (coefficient 0.016, and s. e. 
0.005). 
To test the same model under the assumption of non-linear link between milexp 
and growth the initial model is rearranged in terms of a threshold model 
to allow 
for testing the non-linearity of defence on growth. The estimated threshold value 
is 
"In growth estimations it is expected to find a negative relation 
between population growth rate 
and economic growth. 
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found to be 384.77 billion 1998 U. S. Dollars. A linearity test shows that the effect 
of milexp on growth is nonlinear (with p-value of 0.07). In the case of low defence 
spending - that is below the estimated threshold value - the externality effect is 
positive and significant at 1% level and otherwise high defence spending, exceeding 
the estimated threshold value, is found not to be statistically significant. 
The other growth model employed by Cuaresma and Reitschuler (2004) is based 
on Feder-Ram model, which is a production function based model with two sectors; 
civilian and military. In the linear case two regression analysis are carried out; 
OLS estimation and Instrumental Variables (IV); however both the parameters are 
insignificant statistically. Whereas in the non-linear case, 12 below the threshold 
value of milexp, although the size effect is negative the externality effect is positive 
and both are significant. If milexp is above the threshold value then the externality 
effect seems to be negative. 
Stroup and Heckelman (2001) also consider a non-linear relationship between 
milexp and growth. They extend the Barro-type growth model to include milexp and 
apply panel estimations using data from 44 African and Latin American countries 
from 1975 to 1989. To capture the non-linearity of milexp on growth, squared 
milexp is included to the estimation specification. The main postulate is that the 
positive effects of milexp on economic growth would diminish as milexp continues to 
increase. Furthermore the net effect of high milexp would be negative as a result of 
the opportunity cost of diverting resources away from the civilian sector. 
13 Therefore 
they use a quadratic form and include the squared value of milexp. By applying 
12The estimated threshold value is 216.24 billion 1998 U. S. Dollars. 
13The positive effect of milexp may be arising from providing security would not be sufficient to 
respond the opportunities foregone. 
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panel estimation they take into account the cross-country variations in lost human 
capital and public sector inefficiencies. The findings support a non-linear relation 
between growth and milexp - low level of milexp increases growth and high level of 
milexp results a reduction in growth. 
Although Cuaresma and Reitschuler (2004) and Stroup and Heckelman (2001) 
advocate the non-linear relationship between growth and milexp, both the studies 
do not account for threat; therefore it may not actually reflect those countries with 
a high level of threat, which in turn results in a high milexp. In the study by 
Aizenman and Glick (2006) however, non-linearity between growth and milexp is 
associated with the degree of security and this is related to the level of threat. The 
model specifies that if there is a threat (resulting insecurity) above a threshold value, 
then a country benefits by increasing its milexp. The results of their study show 
that introducing milexp into the growth equation together with the threat variable 
seems to justify government spending on defence when there is a high level of threat. 
However, the threat variable fails to take into account the civil and ethnic wars. Civil 
wars may have a negative effect on economic growth more than international wars, 
see Murdoch and Sandler (2002), Collier and Hoeffler (2002) and Kang and Meernik 
(2005). 14 
Murdoch and Sandler (2002) use a formal model and employ the augmented 
Solow growth model to look at the effect of civil wars on economic growth. They 
assert that countries experiencing civil war could not recover easily as their scarce 
physical and human capital has been destroyed. Further, as the intensity of civil 
war increases, (for which they used a dummy for having more than 
25000 civil war 
14We will discuss the results of Aizenman and Glick 
(2006) in great detail in the preceding 
chapter . 
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deaths) the effect on growth is more negative. In the short run, civil wars affect 
growth negatively and this negative effect may be harmful to the economic activities 
of the neighbouring countries too. 
As stated earlier, even though, most of the studies above examine the same rela- 
tionship with some variations in their methodologies or the other control variables 
used in the regression analysis, there are distinct variations in their findings too. 
To some extend, the findings indicate the difficulty of reaching to an unambiguous 
conclusion on the effect of milexp on economic growth. A step further to the above 
review is to utilise a "vote-counting" method. 15 In this method, each study is clas- 
sified and tabled based on the magnitude and the sign of the effect. However, this 
procedure is also criticised for being biased when the statistical power of the test 
is low, see Hedges and Olkin (1985) and Hunter and Schmidt (1990) among others. 
The next section, therefore uses a meta-analytic review to overcome the problems 
that are present in narrative reviews. 
'5As quoted in (Glass, 1977), Light and Smith (1971) offer the following on the method of the 
"vote-counting" : 
"All studies which have data on a dependent variable and a specific indepen- 
dent variable or interest are examined. Three possible outcomes are defined. 
The relationship between the independent variable and the dependent variable 
is either significantly positive, statistically negative, or there is no significant 
relationship in either direction. The number of studies 
falling into each of 
these three categories is then simply tallied. If a plurality of studies fall into 
any one of these three categories, with fewer falling into the other two, 
the 
modal category is declared the winner. This modal categorizations 
is then 
assumed to give the best estimate of the direction of the true relationship 
between the independent and dependent variable. " 
[p. 433] 
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2.3 A Meta Analysis of Military Expenditure and 
Economic Growth Literature 
The work of Benoit has had a big impact; not only was it the first empirical investi- 
gation of milexp-growth nexus, but the positive significant results were not expected. 
Since then, Benoit's study has been under tremendous criticism and more studies 
have emerged to annul Benoit's results. Although the subsequent studies find the 
adverse effect of milexp on growth, this conclusion has not been statistically ro- 
bust. Dunne (1996) indicates that the empirical work considering both supply and 
demand side effects could be considered to reach a limited consensus that the net ef- 
fect is negative. However the tendency among researchers to look more favorably on 
findings with a negative effect of milexp on growth could lead to partial conclusions. 
To some extent, it has also been discussed earlier that the findings of milexp- 
growth studies are a mix bag and the impact is still ambiguous. This section surveys 
these studies to address whether the mixed findings are genuine and, if it is, to draw 
an overall conclusion by conducting a statistical approach. To start, we systemati- 
cally review the empirical studies that investigate the possible effects of milexp on 
economic growth. Then, the main statistics and conclusions are identified 
from the 
extant literature and converted into a comparable metric form. In doing so, initially 
reviewed studies are classified based on some attributes that we 
define below. 
The puzzle surrounding milexp-growth nexus is that on the one hand there is the 
security related positive effect on economic factors; on the other 
hand there is the 
effect of diverting resources from the economy. Hence, there can 
be two broad chan- 
nels. Individual studies may choose a specific channel to address the milexp-growth 
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nexus and further account for different control variables in their study. Regardless 
of these factors, here, these studies themselves are subject to statistical analysis. 
Moreover, a quantitative approach known as meta-analysis is applied to contem- 
plate on the sources of differences among them that produce conflicting results. As 
Dunne (1996) proposes, the results among studies may vary due to sample size, 
method applied, time period, other control variables and the functional form used. 
Meta-analysis provides statistical tools to compare a pool of milexp-growth stud- 
ies. To allow for comparisons among each independent study an effect size statistic 
is calculated. 16 Once the effect size statistic is estimated for individual studies then 
they become comparable, as it allows one to convert results in a common scale. 17 
There are different types of effect sizes; standardized mean difference, odds-ratio, 
correlation coefficient and so forth. The effect size statistic used here is the partial 
correlation. 
Dunne (1996) emphasizes the problems of methodological and theoretical issues 
and further attests that the empirical studies must be interpreted with underpinning 
hypotheses tested and the other conditioning variables used. In narrative surveys 
it not possible to take into account differences among studies that are testing the 
same hypotheses, whereas meta-analysis allows us to consider the specifications used 
which, in turn, produces a relatively more rigorous result then narrative reviews. 
In selecting the studies to be included in the meta-analysis of milexp and growth 
literature we use the following criterions: (i) Both published or unpublished studies 
are used. Errors in empirical studies, small or large, are unavoidable. However, 
16The effect size will become clearer in subsequent analysis. 
"Effect size has no dimensionality and t-statistic or partial correlation are often used in meta- 
analysis of economic literature. 
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it is a norm to presume that there are relatively minor errors in peer-reviewed 
studies, and therefore these studies are generally preferred in the meta-analysis. 
However, this selection criteria is generally criticised, since there may be a tendency 
towards significant studies to be published only. This is known as the publication 
bias. A "funnel plot" is used to check for possibility of publication bias. (ii) As 
mentioned previously, studies may have taken different channels to analyse direct 
and indirect effects of milexp on the economy. Hence, to analyse the specific effect, 
the studies considered in the meta-analysis are those which look at the direct effect 
of milexp on economic growth; in which milexp is measured as the percentage of 
GDP; and in the regression analysis, the dependent variable is economic growth and 
the independent variable is milexp. 18 (iii) This is a rather narrow meta-analysis 
since we only consider the studies that are mainly reviewed in the first part of this 
chapter. 
Based on the above, a meta-regression analysis is conducted to shed light on 
to the conflicting empirical results of milexp-growth studies. Prior to this analysis, 
below the main characteristics of the studies, specifically the research designs and 
data sets, are briefly outlined. 
Study Characteristics in the Milexp-Growth Literature: Econometric 
Methodologies, Specifications and Data 
As highlighted above, in the reviewed literature the statistical significance, sign and 
magnitude of the coefficient are considered for comparisons 
between study findings. 
The other characteristics of studies are neglected or not easy to synthesize together. 
18Thus, studies that use the growth rate of milexp as the regressor are left out. 
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In effect, the review may produce an imprecise and partial conclusions. One of 
these characteristics is the econometric specifications. A commonly employed single- 
equation based econometric specification is given with the following form 
yi, t = ao + boMili, t + Xi, tB + Zi, tr + ui, t (2.1) 
where y can be either the level or growth rate of GDP19 per head and Mil is the 
ratio of milexp to GDP. X is a vector of common variables used in the economic 
growth literature and has theoretical foundations: these are investment, initial level 
of income, population growth and education. Z is a vector of variables of interest 
in milexp-growth literature such as square of milexp, dummy for war, threat and so 
on. 
In empirical analysis of the milexp-growth nexus, there are theoretical based 
models, i. e. the neo-classical supply-side model of Feder-Ram and Keynesian de- 
mand and supply model with simultaneous equations, and atheoretical models, i. e. 
Granger causality and co-integrations techniques. Feder (1983) develops a model to 
evaluate effects of import and export sectors' on growth. This model is extended by 
Ram (1986) and Biswas and Ram (1986) to look at defence and non-defence sectors 
and their impact on growth. Although many scholars have employed the Feder-Ram 
two-sector model or Granger causality technique, the findings of these studies are 
not included in the meta-analysis of milexp-growth literature due to 
(ii) above. 
Besides the model selection, there are the issues of functional form and inter- 
dependence. Some researchers have claimed that there is a non-linear relationship 
between milexp and growth and recent empirical studies appear to support this. The 
19However, in the meta-analysis, as indicated (ii) above, the studies that have the dependent 
variable as growth rate of GDP are included. 
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discussion on the interdependence among growth, investment and milexp variables 
is not new, but it is on-going. Also, Landau (1993) lists the following problems in 
the earlier studies; omitted variable bias, short time period, endogeneity, not allow- 
ing for non-linear relationships, including variables that is influenced by the level of 
milexp and treating milexp as the cost of providing security when this is indirect. 
The other sources of study-to-study variation in the findings of milexp and 
growth literature may be attributable to the data, time frame and/or sample coun- 
tries. The milexp data used in the empirical studies comes mainly from two sources; 
the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) and the Stock- 
holm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). Although, the NATO and the 
UN differ in the way they define milexp, both ACDA and SIPRI use the NATO 
definition of milexp. 20 
In the light of this discussion, the effect of differences in methodology, data 
and time period among milexp-growth studies is explored thoroughly in the meta- 
regression analysis section below. 
2.3.1 Overview of Meta-Analysis 
Hunter and Schmidt (1990) indicate that a "good" review of earlier studies should 
make use of all the information available from each study reviewed. 
Meta-analysis 
is one of the methods that allows to synthesize the results of other scholars 
in a 
common metric for statistically comparable form in order to obtain statistically 
20The NATO definition of milexp includes expenditure on police forces and the 
UN peace forces 
but these are excluded from the UN definition of milexp. 
On the contrary, the UN includes military 
aid but not the NATO (Brzoska, 1995). 
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reliable quantitative result. 21 
The effect size (henceforth ES) basically makes use of the estimated coefficient, 
its standard deviation and degrees of freedom for each study, i. e. if a study is looking 
at effect of milexp on growth then the ES for each study is constructed using the 
estimated coefficient, standard deviation and degrees of freedom from individual 
milexp-growth study. In other words, t-statistics and degrees of freedom are used 
to find a comparable ES for each milexp-growth regression. 
We construct the ES via defining partial correlations for each estimate in each 
study. 22 The partial correlation is calculated using t-values and degrees of freedom; 
it is based on formula given in Greene (1993). 23 Assume that in a regression analysis 
there is a dependent variable, name it y, and two independent variables, name them 
xl and x2. Having regressed `y' on `xl' and `x2', the two t-ratios, tx1 and tx2, and 
the number of degrees of freedom, (df) are obtained. Assume further that the effect 
of xl on y is the main concern. Thus, the partial correlation between y and xi after 
controlling for x2 can be obtained by regressing y and xl on a constant and other 
variables that we like to account for; in this case it is only x2 that we are controlling. 
Once the regressions are run, the simple correlation between the residuals of these 
two regressions gives the partial correlation between y and xl. 
However, as Greene (1993) states, if we have a regression result with t-statistics 
and the degrees of freedom one can use the formula below instead of running separate 
regressions and obtaining residuals. Then the computation of partial correlation 
21Lipsey and Wilson (2001) provide a good review of meta-analysis methodology and 
this part 
is mainly drawn from their study. 
22Lipsey and Wilson (2001) argue that the most commonly used 
ES statistics are the standard- 
ized mean difference, the correlation coefficient, and the odds-ratio. 
23See page 180 of Greene (1993). 
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between y and xl is given with the following formula, 
t2 
2_ x1 ( 2.2 ryx1 t21 +df 
l 
where r is the ES to be calculated from individual studies. The computed effect 
sizes are then used as the dependent variable in the meta-regression analysis. The 
other characteristics of individual studies; i. e. all the other independent variables, 
the sample size, the time frame, the method of estimation, the sources used, the year 
of the publication, the type of publication, and so forth, may further constitute the 
regressors for the meta-regression analysis. Further, meta-regression analysis allows 
to evaluate whether the other characteristics of studies have any systematic effect 
on the estimated ES. 
Analysing the Effect Sizes 
Lipsey and Wilson (2001) propose the following steps to assess the effect sizes. 
" Include all the relevant studies and choose the ES statistic to create statisti- 
cally independent effect sizes. To ensure statistical independence take one ES 
from each study. 
" Calculate the weighted mean for overall effect using fixed effects meta-analysis. 
Assume that ESi is the estimate of ES in study i, SEA is the standard error 
of estimated effect in study Z. The inverse variance is chosen as the weights, 
SE 
1 24 Therefore the weighted mean ES can be written as: 
ES => 
(wiESi) 
1: wi 
(2.3) 
24Sample size or the inverse standard deviation may also be used. 
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where ESQ is the value of the ES statistic used, wi = (s 
1 
)2 is the inverse 
variance weight for the size i. This is a model of fixed effects meta-analysis 
due to using inverse variance of the estimates as a weight. 
9 Determine the confidence interval for the mean ES: It is based on the standard 
error of the mean and a critical value from the z-distribution. The standard 
error of the mean is computed as the square root of the sum of inverse variance 
weights: 25 
SEES = Ewe 
where SEES is the standard error of the ES mean, wi is the inverse variance 
weight associated with i'th study's ES. The confidence interval for lower, (ESL) 
and upper, (ESu) bounds are built using the formulae 
ESL = ES - z(l_a)(SEES) 
and 
ESu = ES + z(1-a) 
(S 
rs) 
where z(l_a) is the critical value for the z-distribution and a is the significance 
level. For the significance of the mean ES az- test is performed: 
IES I 
SEES 
The formula is distributed as a standard normal variate. Hence if it exceeds 
test statistic 1.96 it is statistically significant with p<0.05, and if it exceeds 
test statistic 2.58, it is significant with p<0.01. 
25 See Hedges and O1kin (1985) 
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" Perform a homogeneity test: In the fixed effects meta-analysis, it is assumed 
that all the effect sizes, drawn from individual studies, estimate the same 
population ES. In other words using the formula (2.3) to estimate the weighted 
mean is valid if homogeneity of distribution of effect sizes are guaranteed. 26 
To attest how realistic this assumption is a test based on the Q- statistic is 
used. The Q- statistic is distributed as a chi - square with k-1 degrees of 
freedom with k being the number of effect sizes: 
wi (ESi _ 
TFS--)2 
, X2 k-I 
or 
Q=>wiESi- 
wiES)2 
Ewi ý' 
2 Xk-1 
as before, ESZ is individual ES for i=1, ... , 
k, ES is the weighted mean for 
ESZ. Q gives the total variance and df =k-1 gives the expected variance, 
hence the difference, Q-k-1 is the excess variance. 27 If Q exceeds the 
critical value for a chi - square with k-1 degrees of freedom, then the null 
hypothesis of homogeneity is rejected. Heterogeneous distribution implies that 
the variability among effect sizes is larger than then one would expect merely 
from sampling error. 
" Re-calculate the weighted mean for overall effect using the random effects 
meta-analysis model. Lipsey and Wilson (2001) claim that the homogeneity 
test examines if the fixed effect model is applicable statistically. Therefore, 
they suggests that although homogeneity may not be rejected statistically, one 
26If it is rejected then the formula in equation (2.3) is used with alteration in the way weights 
are defined. This is the model of random effects and it is further explored below. 
27In the fixed effects between study variation is 0, i. e. Q<k-1, hence variation among study 
is due to within study variation. 
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can still assume conceptually (not statistically), rejection of homogeneity and 
use a random effects model. 28 Each observed ES differs from the population 
mean by subject-level sampling error and random error term. Hence the weight 
in the random effects model is given by: 
*1 w. =- i 
v: 
where vi is the variance associated with the random model and is given by: 
vZ =T2+vz 
v2 = (SEi)2 is as before, the variance associated with subject-level sampling 
error, and T2 is the between study variance: 
2 Q-(k-1) T= ýwi 
- 
(EwilE wi) 
The associated weighted mean and the standard error of random effects model 
are: 
>(wi ESz) 
ESrandom = and SEES =1 random w2 
2.3.2 The Meta-Analysis Results 
Effect Size Analysis of the Milexp-Growth Studies: 
The studies that look at the relationship between milexp (that is measured as a 
percentage of GDP) and economic growth (growth rate of income per head) are 
assembled using various search engines for the economic literature. As previously 
28Fixed and random effects in meta-analysis should not be confused with panel data models of 
fixed and random effects. They are not related. 
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stated, the studies considered for meta analysis are those which regress economic 
growth on milexp, i. e. economic growth is dependent variable and milexp indepen- 
dent. The ES, as the basis of comparisons across milexp-growth studies, is chosen 
to be the partial correlation calculated from individual studies. 29 
There are 25 studies that are included in the meta-analysis with a total of 140 
estimates, i. e. in total there are 140 partial correlations are calculated from the 
studies reviewed. 35% of the 140 estimates find a negative relationship with only 
32% statistically significant. Whereas, 65% of the 140 estimates find a positive 
relationship between milexp and growth but more than half of these are statistically 
insignificant. 
Table 2.1 represents the results of the weighted mean effect sizes within individual 
studies and the mean ES, ES, for overall 140 estimates. Effect sizes are calculated 
using the formula given by equation (2.3). There is no specific theoretical model 
which establishes the direction of the effect of milexp on growth. Hence there exists 
an ambiguity in relations as to the true direction of the effect. Based on the empirical 
studies in table 2.1 the overall ES is found to be -0.243, which indicates a medium 
inverse relationship between milexp and growth. We use the interpretation provided 
by Cohen (1988). 30 This estimate is valid if the assumption of homogeneity is not 
violated and there is no publication or selection biases. 
Under the fixed effects, the "combined (or average) ES" for the 25 studies is 
0.243. To investigate the robustness of this value the homogeneity test is per- 
29The meta-analysis carried out in this chapter is implemented in the programmes 
Microsoft 
Excel, Stata, and Comprehensive Meta Analysis Software. 
"Cohen (1988) suggests that if the ES based on correlation coefficient the absolute value of 
mean effect sizes are; r<0.10 small, r=0.25 medium, and r>0.40 
large. 
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formed. The null hypothesis is that the true ES is the same for all the milexp-growth 
studies in sample, versus the alternative hypothesis that at least one of the effect 
sizes differs from the rest of the sample. 31 The Q-test result is produced in table 
2.2. The test result is highly significant implying a heterogenous distribution. 
31This assumption is a very strict as it has been discussed in narrative review 
that the results 
vary enormously in empirical findings of milexp-growth, therefore employing random effects, 
this 
assumption is relaxed. 
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Model Fixed effects Random effects 
Number of Studies 
Mean Effect size 
Point estimate 
Lower limit (95% interval) 
Upper limit (95% interval) 
Test of null 
Z-value 
P-value 
Heterogeneity Test 
Q-value 
df (Q) 
126 126 
-0.243 0.095 
-0.244 0.049 
-0.242 0.140 
-446.2 4.1 
0.00 0.00 
28783 
125 
Table 2.2: Results of Fixed and Random Effects Meta Analysis 
The assumption of an homogenous distribution of effect sizes is then found to 
be not reasonable for the milexp-growth studies. 32 The test implies that there are 
variations among effect sizes that is beyond the sampling error. Therefore, in the 
milexp-growth literature a random effects model is utilised. Table 2.2 shows both 
the fixed and random effects models for milexp-growth studies. The mean ES, ES, 
in the random effects model is found to be 0.095, which is very small, but positive. 
Stanley (2005) purports that researchers may be influenced to contemplate either 
statistically significant results or inclined towards a specific direction and magnitude 
of an effect. Corroborating on this view, the effect sizes are further investigated for 
the possibility of publication bias. A funnel plot is used to graphically examine 
this possibility. Essentially the graph is a scatter plot and it emerges a shape of 
32In general, it is highly likely that this assumption is violated in empirical economics. See other 
meta-analysis examples in empirical economics like De Dominicis et al. (2006), Doucouliagos and 
Ulubasoglu (2006), Nijkamp and Poot (2004) and also the special issue on meta-analysis in the 
Journal of Economic Surveys 2005, volume 19, issue 3. 
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Figure 2.3: Funnel Plot for Publication Bias 
an inverted funnel. 33 Figure 2.3 is the funnel plot of the estimated effect sizes of 
milexp-growth studies against their precision, St . 
34 The funnel plot illustrates that 
there are some clustering of effect sizes on the right of the graph, but it is not very 
clear. The publication bias might be present or it may not be very severe. 35 
Studies with very large sample size have a bigger weight due to the small standard 
"There may be no publication bias if the funnel graph produced has a shape of inverse-funnel 
and there are no asymmetries present. 
34It is also common to graph sample size against the ES. 
35Note that in the funnel plot the ES is Fisher's Z. The programme used to estimate the fixed 
and random effects meta-analysis, converts the partial correlations to Fisher's Z first and run the 
analysis and convert the results back to the partial correlations. The reason for this is to avoid large 
partial correlations to be assigned more weights. One can easily convert the partial correlations, 
r, into Fisher's Z using: 
Fisher'sZ =1 ln(1 
+rý 
2 1-r 
Funnel Plot of Precision by Fisher's Z 
2.3 
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Figure 2.4: Funnel Plot for Publication Bias: a few studies with large weights 
removed 
errors. In what follows, these studies may dominate the "combined effect" that 
is estimated under fixed-effects analysis, which is the case in the milexp-growth 
literature. Therefore, the estimates that have got the largest weights are removed 
from the sample and the rest of the sample of effect sizes are graphed again for 
publication bias. The figure 2.4 shows the new funnel plot after removing the studies 
with largest weights. 
However, visual inspections of both funnel plots do not guarantee that there 
is no publication bias. Thus, a more formal test is conducted for examination of 
publication bias. Stanley and Jarrell (1989) suggest the funnel asymmetry test 
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(FAT) for exploring publication bias. The test is based on t-statistics. 
ti=ßo+ßi(1/SEz)+ei 
where ti is the t-value of the estimated coefficient from estimate i. The intercept, 
00, and slope, 31, coefficients are to be tested if they are statistically different from 
zero. There is publication bias, if /3 is statistically different from zero at conven- 
tional significance levels. ßo also gives the direction of bias. Stanley (2005) claims 
that 1/SEi is an estimated value thus it contains some level of random sampling 
error, which produces a bias result when it is estimated using ordinary least squares 
(OLS). To overcome this it is suggested to use the square root of the sample size 
or degrees of freedom as an alternative to inverse standard errors, 1/SEi. The sec- 
ond column of table 2.3 reports the results of FAT test for milexp-growth results. 36 
ßo is statistically significant, thus indicating the possibility of publication bias in 
milexp-growth studies. 
The issues of heterogeneity and publication bias are statistically necessary to 
explore and understand variation among reported research findings. However, in 
the milexp-growth literature the issue of whether there is a genuine relationship 
or not emerges to be more important for policy-makers. Using fixed and random 
effects models, two different results are found: fixed effects model implies a negative, 
small-to-medium effect and random effects a positive but very small effect of milexp 
on economic growth. There is another test, known as meta-significance test 
(MST), 
which allows us to explore this question further. The test is 
based on the following 
regression specification: 
ln(I ti 1) = ao + a, ln(dff) + Ei 
36Square root of sample size (N) is also used as independent variable. 
However, square root of 
N is not a good proxy here since the correlation between 1/SEi and 
N is very low. 
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Funnel Asymmetry Test (FAT 
Dependent variable: ti 
Intercept 0.67 
(3.86) 
1 /SEi -0.002 
(-3.93) 
in df i 
no. of observations 140 
R2 0.02 
InItil 
-0.75 
(-1.67) 
0.22 
(2.27) 
140 
0.03 
Note: t-values are in parentheses. 
Table 2.3: FAT and MST tests results 
where the natural logarithm of absolute t-values, In (I ti 1), is regressed on the natu- 
ral logarithm of degrees of freedom, ln(dff). The intuition behind this is that for the 
existence of a genuine relationship between milexp-growth, the magnitude of stan- 
dardized test statistics, that is t-value in milexp-growth studies, varies positively 
with degrees of freedom, see Stanley (2001) and Stanley (2005). The results of MST 
for milexp-growth studies are reported in third column of table 2.3. 
Stanley (2005) asserts that if in FAT the slope coefficient, ßi, is statistically 
different from zero and in MST test, the slope coefficient, al is greater than zero 
then there exists a genuine empirical effect. In what follows, table 2.3 indicates that 
there is a genuine empirical effect of milexp on growth but it is very small, which is 
the same results as in the random-effects meta analysis. 
A Meta-regression Analysis of Milexp-Growth Studies: 
Until now it has been discussed that the "combined effect" of milexp on growth 
Meta Significance Test (MST) 
cannot be calculated from the consideration of sampling error alone among individ- 
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ual estimates. Therefore, in this part, it is intended to further analyse the issue of 
heterogeneity among effect sizes with particular attention to the possible system- 
atic variations between estimates. These systematic variations are used to form the 
variables that are used as the independent variables in the meta-regression analysis. 
Also, these variables are known in meta-analysis as moderator variables. Systematic 
variation may emerge from the use of different theoretical reasoning, methodologi- 
cal issues or some other characteristics of empirical studies. In the milexp-growth 
literature, demand side theories expect a negative effect (via trade-off within other 
government expenditure) and supply side a positive one (via technological spillover 
and positive externalities). Keynesian demand and supply models, for instance, 
expect a negative association of milexp on growth through crowding out of other 
beneficial government expenditure; investment, health and education. However, 
there is also an expectation of a positive effect through Keynesian multiplier ef- 
fects. 37 Whilst, the neo-classical Feder-Ram supply-side models expect a positive 
effect or no economic effect. 
A moderator analysis allows for closer examination of theoretical or methodolog- 
ical variation. In other words each study is reviewed and the main characteristics of 
individual studies are coded, which are then compared across all the studies. This 
provides variables that can be used as the moderating variables in the MRA. In 
other words, moderating variables allow us to segregate the role of other control 
variables, theoretical and methodological issues on the study-to-study findings. 
Stanley and Jarrell (1989) define a generic meta-regression model based on the 
37As mentioned in the narrative review milexp is one of the components of government expen- 
diture and an increase in government expenditure through milexp can stimulate the economy via 
Keynesian multiplier. 
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reported estimate of a relationship. A variant of their model is employed here and 
the important difference to note is that the ES choice of Stanley and Jarrell (1989) 
is t-statistics. However, as stated previously, the partial correlation is our preferred 
ES. The specification for MRA is then: 
K 
ESZ =ß+Z akZZk + ei i=1,2, """ (2.4) 
k=1 
where ESZ is the partial correlation for estimate i, ZZk are the individual study 
characteristics, and ak are the coefficient to be estimated, and which in turn give 
the effect of a particular characteristic of the studies. 
Commonly, OLS is used to estimate equation (2.4). OLS is consistent if the 
estimates of primary studies used to construct the sample are independent from one 
to another. However, some primary studies may provide more than one estimate, 
in which case the independency among estimates can be questioned (De Dominicis 
et al., 2006). Some meta-analytic reviews use one estimate from each study to deal 
with this issue and subsequently use OLS, (Doucouliagos and Ulubasoglu, 2006). 
Instead of undertaking such selection procedure, equation (2.4) is estimated using 
a hierarchial model, also known as a multilevel model. The main reason for this is 
to use all the available information from each study. 38 Hence, the equation to be 
estimated is: 
K 
. 
E'Sij =, ß+EakZijk+uj+eij 
k=1 
i=1,2, ""-; j=1,2, -- (2.5) 
where i and j represent the individual estimate and the study respectively. Also, 
uj is the study level error term, that allows each study to have varying intercept. 
Therefore, it is also known as a random intercept model. The error terms are 
"Multilevel models are often appears in educational studies, see Goldstein (1987). 
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assumed to have a normal distribution; ei N N(0) tee) and uj - N(0, cü). Finally, 
the error terms are independent, thus the total variance is given by; o- + Qe 39 
Using individual study characteristics of milexp-growth studies the explanatory 
variables are constructed. 4° These variables are in the form of dummies and are 
used to shed light to the questions like whether the differences are due to use of 
specific regions, time periods, data sources or econometric applications. 
Results of Meta-regression Analysis 
The dependent variable is the estimated partial correlation between milexp and 
growth. The independent variables used are all dummies with the exception of the 
natural logarithm of the primary study sample sizes. The definition of each variables 
is given in table 2.4. 
Table 2.5 reports the results for OLS with robust standard errors and multi-level 
model estimators. 41 
Different samples of Countries: The use of different samples have impact 
the partial correlation between milexp and growth. In the meta regression result 
it is found that general sample, LDCs and single country samples are significant, 
except for the African dummy. 
Dummy for Data Source: SIPRI data is statistically significant. Implying 
39A detailed description of multilevel techniques can be found in Goldstein 
(1995) and Hox 
(2002). 
40The full list of individual research design are tabled in the appendix, see table 2.6 and 
2.7. 
41In the OLS estimation the disturbance term is tested for homoscedasticity using the 
Breusch- 
Pagan test. The test confirms heteroscedasticity in the disturbance term, therefore the 
OLS 
regression result is reported here with the robust standard errors. 
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Variables I I Definition 
No. Observation in primary study Log of number of observation in the primary study. 
Dummy 1950s Takes value 1 if the primary study includes data from 1950s, 
otherwise 0. 
Dummy 1960s Takes value 1 if the primary study includes data from 1960s, 
otherwise 0. 
Dummy 1980s Takes value 1 if the primary study includes data from 1980s, 
otherwise 0. 
Dummy 1990s Takes value 1 if the primary study includes data from 1990s, 
otherwise 0. 
SIPRI data Takes value 1 if the data used in the primary study comes 
from SIPRI, otherwise 0. 
General Sample Takes value 1 if the primary study data does not come from 
a specific region or a country, otherwise 0. 
LDCs Takes value 1 if the primary study use data only from LDC's, 
otherwise 0. 
Africa Takes value 1 if only African countries data is used, otherwise 
0 
Single Country Study Takes value 1 if a single time series analysis of a country is 
done, otherwise 0. 
Simultaneous Equations Approach Takes value 1 if the method of estimation is simultaneous equa- 
tions approach, otherwise 0. 
Panel Data Takes value 1 if the method of estimation is panel data in the 
primary study, otherwise 0. 
AID Takes value 1 if the primary study control for AID, otherwise 
0. 
Non-linear or interaction terms Takes value 1 if the primary study control for non-linear or 
interaction terms, otherwise 0. 
Democracy Takes value 1 if the primary study control for democracy, oth- 
erwise 0. 
Instability or war Takes value 1 if the primary study control for instability or 
war, otherwise 0. 
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) Takes value 1 if the primary study control for FDI, otherwise 
11 0. 
Neighbouring Countries' Milexp (NME) Takes value 1 if the primary study control for NME, otherwise 
o. 
Table 2.4: Meta-Regression Analysis Variables 
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Meta-Regression Analysis of Milexp-Growth Studies 
Dependent variable: Partial Correlations 
OLS (I) Hierarchical Model (II) 
No. Observation in primary study 0.076 0.076 
[0.043] [0.041] 
(0.076) (0.064) 
Dummy 1950s 0.181 0.181 
[0.093] [0.073] 
(0.054) (0.014) 
Dummy 1960s -0.125 -0.125 
[0.071] [0.070] 
(0.081) (0.076) 
Dummy 1980s -0.192 -0.192 
[0.142] [0.114] 
(0.178) (0.093) 
Dummy 1990s -0.281 -0.281 
[0.094] [0.078] 
(0.003) (0.000) 
SIPRI data 0.119 0.119 
[0.045] [0.050] 
(0.009) (0.017) 
General Sample -0.328 -0.328 
[0.174] [0.163] 
(0.062) (0.045) 
LDCs -0.399 -0.399 
[0.112] [0.105] 
(0.001) (0.000) 
Africa -0.096 -0.096 
[0.074] [0.078] 
(0.201) (0.222) 
Single Country Study -0.282 -0.282 
[0.166] [0.139] 
(0.091) (0.042) 
Simultaneous Equation Approach 0.047 0.047 
[0.062] [0.069] 
(0.449) (0.496) 
Panel Data -0.122 -0.122 
[0.111] [0.111] 
(0.270) ( 0.269) 
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Continued: Meta-Regression Analysis of Milexp-Growth Studies 
Dependent variable: Partial Correlations 
OLS (I) Hierarchical Model (II) 
AID 0.032 0.032 
[0.093] [0.100] 
(0.735) (0.754) 
Non-linear or 0.216 0.216 
interaction terms [0.065] [0.064] 
(0.001) (0.001) 
Democracy 0.140 0.140 
[0.063] [0.093] 
(0.028) (0.133) 
Instability or War -0.057 -0.057 
[0.071] [0.069] 
(0.425) (0.406) 
Foreign Direct Investment 0.151 0.151 
[0.069] [0.075] 
(0.030) (0.045) 
Neighbouring Countries' Milexp 0.358 0.358 
[0.108] [0.106] 
(0.001) (0.001) 
Constant 0.182 0.182 
[0.173] [0.145] 
(0.294) (0.209) 
R2 0.45 
"[]"Standard errors and "()" p-values 
Number of level 1 observations in Hierarchical Model = 140 
Number of level 2 observations in Hierarchical Model = 25 
Table 2.5: Meta-regression Analysis Results of Milexp-Growth Studies 
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that studies using SIPRI data produce a larger milexp-growth effect. 
Dummy for Period : There is a noticeable differences whether the period 
dummy covers 1950s or 1990s. Especially, 1950s have a positive significant effect on 
the partial correlation between milexp-growth. Whereas, 1990s have an environment 
that seems to exert a negative effect on the partial correlation. 
Estimation and Specification Dummies: The use of panel data methods, 
and the functional form have significantly effect on the estimated partial correlations. 
Overall, in the MRA the use of OLS seems to produce larger standard errors in 
comparisons to multi level estimation. However, there are no significant differences 
among the results of both methods. 
2.4 Summary and Conclusions 
This chapter conducts a narrative and meta-analytic review of milexp - growth 
literature in order to investigate overall conclusions in a large body of empirical 
literature and to contemplate and integrate all these studies together. 
The narrative review of milexp growth emphasizes the difficulty of finding a 
"combined effect" of milexp on growth using earlier study findings. Utilizing the 
fixed and random effects meta analysis, the combined effects of milexp - growth 
studies are found to be -0.245 and 0.095 respectively. They imply a direct negative 
small-to-medium impact of milexp on growth in fixed effects and a direct small 
positive impact in random effects. However, the robust impact is the direct small 
positive impact obtained from the random effects model, 0.095, due to the observed 
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heterogeneity of the distribution of effect sizes. 
The chapter further explores the issue of publication bias and whether there 
exists a genuine relationship between milexp and economic growth. The test results 
reveal the presence of publication bias but also a genuine effect of milexp on economic 
growth. 
Then, a meta-regression analysis is used to evaluate the role of individual char- 
acteristics on the "combined effect" . 
Our results imply that regional differences, 
time periods and method of estimation have a significant impact on the estimated 
partial correlation. To some extent, the choice of other control variables used seems 
to be important too. 
Finally, among milexp-growth studies, Granger causality and Feder-Ram based 
models are left out, since meta-analysis conducted in this chapter used only the 
studies that include the independent variable as milexp (milexp is measured as the 
ratio of military spending to GDP) and the dependent variable as economic growth 
(economic growth is measured as the change in GDP). Therefore, the result from 
this review is somewhat restrictive. 
In the next chapter these findings are taken into consideration, but also variables, 
like threat, are included to re-analyse this relationship. 
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2.5 Appendix 53 
Summary of Variables Used in the Milexp-Growth Literature 
Study No. Estimations Other Variables 
within the study 
Benoit (1978) 1 Investment (inv) 
Benoit (1978) 2 Economic aid (Aid) 
Benoit (1978) 3 inv; aid 
Deger & Smith (1983) 1 inv; income (y); foreign capital flows (FDI); popgr; growth 
in agricultural product 
Deger & Smith (1983) 2 inv; y; FDI; popgr; growth in agricultural product 
Deger & Smith (1983) 3 inv; y; FDI; popgr; growth in agricultural product 
Deger & Smith (1983) 4 inv; y; FDI; popgr; growth in agricultural product 
Deger & Smith (1983) 5 inv; y; FDI; popgr; growth in agricultural product 
Lim (1983) 1 Output capital ratio (IOCR); Deficit on Current Account 
to Gross National Saving Ratio (F/S) 
Lim (1983) 2 IOCR; F/S 
Lim (1983) 3 IOCR; F/S 
Lim (1983) 4 IOCR; F/S 
Lim (1983) 5 IOCR; F/S 
Lim (1983) 6 IOCR; F/S 
Lim (1983) 7 inv 
Lim (1983) 8 FDI 
Lim (1983) 9 inv; FDI 
Deger & Sen (1983) 1 inv; y; popgr; net foreign capital transfer 
Faini, et. al. (1984) 1 y; income squared (y2); pop; pop squared (pop2); Capital 
inflow from abroad; Dummy for shifting intercept every 
5-years 
Cappelen, et. al. (1984) 1 growth of manufacturing output (grmanu); inv 
Cappelen, et. al. (1984) 2 grmanu; inv 
Cappelen, et. al. (1984) 3 grmanu; inv 
Cappelen, et. al. (1984) 4 grmanu; inv 
Cappelen, et. al. (1984) 5 Growth of world exports of manufactured goods (grW- 
manu); Government final consumption (Excluding milexp) 
Cappelen, et. al. (1984) 6 grWmanu; Government final consumption (Excluding mil- 
exp) 
Cappelen, et. al. (1984) 7 grWmanu; Government final consumption 
(Excluding mil- 
exp) 
Cappelen, et. al. (1984) 8 grWmanu; Government final consumption 
(Excluding mil- 
exp) 
Landau (1986) 1 inv; y; the growth rate of world GDP (GDPWGR); Gov- 
ernment consumption net of education and defence 
OCSA); Edu; transfers; capital expenditure (capexp) 
money supply (Money); pop; popgr; Life expectancy at 
birth in 1970 (LE7); linear time trend ( T); Aid ; DEM; 
Index of real exchange rate (Xrate); COUP; OIL ; Pri- 
vate transfers from abroad (APUTS) ; War with foreign 
country ( War); Interest rate (ir) 
Landau (1986) 2 inv; y; GDPWGR; OCSA; edu; transfer; capexp; Money; 
pop; popgr; LE7; T; Aid; DEM; Xrate; COUP; OIL ; 
APUTS; agriculture production sahre ( AS); manufac- 
turing production share (MS); Other industry production 
share (OS); inflation (inf ); share of pop is European ex- 
traction (SEUR); 
Landau (1986) 3 inv; y; OCSA; edu; transfer; capexp; pop; popgr; 
T; 
Aid; OIL ; APUTS; inf; current education (EDO); the 
distance to nearest seaport for landlocked countires (Dis- 
tance); RAIN 
Landau (1986) 4 inv; y OCSA; edu; transfers; capexp; pop; popgr; 
T; aid; 
EDO; Distance 
Landau (1986) 5 inv; y; inv*y; GDPWGR; 
OCSA; OCSA*y; edu; edu*y; 
* y; pop; transfers ; capexp; capexp*y; money; money 
pop*y; popgr; LE7; LE7*y; T; Aid; DEM; Xrate; COUP; 
OIL ; APUTS; War; War*y; jr 
Landau (1986) 6 y; GDPWGR; OCSA; OCSA*y; edu; edu*y; transfers; 
capexp; capexp*y; money; money*y; pop; pop*y; popgr; 
LE7; LE7*Y; T; aid; DEM; Xrate; COUP; OIL ; APUTS; 
War; War*Y; jr 
Landau (1986) 7 inv; inv*y; Y; 
GDPWGR; OCSA; OCSA*y; edu; edu*y; 
* y; transfer; capexp; capexp*y; money; money*y; pop; pop 
popgr; LE7; LE7X; T; aid; DEM; Xrate; COUP; OIL 
APUTS; War; War*Y; jr 
2.5 Appendix 
Continued: Summary of Variables Used in the Milexp-Growth Literature 
Study No. Estimations Other Variables 
within the study 
Landau (1986) 
Landau (1986) 
Landau (1986) 
Landau (1986) 
Landau (1986) 
Biswas & Ram (1986) 
Biswas & Ram (1986) 
Biswas & Ram (1986) 
Biswas & Ram (1986) 
Biswas & Ram (1986) 
Biswas & Ram (1986) 
Deger (1986) 
Deger (1986) 
Deger (1986) 
Deger (1986) 
Deger (1986) 
Lebovic & Ishaq 
Lebovic & Ishaq 
Lebovic & Ishaq 
Lebovic & Ishaq 
Chan (1988) 
Chan (1988) 
Chan (1988) 
8 inv; inv*y; y; GDPWGR; OCSA; OCSA*y; transfer; cap- 
exp; capexp*y; money; money*y; pop; pop*y; popgr; 
EDO; EDO*y T; aid; DEM; Xrate; COUP; OIL ; APUTS; 
War; War*Y; jr 
9 inv; inv*y; y; GDPWGR; OCSA; edu; transfers; capexp; 
capexp*y; money; money*y; pop; pop*y; popgr; popgr*y; 
AS; MS; OS; inf; SEUR; LE7; LE7*y; T; T*y; aid; aid*y; 
DEM; Xrate; COUP; COUP*y; OIL ; APUTS; agricul- 
tural land per capita (AGLPC); AGLPC*y 
10 y; GDPWGR; OCSA; edu; transfers; capexp; capexp*y; 
money; money*y; pop; pop*y; popgr; popgr*y; AS; MS; 
OS; inf; SEUR; LE7; LE7*y; T; T*y; aid; aid*y; DEM; 
Xrate; COUP; COUP*y; OIL ; APUTS; AGLPC*y 
11 inv; inv*y; y; GDPWGR; OCSA; edu; transfers; capexp; 
capexp*y; money; money*y; pop; pop*y; popgr; popgr*y; 
AS; MS; OS; inf; SEUR; T; T*y; aid; aid*y; DEM; Xrate; 
COUP; COUP*y; OIL ; APUTS; AGLPC*y 
12 inv; inv*y; y; GDPWGR; OCSA; transfers; capexp; cap- 
exp*y; money; money*y; pop; pop*y; popgr; popgr*y; 
AS; MS; OS; inf; SEUR; EDO; EDO*y; T; T*y; aid; aid*y; 
DEM; Xrate; COUP; COUP*y; OIL ; APUTS; AGLPC*y 
1 inv; popgr 
2 inv; popgr 
3 inv; popgr 
4 inv; popgr 
5 inv; popgr 
6 inv; popgr 
1 inv; y; foreign capital flows (FDI) 
2 inv; y; FDI; popgr 
3 inv; y; FDI; popgr; inf 
4 inv; y; FDI; inf 
5 inv; y; FDI 
(1987) 1 inv; popgr; merchandise exports (EXPR) 
(1987) 2 inv; popgr; EXPR 
(1987) 3 inv; popgr; EXPR 
(1987) 4 inv; popgr; EXPR 
1 FDI less milexp; Index for liransportation and Commu- 
nication facilities (TransComIndex); the rate at which 
energy-generating plants operated as a percentage of their 
installed capacity (Energy); literacy; birthrate ; the num- 
ber of military personnel per one thousand people (MP) 
2 tax burden (Tax); budget balance (BB); inf; FDI plus do- 
mestic capital formation 
3 rate of export expansion; index of the industrial compo- 
nent of its exprts 
Grobar & Porter (1989) 
Grobar & Porter (1989) 
Grobar & Porter (1989) 
Grobar & Porter (1989) 
Grobar & Porter (1989) 
Gyimah-Brempong (1989) 
Gyimah-Brempong (1989) 
Looney (1989) 
Looney (1989) 
Landau (1993) 
Landau (1993) 
Landau (1993) 
Landau (1993) 
Landau (1993) 
Landau (1993) 
2 external resources 
3 inv; y; external resources 
4 inv; y; external resources 
5 inv; y ; external resources 
1 inv; Skilled labour; Aid; export growth; Rain; timetrend 
2 inv; Skilled labour; Aid; export growth; Rain; timetrend 
1 inv; inf; avreage resource balance 
2 inv; inf; avreage resource balance 
1 milexp squared (milexp2); neighbouring countries' milexp( 
NME); Average GRy of OECD (GrYOECD); y; change 
in terms of trade ( CTOT); Debts; Life; OILS; Political 
Instability Dummy (PID) 
2 milexp2; NME; GrYOECD; y; CTOT; Debts; Life; OILS; 
PID 
3 NME 
4 NME; milexp2 
5 NME 
6 NME; milexp2 
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Study No. Estimations Other Variables 
within the study 
Landau (1993) 7 NME 
Landau (1993) 8 NME; milexp2 
Landau (1993) 9 NME 
Landau (1993) 10 NME; milexp2 
Landau (1993) 11 NME 
Landau (1993) 12 NME; milexp2 
Landau (1993) 13 NME 
Landau (1993) 14 NME; milexp2 
Landau (1993) 15 milexp2; Output to Capital Ratio (COR); GrYOECD; y; 
CTOT; Debts; Life; OILS; PID; NME 
Landau (1993) 16 inv; milexp2; COR; GrYOECD; y; CTOT; Debts; Life; 
OILS; PID; NME 
Landau (1993) 17 Central Government expenditure (CGES); milexp2; COR; 
GrYOECD; y; CTOT; Debts; Life; OILS; PID; NME 
Landau (1993) 18 edu; milexp2; COR; GrYOECD; y; CTOT; Debts; Life; 
OILS; PID; NME 
Landau (1993) 19 edu; milexp2; COR; GrYOECD; Y; CTOT; Debts; Life; 
OILS; PID; NME 
Landau (1993) 20 BT; milexp2; COR; GrYOECD; y; CTOT; Debts; Life; 
OILS; PID; NME 
Landau (1993) 21 Transfers; milexp2; GrYOECD; Y; CTOT; Debts; Life; 
OILS; PID; NME 
Landau (1993) 22 Balance trade, capital account balance & transfers (OB) 
milexp2; GrYOECD; y; CTOT; Debts; Life; OILS; PID; 
NME 
Landau (1993) 23 inv; CGES; edu; OB ; milexp2; GrYOECD; y; CTOT; 
Debts; Life; OILS; PID; NME 
Landau (1993) 24 milexp2; GrYOECD; y; CTOT; Debts; Life; OILS; PID; 
NME 
Landau (1993) 25 COR; milexp2; GrYOECD; y; CTOT; Debts; Life; OILS; 
PID; NME 
Landau (1993) 26 inv; COR; milexp2; GrYOECD; y; CTOT; Debts; Life; 
OILS; PID; NME 
Landau (1993) 27 milexp 
Landau (1993) 28 milexp2; COR 
Landau (1993) 29 milexp2; inv; COR 
Knight, et. al. (1996) 1 y, popgr, inv, edu (secondory education), tarrifs ; Africa 
Dummy (AfricaD); West Hemisphere Dummy (WestD) 
Knight, et. al. (1996) 2 y; popgr; inv; edu; Tariffs; AfricaD; WestD; WarRatio 
Knight, et. al. (1996) 3 y; popgr; inv; edu; Tariffs 
Knight, et. al. (1996) 4 y; popgr; inv; edu; Tariffs; WarRatio 
Landau (1996) 1 
Landau (1996) 2 milexp2 
Landau (1996) 3 milexp2 
Landau (1996) 4 milexp2 
Landau (1996) 5 milexp2; dummy for Japan, Austria and Finland (DDIS), 
DDIS*milexp; DDIS*milexp2 
Landau (1996) 6 DDIS; DDIS*milexp; DDIS*milexp2 
Landau (1996) 7 DDIS; DDIS*milexp; milexp2; DDIS*milexp2 
Landau (1996) 8 DDIS; DDIS*milexp; milexp2; DDIS*milexp2; Debt; 
edu; edu2; popgr; T; y; per capita product as percentage 
of US (YRe1US) ; YReIUS squared (YRe1US2) 
Landau (1996) 9 DDIS; DDIS*milexp; milexp2; DDIS*milexp2; edu; edu2; 
popgr; T; y; YRe1US; YReIUS2 
Landau (1996) 10 DDIS; DDIS*milepx; milexp2; DDIS*milexp2; edu; edu2; 
y; YRelUS; YRe1US2 
Landau (1996) 11 DDIS; DDIS*milexp; milexp2; DDIS*milexp2; y; YRe1US; 
YRe1US2 
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Continued: Summary of Variables Used in the Milexp-Growth Literature 
Study No. Estimations Other Variables 
within the study 
Brumm (1997) 1 inv; edu (secondary education); popgr; average govern- 
ment consumption ( gov); growth rate of domestic credit 
(GDC); y; growth rate of export ( Gexport); DEVEL- 
OPED84 
Brumm (1997) 2 inv; edu; popgrl; y; DISARRAY 
Antonakis (1997) 1 inv; y; y(-1); y(-2); GrY(-1); popgr 
Antonakis (1997) 2 inv; y; y(-1); y(-2); GrY(-1); popgr 
Heo & DeRouen (1998) 1 inv; popgr; growth milexp (Grmilexp); growth of non mil- 
exp (GrNonmilexp); non-milexp 
Heo & DeRouen (1998) 2 inv; popgr; Grmilexp; Grnonmilexp; non-milexp 
Heo & DeRouen (1998) 3 inv; popgr; Grmilexp; Grnonmilexp; non-milexp 
Heo & DeRouen (1998) 4 inv; popgr; Grmilexp; Grnonmilexp; non-milexp 
Heo & DeRouen (1998) 5 inv; popgr; Grmilexp; Grnonmilexp; non-milexp 
Antonakis (1999) 1 inv; GrY(-1); popgr ; export 
Antonakis (1999) 2 inv; GrY(-1); popgr ; export 
Antonakis (1999) 3 inv; GrY(-1); popgr ; export 
Antonakis (1999) 4 inv; GrY(-1); popgr ; export; dummy takes "0" between 
1960 -1973 and "I" between 1974-1993 
DeRauen (2000) 1 inv; popgr; growth of milexp and nonmil gov spending 
Heckelmen & Stroup (2001) 1 inv; y; government expenditure less milexp (Gov) ; ed- 
ucation (Edu) ; the years of life expectancy (Life) ; the 
log of the fertility rate (Fert); annual growth rate of 
the M1 money supply less the rate of growth in poten- 
tial GDP (MlGrowth); inf; Inf squared (inf2); milexp 
squared (milexp2); Interaction term milexp times GOV 
( Milexp*Gov); military perssonel as a percentage of Pop- 
ulation (MP); MP squared (MP2); interaction term MP 
times Ede (MP*Edu); democracy (Dem); Time and Coun- 
try Dummies 
Heckelmen & Stroup (2001) 2 inv; y; Gov ; Edu; Life; Fert; MlGrowth; inf; inf2; Mil- 
exp2; Ms*Gov; MP; MP2; MP*Edu; Dem ; Time Dummy 
Heckelmen & Stroup (2001) 3 Y; Inv; Gov ; Educ; Life; Fert; MlGrowth; Inf; Inf2; 
milexp2; milexp*Gov; MP; MP*2; MP*Edu; Dem; Country 
Dummy 
Heckelmen & Stroup (2001) 4 inv; y; Gov ; Edu; Life; Fert; MlGrowth; Inf; Inf2; mil- 
exp2; milexp*Gov; MP; MP2; MP*Edu; Dem; Time and 
Country Dummy 
Heckelmen & Stroup (2001) 5 inv; y; Gov ; Edu; Life; Fert; MlGrowth; Inf; Inf2; mil- 
exp2; milexp*Gov; MP; MP2; MP*Edu; Dem; time and 
country dummies 
Aizenman & Glick (2006) 1 inv; y popgr ; Edu 
Aizenman & Glick (2006) 2 threat; inv; y popgr ; Edu 
Aizenman & Glick (2006) 3 milexp*threat; threat; inv; y popgr ; Edu 
Aizenman & Glick (2006) 4 good government (goodgov); inv; y popgr ; 
Edu ; Sub- 
Saharan Africa Dummy 
Aizenman & Glick (2006) 5 milepx*goodgov; inv; y popgr ; Edu ; 
Sub-Saharan Africa 
Dummy 
Aizenman & Glick (2006) 6 milexp*threat; threat; inv; y popgr ; 
Edu 
Aizenman & Glick (2006) 7 milexp*threat; threat; inv; y popgr ; 
Edu 
Bose et. al. (2007) 1 
inv; y; initial human capital (HC); initial life expectancy 
(life); political instability (PI); tax revenue (tax) 
Bose et. al. (2007) 2 
inv; y; HC; life; PI; Tax; Initial M2 (M2) ; Initial Trade 
Ratio (TR) 
Bose et. al. (2007) 3 
inv; y; HC; Life; PI; Government education expenditure 
as a share of GDP (Edu); Government expenditure in 
transport and communication as a share of GDP (TC); 
other government expenditures (0) ; Tax; Government 
surplus/deficit as a sahre of GDP (SurpDef); M2; 
TR; 
Black Market Premium (BMP); growth rate of terms of 
trade (TT) 
Bose et. al. (2007) 4 
inv; y; HC; life; PI; Edu; TC; 0; Tax; SurpDef 
Table 2.7: Other Variables used in Milexp-Growth Literature 
Chapter 3 
Military Expenditure, Investment 
and Economic Growth: A 
Panel-Instrumental Variables 
Approach 
"Military might can facilitate economic development but at some point the 
military burden may start to act as a fetter on economic growth. " 
(Dunne, 1997), [p. 4]. 
"There are both positive (demand) and negative (supply) relationships and 
the net balance will depend on the threat influencing the demand for military 
spending and the growth potential of the economy influencing the supply side. 
As a result anything is possible; you can observe all four combinations of high 
and low growth and high and low share of military spending in GDP. " 
(Smith, 2008), [p. 58]. 
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In chapter two, utilising the fixed-effects meta analysis, it is found that the overall 
direct effect of milexp on economic growth is negative and small (I ES j< 0.25); 
however, using the random-effects meta analysis, the combined effect is found to be 
positive and very small (' ES j< 0.10). Subsequently, this chapter re-analyses the 
relationship looking into the conflict dimension. The chapter starts with considering 
how milexp can be related to conflict and then tests its effects on economic growth. 
Aizenman and Glick (2006) identify the channels through which external con- 
flict affects the level of milexp and subsequently the effect of milexp on growth. 
In the light of this assessment, Aizenman and Glick (2006) then model economic 
growth, milexp, and threat together - the growth-milexp-threat approach. Inclusion 
of threat with milexp into a growth model may, in fact, give more explanation to 
those countries with possibility of a high threat level and a high milexp. They con- 
struct a threat variable using the number of years in inter-state wars to examine 
milexp-growth relationship. Hence the threat variable used in the Aizenman and 
Glick (2006) study does not consider internal threats whereas, as discussed in the 
previous chapter, there are more intra-state wars than inter-state ones in the period 
considered (Kang and Meernik, 2005). 
However, unlike external threats, internal threats are a long-lasting problem in 
some countries. The government can either use force to solve them in the short- 
term by repressing the public, or understand the causes and produce the long term 
remedies. Politically, government may not be able to bear the costs of solving 
the conflict, as this may mean losing power, while such delays may finally bring 
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mass violence countrywide. In order to understand the causes of internal conflict, a 
profound political and economic analysis is necessary. This channel is pursued here, 
but the causes of internal threat are not the part of the analysis. ' 
Furthermore, Aizenman and Glick (2006) carry out single equation cross-section 
estimations. Deger (1986) and Dunne and Smith (2001) claim that a single equation 
may not reflect the complex issues arising between milexp and growth. They claim 
that a cross-country growth estimation suffers from omitted variable bias arising 
from country-specific effects. Considering the limitations in a single cross country 
analysis due to endogeneity and individual country effects, in this chapter we further 
develop the growth - milexp - threat approach of Aizenman and Glick (2006) and 
define a milexp equation to account for control variables, extend the time period 
and use a panel fixed-effects analysis to study the effects of milexp on growth. Next, 
we explore determinants of investment and construct an investment equation to 
complete a three-equation simultaneous model that provides a thorough examination 
of the possible effect of milexp on growth. To an extent the link between milexp and 
growth is obscure and unclear, the effect of threat and instability on investment and 
growth is an obvious one and using a threat-milexp and security-investment model 
we aim to shed light on major problems of developing countries during transition. 
This chapter proceeds as follows: we first revisit the study of Aizenman and 
Glick (2006) and replicate their results, then re-consider the determinants of milexp. 
Based on the Aizenman and Glick (2006) study and the determinants of milexp we 
next develop our empirical specifications and explain the methodology and data. 
The empirical analysis is then carried out and finally we present a summary and 
'In subsequent chapter an internal instability variable is built and possible determinants are 
empirically investigated. 
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some concluding remarks. 
3.2 The AG Study Revisited: Robustness of Mil- 
itary Expenditure, External Threat and Eco- 
nomic Growth Approach 
Aizenman and Glick (2006) (AG henceforth) look at the security aspect of milexp 
in relation to economic growth and suggest that the previous findings differ widely 
as a result of a non-linear relationship between milexp and growth. In an exten- 
sion of a Barro-type growth specification, milexp and threat are included alongside 
other common explanatory variables and assuming a non-linear relationship between 
milexp and growth: any hostile action from outside potentially puts the country's 
security at risk; therefore the degree of security is related to the level of threat and 
as a result a higher level of milexp is the likely outcome. 
The threat variable accounts only for international disputes and wars, hence 
they argue that a more rigorous threat variable should consider internal wars in 
addition to external ones. There are a number of other caveats and criticisms of 
AG's growth-milexp-threat approach, in particular with regard to the data points 
and the econometric specification. Therefore in this chapter we aim to refine the 
model with further improvements of statistical specification, method and 
broader 
and up-to-date data. 
AG investigate the non-linear interaction between economic growth and milexp 
by testing the following econometric specification; 
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gy = al mil + a2 (mil) (thr) + a3 thr + /3X, al < 0, a3 < 0, a2 >0 (3.1) 
where, gy is the annual average real per capita GDP growth for the period of 1989- 
1998; mil is the average of the ratio of nominal milexp to nominal GDP over the 
period 1989-1998; thr is threat, estimated as the number of years a country was at 
war during the period of 1970 to 1998; (mil)(thr) is the product of mil and thr; 
and X is a set of control variables: i. e. initial education (leduc), labour growth rate 
(gpop), investment (inv), and the initial GDP per head (lgdp). 
AG assume that in the presence of threat, milexp leads to an increase in growth 
hence the relationship is positive. They find the estimated threshold value of threat 
to be 3.5 and when threat falls below this value, an increase in milexp has a negative 
effect on economic growth. Formally, the threashold value is derived from equation 
(3.1) as: 
Ogy 
= al + a2thr <0 if thr < -a2 ömil al 
Note that it is assumed a2 >0 and al <0 thus ä2 is always positive. 
Using OLS estimation, a cross section analysis is conducted. There are three 
regressions; the first regression includes only mil variable and the standard set of 
control variables: investment, initial GDP per capita, initial level of education and 
population growth. In this regression the coefficient of milexp is found to be negative 
but statistically insignificant. In the second regression the external threat variable is 
included alongside the milexp variable. The coefficient of mil is larger in magnitude 
but remain negative and still insignificant. The threat variable is significant and 
positive at the 5% level, which contradicts with their a priori assumptions. Finally 
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they include the product of a milexp and threat variable (mil)(thr) in their estima- 
tion to account for a non-linear relationship. Then the milexp and external threat 
variable has a negative coefficient, which confirms their assumption of the coeffi- 
cient on milexp and external threat being negative. However, only the coefficient 
of milexp is significant at 1%. Further, (mil) (thr) has a positive coefficient and is 
significant at 5% and this finding also confirms their hypothesis. 
They also look at the issue of corruption, milexp and growth. The conjecture 
they test is "the impact of milexp on growth is a non-linear function of corruption 
and milexp in the presence of corruption reduces growth". To carry out the analysis, 
a good government variable (goodgov) is used to proxy corruption which is an index 
number ranging from 1 to 10,10 representing the least corrupt (or good) govern- 
ment. The findings show that having less corruption has a positive effect on growth, 
subsequently milexp and (goodgov) interaction term (mil) (goodgov) is included. Es- 
timation result reveals that mil and (mil) (goodgov) variables are significant at 1% 
level and the interaction variable is positive as expected. 
Overall, their results attest that if milexp is caused by security reasons then it 
has a positive effect on growth and if it is motivated by rent seeking behaviour it is 
harmful to economic activity. Below we re-visit their study, re-construct their data, 
and then extend the data period in order to assess the robustness of their findings. 
Replicating and Extending the study of AG 
We re-estimate equation 3.1. The results are shown in table 3.1 and 3.2. In table 
3.1 column I to III show the results of replicated estimation for 79 countries. 
Overall, the standard control variables; natural logarithm of initial level of GDP 
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(lgdp); investment as a percentage of GDP (inv); and initial years of male schooling 
(leduc) are significant and have the expected signs with an adjusted R- squared 
around 0.35. Three estimations are carried out as in the AG study; the first one 
includes milexp and standard control variables as explanatory variables. The results 
show that milexp has a positive effect but is statistically insignificant. The second 
estimation incorporates the threat variable in addition to milexp. The results show 
that milexp becomes negative but is still insignificant. This result does not change 
when we add the product of milexp and threat to the estimation. Therefore it can be 
concluded that there is a negative relationship between growth and milexp. However 
in the presence of threat, milexp has a positive effect on growth if threat exceeds a 
threshold value, which confirms AG's conjecture. Further unlike the findings of AG, 
the milexp variable is insignificant in our estimations. These may have happened 
due to two reasons. The first reason is the loss of 12 observations: the reduction 
in sample size to 79 from 91 may have been important for our estimations because 
the estimation results are found to be very sensitive to sample size (Dunne and 
Smith, 2001). These 12 countries include the lowest spenders on milexp i. e. Iceland 
(0), Barbados (0.7), Jamaica (0.8), Costa Rica (0.7), moreover the threat variable 
for these 12 counties is 0. The second reason may be due to the revisions of data 
although the time period and the datasets constructed exactly the same way as AG's 
paper. 2 
As indicated previously, in replicating the results of the AG study the same data 
sources and time periods are used. The milexp data, in particular, is taken from 
the World Bank - World Development Indicators 
(WDI) and AG too assemble their 
data from this source. However, in re-constructing the data from WDI there are 
'The summary statistics for these estimations are given in table 3.3. 
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Military Expenditure External Threat and Growth 
Dependent variable: The average real per capita GDP growth over 1989-98 
Model I II III IV V VI 
Observations 79 79 79 91 91 91 
Constant 11.52 11.14 11.59 12.11 11.83 14.52 
(2.85) (2.82) (3.03) (3.39) (3.31) (3.49) 
mil 0.1 -0.01 -0.07 (0.14) (0.15) (0.21) 
(mil) (thr) 0.03 
(0.06) 
extthr 0.22 0.13 0.35 -0.15 (0.13) (0.23) (0.15) (0.29) 
mil-4G -0.09 -0.26 -0.52 
(0.15) (0.16) (0.2) 
(mil-AG) (thr) 0.14 
(0.07) 
leduc 0.83 0.79 0.79 0.76 0.73 0.75 
(0.37) (0.36) (0.36) (0.44) (0.43) (0.42) 
lgdp -1.43 -1.36 -1.40 -1.46 -1.39 -1.66 
(0.36) (0.36) (0.38) (0.43) (0.42) (0.44) 
inv 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.14 0.13 0.15 
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
gpop -0.80 -0.78 -0.80 -0.83 -0.78 -0.89 
(0.3) (0.3) (0.3) (0.35) (0.34) (0.34) 
R2 R 0.33 0.35 0.34 0.24 0.27 0.3 
S. e. e (1.82) (1.79) (1.81) (2.24) (2.18) (2.13) 
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. (mi1AG) is the data obtained from 
Aizenman and Glick (2006). 
Table 3.1: Replicated AG model with re-constructed data for the same time period 
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12 countries data series are missing, which originally appear in the AG data. To 
assess whether losing 12 observations, or revision of the data, might have caused the 
differences between our results and the AG's results, we use two milexp data series; 
AG's original milexp data constructed by the authors from WDI3 and the data we 
construct from the same source and period. Using AG's milexp series with the rest 
of the data re-constructed we reach the full sample of 91 countries as in the AG's 
study. A detailed comparisons of the AG's data and re-constructed data is given in 
table 3.3. 
Columns IV to VI in table 3.1 report the results for the sample of 91 countries, 
in which the milexp data is taken from AG's data set and the model is re-estimated. 
This gives very similar results to the one reported in AG's paper. Milexp and threat 
both have negative signs and their product is positive. Milexp and (mil) (thr) are 
significant at 1% and 5% respectively and threat (thr) is insignificant. However the 
threshold value in our estimation is 1.07 against 3.5 in AG's. Therefore the impact 
of milexp on economic growth ranges from -0.015 to 1.11 in our estimation against 
-0.56 to 0.88 in AG's. These results acknowledge that 
losing 12 observations has 
played an important role in our estimation. 
Going one step further, the data period is extended and the model is re-estimated 
using AG's methodology. Table 3.2 illustrates the results of extended time period 
(1970 - 2000). In this estimation, threat is calculated 
from 1970 to 1987 and mil- 
exp is averaged over the period of 1988 - 2000, since previous and present threat 
should generate future levels of milexp. In comparisons with table 3.1 there is an 
improvement in the adjusted R- squared, the explanatory power is around 0.54 
3We thank to the authors for providing their original data. 
3.2 The AG Study Revisited: Robustness of Military Expenditure, External Threat 
and Economic Growth Approach 66 
and standard control variables are significant and have expected signs. In these 
estimations leduc is averaged over the period of 1970 to 2000 where in table 3.1 
leduc is only the initial level of education, which is the 1975 value. Finally table 3.2 
shows the extended time period estimations with 74 observations. Models I and II 
show the coefficient of milexp to be positive but insignificant. However, inclusion of 
the product of milexp and threat variable gives a negative but insignificant milexp 
coefficient. The coefficient of threat is persistently positive but insignificant. These 
results need a careful interpretation, in particular, noting that in AG's study the 
average growth rate is the dependent variable and it is averaged over 10 years, which 
is a very short time period. Subsequently, a cross-section analysis is conducted with 
a longer data period and the findings of the AG study could not be re-produced. 
Hence, it could be argued that the AG's results are specific to a certain time period 
and specification defined. This discussion is pursued in great detail in the subsequent 
sections. 
Having re-estimated the model using the same methodology but with extended 
data we could not reach the same inferences with AG. The results seems to be sensi- 
tive to data period chosen or there are some crucial caveats. In the next sections of 
this chapter we draw upon the AG model with further extensions and modifications 
to their original model. 
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Military Expenditure, External Threat and Growth 
Dependent variable: Real GDP per capita growth averaged from 1970-2000 
Model: I II III 
Observations: 74 74 74 
Constant: 12.10 12.01 12.38 
(1.95) (1.94) (2.07) 
mil_88_00 0.08 0.04 -0.01 
(0.08) (0.09) (0.13) 
thr_70_87 0.11 0.05 
(0.09) (0.15) 
(mil) (thr) 0.02 
(0.04) 
leduc_70_00 0.84 0.77 0.75 
(0.33) (0.33) (0.34) 
lgdp_70 -1.55 -1.52 -1.55 
(0.24) (0.24) (0.24) 
inv_70_00 0.14 0.14 0.14 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
gpop_70_00 -0.76 -0.79 -0.81 
(0.21) (0.21) (0.22) 
R2 0.56 0.56 0.56 
S. e. e (1.11) (1.10) (1.11) 
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. 
Table 3.2: AG model with extended time period using cross-section data 
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Examining the Determinants of Military Expenditure 
As previously discussed, government expenditure has been found to have a negative 
impact on economic growth (Barro, 1991). The justification for this argument is 
that an increase in government spending results in lowering private investment - i. e. 
the crowding-out effect. This, in turn, affects accumulation of physical and human 
capital negatively for the future periods. Subsequently, it leads to a low capital 
to labour ratio and that further lowers economic growth through reduction in per 
capita output. In view of the neoclassical growth model this happens only during 
transition. In a balanced growth path, growth is influenced only by the growth rate 
of technology. 
Milexp is also a part of government spending and it is a pure public good, 
therefore it is non-rival (one person can benefit without limiting the use of it by 
anyone else) and non-excludable (a good cannot be prohibited to any person from 
enjoying the benefits), see Miles et al. (2003) and Stiglitz (2000). Since it cannot 
be provided privately, it is the government's duty to provide security for the people. 
Explicitly, the government allocates funds to the military that will build a strong 
army to protect against threat posed internally or externally to the existence of the 
nation (Collier and Hoeffler, 2002). 
As indicated above, demand for milexp is supposed to be security related; how- 
ever, perceptions of security may vary across countries. Specifically, countries' 
strategic factors play an important role in shaping the current security 
level of each 
country. The main strategic factors are geo-political and regional 
location, historical 
and political disputes, democracy level, ethnic minorities, and the 
level of develop- 
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ment. In some cases security may not be the main motivation in determining the 
level of milexp. The rent seeking behaviour of self-interested political/regional/ in- 
ternational powers may cause excessive milexp that can be very costly to countries' 
economic progress. Therefore using control variables for milexp may actually help 
to segregate the high milexp caused by the rent seeking behaviour of groups/parties 
with vested-interests and strategic positions. In addition, it is still arguable as to 
whether a high level of milexp will have a deterring effect on possible threats (Collier 
and Hoeffler, 2002) . 
There are two main studies that have thoroughly looked at the determinants of 
milexp using more recent data and test the potential variables that influence milexp; 
Collier and Hoeffler (2002) and Dunne and Perlo-Freeman (2003). 
Collier and Hoeffler (2002) highlight the importance of regional peace and how 
the neighbours' milexp may influence the home country's milexp - one country's 
milexp may be a threat to another country/countries. They look at the possible 
effect of external and internal conflicts on milexp. Their findings show internal 
conflict is an important motivation of milexp and milexp is not effective in reducing 
the risk of internal conflict. They use data from 1960-1999 and conduct a pooled data 
analysis to test for the determinants of milexp assuming that the need for security 
leads to a demand for milexp. This is related to the threat posed by rebellions 
(i. e. possible civil wars), neighbouring countries (arms races) and wars (civil or 
international wars). Collier and Hoeffler (2002) find international and civil wars, 
internal and external threat and neighbouring country's military spending increases 
the home country's military spending. Figure 3.1 shows this positive relationship 
between milexp and the neighbouring country's milexp. During the last 41 years, 
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trends have only changed slightly. The graphs are also important in comparisons of 
pre - Cold War and post - Cold War times. 
They also investigate whether milexp deters rebellion's action and find no de- 
terring evidence of milexp. Besides, the civil war estimation shows that the level 
of GDP and the GDP growth rate have a negative effect and the population has 
a positive effect on civil wars. Drawing upon this point, the endeavour of govern- 
ments should be, if possible, to avoid any sort of war and if possible to spend more 
on defence, but this would not be the ultimate solution. The governing argument 
should be 'how could we reduce the demand for milexp'? 
Dunne and Perlo-Freeman (2003) use data from 98 developing countries for the 
period of 1981-1997 to estimate a demand function for milexp using static and 
dynamic panel estimations. They argue that the end of the Cold War changed the 
demand for milexp and "cross section data failed to pick up important time series 
effects". Therefore to see whether there is any structural change in the demand 
equation after the Cold War, they employe a panel fixed-effects model and claim 
that the results corroborate their hypothesis that `the post-Cold War period changed 
the demand for milexp'. Further they also find evidence that external and civil wars 
and potential enemies' milexp are the major determinants of milexp. Population and 
democracy influence milexp negatively and income levels do not have a significant 
effect on milexp. In agreement with many other recent studies they also postulate 
that the end of the Cold War has changed the demand for milexp and since the 
1990's it is influenced more by internal factors than external ones. 
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Figure 3.1: Military Expenditure and Neighbouring Countries' Military 
Expenditure 
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3.3 Military Expenditure, Threat and Economic 
Growth 
In section 3.2 of this chapter we have critically analysed the growth-milexp-threat 
approach proposed by AG and re-visited their study with more recent data to see 
whether their results still hold. It is shown that even though the same methodology 
is followed, the results indicate that there are some important differences. 
Here, a comprehensive empirical specification to evaluate the milexp - growth 
nexus is proposed. Consequently, in this section we further extend AG's approach by 
defining the determinants of the milexp equation and using this equation to identify 
the instruments for a two stage-least squares estimation where the growth equation 
will be used as the main structural equation. The next section of this chapter goes 
through in detail the methodology and results. 
3.3.1 Methodology 
The growth specification originally proposed by AG is used to define the baseline 
model. ' Having considered possible extensions of this model we identify the follow- 
ing; 
" Demand for milexp needs to be investigated empirically to analyse control 
variables for military expenditure; we use the Collier and Hoeffler (2002) study, 
in which they looked at the determinants of military expenditure. 
" In the context of economic growth, milexp may have an adverse effect on other 
4Their model has been discussed in great detail in the preceding section. 
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economic variables that are important for economic development. Among 
these variables, especially investment and education are are considered to be 
crucial for economic growth. Thus, the complex interaction between these 
variables makes it inappropriate to use a single equation framework, see Deger 
(1986). 
Therefore we employ a simultaneous equation model with a panel fixed-effects esti- 
mator. The two equations model is as follows; 
gyz, t= coo + ai mill, t+ cx2 (mil (intthr)i t+ a3 intthrr, t 
+a4 (rnZl)(extthr)i t+ a5 extthrr, t + a6linigdpi, t + a7popgrr, t 
+a8invi, t + a9tedi, t + qi + uit 
(3.2) 
mi l i, t= 'yo + 71 NMEi, t+ 'Y2 DI 
WZ, t+ 73 D CWZ, t+ 'y4 intthr2, t+ -y4 extthrr, t 
+75lnpOpi, t +'Ysingdpi, t + 77dem2, t + µi + vit 
(3.3) 
Each variable has a country index, i and time index t. It is assumed that al < 
0, 
a2>0, a3<O, a4>0and a5<ft 
Where; 
" `gy' is annual real GDP per capita growth over 
1960-2000. The data is taken 
from the Penn World Table v 6.1 (PWT v 6.1), in constant dollars using Chain 
Index, 
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" `mil' is military expenditure as share of GDP from 1960-2000, taken from 
various SIPRI yearbooks, 
" `intthr' is estimated by summing the years being at civil war during 1955-1995. 
The data is taken from COW (Correlates of War) Intra-State War Participants 
V 3-0 data set and MEPV (Major Episodes of Political Violence) 1946-2002, 
" `(mil)(intthr)' is the interaction term between mil and iritthr to account for a 
non-linear relationship, 
" `extthr' is estimated by summing the years being at international war dur- 
ing 1955-1995. The data is taken from COW Militarized Interstate Disputes 
(v3.02) data set. An armed conflict is defined as war if there are 1000 or more 
battle deaths in a year. 
" `(mil) (extthr)' is the interaction term between mil and extthr to account for a 
non-linear relationship, 
" `DIW' is a dummy variable taking a value of one if the country experienced 
international war during 1960 - 2000. This dataset is constructed by using 
COW Militarized Interstate Disputes (v3.02) with fatality level set at 6 (i. e. 
total dead is 1000 and over) and hostility level 5 (i. e. war), 
" `DCW' is a dummy variable taking a value of one if the country experienced 
civil war during 1960 - 2000. We use COW Intra-State War Participants V 
3-0, in which they tag war type and we use tag 4, which is civil war for the 
control of central government, 
" `dem' is an index ranging from 0 to 10, measuring the degree of democracy 
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in each country (10 being more democratic). It is taken from the Polity IV 
database. The democracy variable is averaged over 1960 - 2000, 
" `NME' is neighbouring countries' military expenditure (NME). We use SIPRI 
milexp data and COW Contiguity data to construct the NME. Each country's 
neighbouring countries' milexp is added and divided by their total number of 
neighbours, 
" `inv' is the share of real investment in real GDP, taken from PWTv6.1, from 
1960 - 2000, 
" `popgr' is population growth from 1960 - 2000, taken from PWTv6.1, 
" `lnpop' is the natural logarithm of population from 1960 - 2000, taken from 
PWTv6.1, 
" `ingdp' is the natural logarithm of GDP per capita from 1960 - 2000, taken 
from PWTv6.1, 
" `linigdp' is the natural logarithm of GDP per capita in 1960 for cross - country 
estimations. In panel data estimations: when t=1 (i. e. the other variables are 
averaged from 1960 to 1965) we take initial level as 1960. However, for all 
other sub-periods we use the year proceeding the start at the sub-period e. g. 
1965 for 1966-1970,1970 for 1971-1975 etc. The data is taken from PWTv6.1, 
" `ted' is the of total number of years of schooling at primary, secondary and 
higher levels for males and females aged 25 and over, using the Barro-Lee data 
set. 5 
'In the AG study initial level of education for males used only to proxy the level of human 
capital, but our preferred variable for human capital is `ted', the total numbers of years in school 
for male and female. 
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The econometric specification needs to be chosen carefully, considering how the 
results of earlier work differ from one to another. It is noted by Dunne and Smith 
(2001) that the results obtained in the empirical analysis of milepx, investment and 
growth, are highly sensitive to the choice of estimator and the period chosen. Also, 
they draw attention to the difficulty of estimating the effect of very small changes 
in milexp on growth. Consequently, the results among alternative estimators and 
periods vary substantially. 
Dunne and Smith (2001) carry out an empirical investigation of possible linkages 
between milexp, economic growth and investment using data from 28 countries for 
the period 1960-1997. In order to estimate the effect of milexp on investment and 
growth empirically, they use various econometric models, namely pooled OLS; fixed 
effects (FE); random coefficients model (RCM); and vector autoregression (VAR). In 
the pooled OLS estimation there is a negative relationship between milexp and in- 
vestment irrespective of whether using data from 1961-1975 or for the whole sample, 
1960-1997. In the FE and RCM they find a positive effect of milexp on investment 
in whole period but a negative effect for the earlier period. For the growth equation, 
the results are found to be sensitive to the change in estimators too; in the one-way 
and the two-way fixed effect estimates there is a negative relationship between mil- 
exp and growth while in the RCM there is a positive effect. Finally they use VAR 
estimates to test for causal relationships among milexp, growth and investment and 
find no connection. 
In this study we employ the following estimation methods; OLS, simultaneous 
equations methods (SEM), and panel data fixed effects. OLS estimations are carried 
out to be able to compare with AG's results and to see the long run relation of milexp 
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and growth. We apply a two-stage least squares regression (TSLS) to equation (3.2) 
to take into account possible endogeneity problems (Deger, 1986). The endogeneity 
means that milexp is correlated with the error term in (3.2) and the inferences 
drawn from OLS estimation will not be valid (Wooldridge, 2002). Therefore we 
define equation (3.3) using earlier studies on demand for milexp to generate our 
instruments. 
Although Deger and Sen (1983) argue that milexp is determined by strategic 
factors and economic factors do not play an important role, we consider the fact that 
during the last 40 years there have been more internal wars; therefore it may also 
be the case that economic factors might have been an important issue as discussed 
in Dunne and Perlo-Freeman (2001), Murdoch and Sandler (2001) and Kang and 
Meernik (2005). 
Accordingly, in the demand for milexp equation, we consider the level of GDP, 6 
which is positive but insignificant, see table 3.4. Murdoch and Sandler (2002) show 
that war at home would affect the neighbouring counties negatively and may, as 
a result, increase their milexp to be able to protect their territories from possible 
migration problems or danger of war. Based on this argument we use neighbouring 
countries' milexp as the control variable in the milexp equation and we expect it to 
have a positive effect on milexp. 
Kang and Meernik (2005) draw attention to the aftermath of civil wars and their 
collateral damage on the economy as well as growth. Occurrence of civil war can 
damage countries' economic soundness and regaining the economic confidence may 
take time. The government may maintain its milexp at high levels to protect its 
6See table 3.4 for the detailed results. 
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nation against a high risk of renewed civil war. Arguably, one might expect that 
as they regain confidence and engage more in economic activity, the level of milexp 
should decrease moderately. There should be some optimal level that is related 
to their threat level at each stage. If, however, the motivation of high milexp is 
rent seeking behaviour of interested parties, we need to segregate this from security- 
related demand for milexp. Therefore we use the democracy level to control for 
this type of situation. One can expect that if the type of regime is democratic, the 
government cannot increase the level of milexp without informing and convincing 
the public with well-explained reasons for the rise. 7 
Considering the limitation of OLS estimation in terms of capturing individual 
country effects in the growth equation and the important time effect in the milexp 
equation, we employ a panel data-fixed effect estimate; see Islam (1995), Dunne and 
Perlo-Freeman (2003), and Collier and Hoeffler (2002) among others for discussion 
on this issue. 
We use data from various sources and our data set comprises 87 countries. 8 In 
the cross-country analysis we use averages from 1960-2000. In panel data we have 
eight five-year periods, 1960-65,1966-70, - "" , 1996-2000. 
That is, when the time 
dimension, (t), equals one we have averaged the data from 1960 - 1965, only this 
will be a 6-year average, the rest are 5-year averages. The reason we average over 
5-year periods is to reduce the business cycle effects and it may also be too short to 
use annual data for growth analysis (Islam, 1995). Except for the threat variable, 
the data length is 41 years starting from 1960. Due to the way threat is defined, 
7See figure 2.2, which illustrates milexp, growth, democracy and threat for countries in our 
sample, they are all in 5 years-averages for each point. 
8For descriptive statistics and details on data refer to appendix 3.6. 
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there is no threat variable for the first period, when t=1. Therefore we use 1955- 
1959 to be able obtain the preceding years involvement in war and construct a value 
for the first period threat variable. 
3.3.2 Empirical Results 
This section provides the findings of the empirical model specified by equation (3.2) 
using the various estimators. Prior to the discussion of these findings, we present 
the results of the determinants of milexp, that is specified by equation (3.3) using a 
panel fixed-effects estimate. Then, in analysing the milexp-growth nexus empirically, 
two data structures are used; namely cross-section and panel data. The results are 
tabled in 3.5 to 3.8. We expect to find a negative relationship between milexp and 
growth, that is ai < 0, but positive relationships through the interaction terms with 
external and internal threat variables, 02> 0 and a4 > 0. 
Determinants of Milexp: 
The demand for milexp is specified as equation (3.3) and estimated using a panel 
fixed-effects model. Table 3.4 shows the results. The findings show that neigh- 
bouring countries' milexp, democracy, external threat, civil and international war 
dummies have important implications for the determination of the level of milexp. 
Whereas, the level of income, GDP, population and internal threat are statistically 
insignificant; income level and internal threat variables are positive. 
Neighbouring countries' milexp and democracy variables require a careful exam- 
ination. As expected, neighbouring countries' milexp is positive and significant at a 
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1% level, whereas the democracy variable is negative and statistically significant at 
1% level. These findings confirm that a country's decision of milexp is influenced by 
the political regime of that government as well as regional trends. Furthermore, any 
given country sees the other countries' milexp as a threat and thus they respond by 
increasing their milexp. 
Cross-Country Results of the Milexp-Growth Nexus: 
Table 3.5 illustrates the results of the growth equation using an OLS estimator. 
There are seven estimations in this table. Standard control variables are used in 
the growth equations; investment, initial level of income, population growth and 
education, are significant and have expected signs. Overall, the estimated specifi- 
cations have an adjusted R- square about 0.61. Investment and education have a 
positive and statistically significant effect on growth, whilst population growth and 
initial level of income have a negative impact. The first column shows the results 
when including milexp and standard control variables in which milexp is positive 
and significant at the 5% level. However, when external threat (extthr) is included in 
the model estimated; milexp persists its positive effect, but is insignificant (p-value 
0.109). Extthr is also positive and insignificant. In column III of table 3.5, the 
interaction term of (extthr) and milexp is included but the results do not change 
and the coefficient of the interaction term is negative. 
In comparisons with the results of AG, we find contradictory results in terms of 
threat and milexp. This may have happened as a result of having averaged over 41 
years, so that the data does not exactly correspond to milexp and threat interaction 
for certain periods of war as AG used a 10-year period. It should be noted that 
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Determinants of Military Expenditure 
Dependent variable: Milexp as 
Method: Panel - Fixed Effect 
Observations: 
a percentage of GDP 
696 
Coefficient P-values 
Constant 4.69 0.05 
(2.37) 
NME 0.309 0.00 
(0.05) 
Dem -0.092 0.00 
(0.03) 
Extthr 0.642 0.00 
(0.11) 
Intthr 0.065 0.42 
(0.08) 
DCW 0.657 0.03 
(0.30) 
DIW 0.653 0.09 
(0.38) 
Lngdp 0.14 0.54 
(0.23) 
Lnpop -0.397 0.15 
(0.28) 
R2 0.74 
S. e. e 1.54 
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. 
Table 3.4: Demand for Military Expenditure 
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Military Expenditure, Threat and Growth 
Dependent variable: GDP growth averaged from 
Model I II III IV 
Observations: 87 87 87 87 
1960-2000 
V VI 
87 87 
VII 
87 
Constant 10.81 10.7 10.47 10.78 10.04 10.89 10.61 
(1.8) (1.82) (1.87) (1.82) (1.88) (1.81) (1.82) 
mil 0.104 0.089 0.113 0.084 0.168 0.103 0.127 
(0.05) (0.05) (0.07) (0.06) (0.08) (0.05) (0.05) 
extthr 0.035 0.074 0.04 0.107 
(0.06) (0.09) (0.06) (0.09) 
(mil) (extthr) -0.008 -0.016 
(0.01) (0.01) 
intthr -0.018 0.039 -0.016 0.038 
(0.02) (0.05) (0.02) (0.05) 
(mil) (intthr) -0.025 -0.022 
(0.02) (0.02) 
inv 0.107 0.107 0.106 0.103 0.105 0.104 0.107 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
linigdp -1.384 -1.364 -1.34 -1.368 -1.276 -1.39 -1.343 
(0.22) (0.22) (0.23) (0.22) (0.23) (0.22) (0.22) 
popgr -0.696 -0.697 -0.692 -0.683 -0.686 -0.684 -0.7 
(0.19) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) 
lted 1.022 0.996 0.985 1.017 0.86 1.044 0.912 
(0.27) (0.28) (0.28) (0.28) (0.30) (0.28) (0.29) 
R2 0.62 0.61 0.61 0.61 0.61 0.61 0.62 
S. e. e 1.07 1.07 1.08 1.08 1.07 1.07 1.07 
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. 
lted is the natural logarithm of total number of years of education (ted). 
83 
Table 3.5: The milexp-threat-growth approach: Cross-Section OLS Method 
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during war periods, milexp increases sharply and after the war period it may drop, 
which may not happen immediately so it does not follow a smooth pattern, see 
(Collier and Hoeffler, 2002). Therefore when we average over such a lengthy period, 
milexp might not correspond to the threat variable. Thus using 5-year averages in 
a panel analysis might produce more accurate results. 
In column IV of table 3.5, we include internal and external threat together, 
however both are insignificant. Milexp is positive and insignificant (p-value 0.13), 
the other variables are significant and are of the expected sign. Subsequently, we add 
interaction terms, (mil (intthr) and (mil (extthr) in column V of table 3.5. Both 
interaction terms are negative and insignificant however milexp is significant at 5% 
and positive. 
The final two columns, (VI and VII), of table 3.5, show the relationship between 
growth, milexp and internal threat. When internal threat is used as an explanatory 
variable, milexp is positive and significant at the 5% level, and internal threat is 
negative but insignificant. Adding the interaction term (mil) (intthr) does not change 
the results much and the interaction term is still negative and insignificant and 
milexp is positive. When we switch to TSLS using cross-country data there is not 
much to gain. The results, reported in table 3.6, show milexp to be positive and 
significant but the interaction terms are negative and insignificant. This may confirm 
that milexp does not correspond to threat variables. 
Panel Data Results of the Milexp-Growth Nexus: 
In the panel (or cross-section time series) analysis, we have 87 countries and 8 
time periods, the data is averaged over non-overlapping, five-year periods, creating 
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Military Expenditure, Threat and Growth: Simultaneous Equations 
Dependent variable: GDP 
Model: I 
Observations: 87 
growth averaged from 1960-2000 
II III IV V 
87 87 87 87 
VI 
87 
VII 
87 
Constant 11.11 11.25 10.31 11.28 9.56 11.19 10.75 
(1.85) (1.91) (1.91) (1.91) (1.96) (1.86) (1.86) 
mil 0.197 0.223 0.237 0.215 0.345 0.194 0.23 
(0.07) (0.09) (0.11) (0.09) (0.12) (0.07) (0.07) 
extthr -0.029 0.116 -0.023 0.165 
(0.07) (0.10) (0.07) (0.10) 
(mil) (extthr) -0.023 -0.037 
(0.02) (0.02) 
intthr -0.012 0.079 -0.014 0.069 
(0.02) (0.05) (0.02) (0.05) 
(mil) (intthr) -0.043 -0.033 
(0.02) (0.02) 
inv 0.101 0.1 0.101 0.098 0.101 0.098 0.104 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
linigdp -1.406 -1.426 -1.329 -1.426 -1.219 -1.411 -1.34 
(0.22) (0.23) (0.23) (0.23) (0.24) (0.22) (0.23) 
popgr -0.813 -0.828 -0.757 -0.814 -0.766 -0.8 -0.824 
(0.20) (0.21) (0.20) (0.21) (0.20) (0.20) (0.20) 
lted 0.959 0.972 0.948 0.987 0.719 0.979 0.778 
(0.28) (0.29) (0.29) (0.29) (0.31) (0.28) (0.31) 
R2 0.6 0.58 0.59 0.58 0.59 0.6 0.6 
S. e. e 1.09 1.11 1.1 1.11 1.11 1.1 1.09 
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. 
lted is the natural logarithm of total number of years of education (ted). 
Table 3.6: The milexp-threat-growth approach: Cross-Section, Two-Stage Least 
Squares Method 
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a balanced panel of 696 observations. Table 3.7 depicts the results of the panel 
fixed effect estimation. Unlike the cross-section analysis, milexp is negative and 
significant at 1% throughout the estimations. Although the interaction terms are 
positive they are statistically insignificant. Threat variables are negative but they 
are also insignificant. Investment and initial GDP are significant at 1% and have 
the expected signs; however population growth and education are both insignificant. 
Adjusted R- squared value is about 0.35. In general, qualitatively, milexp, threat 
and the interaction terms confirm AG's conjecture but quantitatively the threat and 
interaction terms do not appear to have a strong relationship in growth estimation. 
We now turn to the panel fixed-effects with TSLS and the results are shown in 
table 3.8. The first column of table 3.8 shows the results of equation (3.2) using a 
panel fixed-effects model with a TSLS estimator. The instruments are decided by 
estimating equation (3.3) using panel fixed-effects. ' Estimations are done sequen- 
tially adding external, internal threats and their interaction terms with milexp. As 
it can be seen from column V of table 3.8, milexp is significant at the 1% level and 
negative, both external threat and internal threat are negative and significant at the 
5% level. Interaction terms, (mil) (extthr) and (mil (intthr), are positive and signif- 
icant at the 1% and the 5% levels respectively. Generally, investment and initial 
level of income, GDP, are significant at the 1% level and are of the expected signs. 
Population growth and education are both negative and insignificant. 
Based on our estimation in table 3.8, external threat has a more negative impact 
9The result of equation (3.3) using panel fixed effect is shown in table 3.4. Which shows that the 
neighbouring countries milexp, external and internal threats, civil and international war dummies 
and level of income have positive influence on the home country's milxep and democracy and 
population have a negative effect. The adjusted R- squared value is very high - about 0.75. 
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Military Expenditure, Threat and Growth: Panel - Fixed Effects 
Dependent variable: GDP growth 
Model: I II III IV V VI VII 
Observations: 696 696 696 696 696 696 696 
Constant 23.63 23.54 23.63 24.05 24.06 24.13 24.08 
(3.18) (3.19) (3.20) (3.23) (3.24) (3.23) (3.23) 
mil -0.206 -0.213 -0.232 -0.207 -0.234 -0.2 -0.207 
(0.06) (0.06) (0.08) (0.06) (0.08) (0.06) (0.06) 
extthr 0.064 -0.016 0.069 -0.019 
(0.18) (0.26) (0.18) (0.26) 
(mil) (extthr) 0.009 0.010 
(0.02) (0.02) 
intthr -0.119 -0.242 -0.117 -0.235 
(0.12) (0.21) (0.12) (0.21) 
(mil) (intthr) 0.039 0.036 
(0.05) (0.05) 
inv 0.157 0.157 0.156 0.157 0.157 0.158 0.158 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
linigdp -2.873 -2.86 -2.858 -2.933 -2.924 -2.946 -2.942 
(0.43) (0.43) (0.43) (0.44) (0.44) (0.43) (0.43) 
popgr -0.259 -0.259 -0.258 -0.271 -0.259 -0.271 -0.262 
(0.20) (0.20) (0.21) (0.21) (0.21) (0.21) (0.21) 
ted 0.098 0.097 0.092 0.124 0.122 0.125 0.129 
(0.13) (0.13) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) 
R 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.35 
S. e. e 2.5 2.51 2.51 2.51 2.51 2.5 
2.51 
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. 
Table 3.7: The milexp-threat-growth approach: Panel Fixed-Effects 
Method 
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Military Expenditure, Threat and Growth: Panel - Fixed Effects with TSLS 
Dependent variable: GDP growth 
Model: I II III 
Observations: 696 696 696 
Constant 24.38 24.19 25.09 
(3.29) (3.56) (3.48) 
mil -0.568 -0.983 -1.000 (0.15) (0.23) (0.22) 
extthr 0.72 -0.57 (0.28) (0.31) 
(mil) (extthr) 0.127 
(0.04) 
intthr 
(mil) (intthr) 
IV 
696 
24.16 
(3.61) 
-0.987 
(0.24) 
0.722 
(0.28) 
0.007 
(0.14) 
inv 0.143 0.126 0.119 0.126 
(0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
linigdp -2.692 -2.38 -2.502 -2.374 
(0.45) (0.50) (0.47) (0.51) 
popgr -0.341 -0.417 -0.356 -0.417 
(0.21) (0.23) (0.22) (0.23) 
ted -0.068 -0.236 -0.203 -0.239 
(0.15) (0.18) (0.17) (0.19) 
R2 
S. e. e 
0.31 0.19 0.24 0.19 
2.58 2.79 2.71 2.8 
v 
696 
24.79 
(3.54) 
-1.078 
(0.25) 
-0.705 
(0.34) 
0.142 
(0.04) 
-0.459 
(0.24) 
0.156 
(0.07) 
0.118 
(0.03) 
-2.443 
(0.49) 
-0.312 
(0.22) 
-0.212 
(0.18) 
0.23 
2.73 
VI 
696 
24.57 
(3.32) 
-0.554 
(0.15) 
-0.049 
(0.13) 
0.144 
(0.02) 
-2.729 
(0.45) 
-0.343 
(0.21) 
-0.052 
(0.16) 
0.32 
2.57 
VII 
696 
24.46 
(3.33) 
-0.577 
(0.16) 
-0.325 
(0.22) 
0.084 
(0.06) 
0.145 
(0.02) 
-2.716 
(0.46) 
-0.323 
(0.21) 
-0.045 
(0.16) 
0.31 
2.58 
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. 
Instrumented: Mil 
Instruments: diw dcw nme dem lnpop ingdp 
Table 3.8: The milexp-threat-growth approach: Panel Fixed-effects with Simulta- 
neous Equations (TSLS) 
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on growth relative to internal threat. However this may have happened since there 
is complete data available on developed countries and the countries, which have had 
internal wars, are likely to have poor data. 
Furthermore, using the estimated coefficients in table 3.8, one can easily calculate 
a range of threshold values for external and internal threats. It is implicit in equation 
(3.2) that 
a9y 
= 01 + a2(intthr) + a4(extthr) (3.4) ämil 
At a given level of internal and external threats, if the evaluation of equation 
(3.4) is equal to zero a country is in its optimal level of milexp. However, when, it 
is greater than 0a rise in milexp influence growth positively and vice versa. 
The estimated coefficients in column V of table 3.8 are used to evaluate the 
overall effect of milexp on economic growth together with the external and internal 
threats. 1° Firstly, assume that the external and internal threat variables are equal 
and then equate equation (3.4) to zero, the threshold value is found to be about 3.6, 
which is close to 3.5 that of AG's value. This suggests that when both the level of 
internal and external threats are above 3.6 a rise in milexp would have a positive 
effect on growth. Secondly, when evaluated at the means; that is 0.15 for external 
and 0.31 for internal threats, it can decrease growth by about 0.93 percentage points. 
Thirdly, in countries with no internal and external threats, milexp would decrease 
growth by about 1.078 percentage points. Finally, in countries with the highest level 
of external and internal threats it would increase growth by about 1.022 percentage 
points. 
'0Note that the mean, min and max values are calculated to be 0.15,0 and 6 for external threat, 
0.31,0 and 8 for internal threat respectively. 
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Based on these final findings, assessing at the mean values of internal and external 
threats, milexp has a negative effect on economic growth. However in the presence 
of a high level of threat above the estimated threshold value, milexp may influence 
economic growth positively. 
3.3.3 Summary 
Is there a non-linear effect of milexp on economic growth that in turn explains why 
various milexp-growth studies have found contradictory results? By non-linearity 
it is meant that there could be circumstances where an increment in milexp could 
influence economic growth positively or negatively conditional upon the value of 
the estimated threshold. This section has presented an answer to this question 
starting with the commonly applied cross-country analysis to a panel fixed-effects 
with simultaneous equations. 
Drawing upon the non-linear model of Aizenman and Glick (2006), which in- 
corporates a threat variable into the empirical specification of milexp-growth with 
an interaction term. This chapter first re-visits their model. Like many milexp- 
growth studies, Aizenman and Glick (2006) employ a cross-country regression anal- 
ysis, which is the starting point for our analysis. Having applied the methodology 
of Aizenman and Glick (2006), it is found that the results differ from their findings. 
Two issues arise, simultaneity problem in the growth equation and aggregation of 
the data over a long time period, which may have affected the variation in milexp. 
Subsequently, milexp does not correspond to the estimated threat variables. To 
overcome these problems we employ a panel fixed-effects estimator within a simul- 
taneous equations framework. 
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Very few studies have concentrated on the demand for milexp whilst investigating 
effects of milexp on the economy. Considering the determinants of milexp along with 
the issue of security in a growth specification this gap is partly addressed. However, 
this section does not consider the interdependence between milexp, investment and 
economic growth, which is dealt with in the next section by instrumenting the 
investment variable along with the milexp variable. 
There are two important conclusions that emerge from the findings in this sec- 
tion. Firstly, by investigating empirically the effect of milexp on growth, we find that 
there exists an inverse relationship between milexp and growth. In the presence of 
the highest level of external and internal threats, a rise in milexp would affect 1.022 
percentage points increase on growth. On the contrary, when there is no threat a 
rise in milexp might reduce growth by about 1.078 percentage points. 
Secondly, the democracy level has a significant negative impact on milexp; in 
other words as democracy increases a country seems to spend less on milexp. Whereas, 
neighbouring countries' milexp has a significant positive effect on milexp, which sup- 
ports the arms races between countries. 
As countries are extremely sensitive to the issue of increasing or decreasing mil- 
exp, these findings are particularly important and they should be interpreted care- 
fully. It would be beneficial if one considers case studies of countries where for 
individual countries the factors of internal and external threats are specified and 
then test the model proposed here. 
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3.4 Military Expenditure, Threat, Investment and 
Economic Growth 
In order that national security is attained and maintained, our results in section 3.3 
reveal that milexp is needed at some level; but due to nonlinearities, it is "state de- 
pendent", that is if a country's threat level is below (above) the estimated threshold 
level a rise in milexp has a negative (positive) impact on economic growth. This 
section aims to further extend the model proposed in section 3.3 to re-examine the 
milexp-growth relationship together with an investment equation. A three-equation 
simultaneous approach has been very common because it accounts for possible trade- 
offs between milexp and investment through direct and indirect channels. 
Stable and sustainable economic and political environments are important for 
investment decisions. Investment decisions involve some risk and uncertainty under 
even "normal" economic circumstances and when there is further economic or polit- 
ical instability, these will hinder considerably the decisions. In order that investors, 
entrepreneurs or other private parties to commit to long term investment decisions 
some conditions have to be met, among these are: (i) the assessment of risk and 
uncertainty in the economy, (ii) guaranteed returns on investment (importance of 
well defined and enforced property rights), and (iii) recoverability of costs. 
Individuals and firms can anticipate the economic risks, whereas this is not the 
case for uncertainty. Uncertainty can be defined in many ways; however the effect of 
any such elements on investment are perceived the same way by potential investors, 
for instance inflation or social unrest. Broadly considering, both signal some eco- 
nomic uncertainty for potential investors, in a way that inflation is associated with 
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the economic and subsequent political instability. To some extent, social unrest or 
internal conflict is considered to be a problem of inequality, whether it is a social or 
economic form. Even though it is expected that both internal and external threats 
to reduce investment, the effect of internal conflict could be more direct and harmful 
than external threat. " 
Pindyck and Solimano (1993) claim that political instability does not affect in- 
vestment, whereas inflation has a robust adverse effect on investment. Goel and 
Ram (2001) also show detrimental effects of inflation on investment. In contrary, 
in a cross-section study, Hall and Jones (1999) show that insecure property lowers 
capital accumulation, productivity and growth. 
In the 1970s and 1980s hyperinflation was a major problem in many developing 
countries; for instance in Argentina and Turkey. Social strife was also common and 
both countries were having high levels of milexp. In recent years hyperinflation is 
not as widespread as it was a few decades ago. What was arguably causing an 
increase in milexp can indirectly affect lowering investment. This is assumed to be 
trivial and logical but empirical results do not give a concrete answer. 
In the light of these considerations, using the earlier literature an investment 
equation is specified. In particular, two very different studies Deger (1986) and 
Goel and Ram (2001) are considered. The former looks at the situation in the 
context of milexp and economic growth in a model of simultaneous equations and 
the latter study solely of investment and its break down; R&D and non-R&D. 
Next in this section, the study of Goel and Ram (2001) is reviewed in detail and 
"The correlation between internal conflict and investment is -0.153, which is significant at 5%, 
see table 3.15 for correlation among other variables. 
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subsequently the investment equation is defined and tested. 12 
Determinants of Investment: 
Goel and Ram (2001) take data on R&D from the National Science Board 1992 to 
investigate R&D and non R&D investment using data for 9 OECD countries from 
1981 to 1992. Total investment data is taken from the OECD database and to 
compute non-R&D investment, R&D outlays is subtracted from total investment. 
This gives them three dependent variables; total investment, non-R&D and R&D 
investment. Then, they propose two proxies for uncertainty: the five-year moving 
average and the standard deviations of the inflation rate. 13 The other regressors 
are the real lending rate and one-period lagged GDP growth. Applying the panel 
fixed-effects method, the effects of uncertainty vary for each dependent variable; in 
the R&D equation uncertainty measures are statistically significant and negative, 
in non-R&D investment are positive and in the aggregate investment equation are 
not significant. The interest rate variable is negative and insignificant and the lag 
of growth is positive and significant. They claim that the results imply the need for 
the segregation of investment based on the degree of irreversibility. 
In addition to the above variables, Deger (1986) includes milexp in the investment 
equation specification. As discussed earlier, Deger (1986) finds that the effect of 
milexp and inflation on investment is negative and growth and the income level 
have a positive effect on milexp. 
12As in the previous sections we have already discussed Deger (1986), therefore below discussion 
is focused on the study of Goel and Ram (2001). 
13Inflation rate is the annual percentage change in the consumer price index (CPI) which is taken 
from the International Monetary Fund IMF database. 
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3.4.1 Methodology 
Deger (1986) defines an investment equation to be a function of the growth rate, 
milexp, inflation and foreign capital flows as a percentage of GDP. Whereas, Goel 
and Ram (2001) regress investment on inflation, nominal interest rate, and a one- 
period lagged growth rate. As indicated earlier, Goel and Ram (2001) show that 
the high irreversibility of R&D outlays reduces the chance of investment in this area 
in comparison with non-R&D investment. In comparison of the military R&D and 
the non-military R&D spending it is more likely that the former can be carried out 
more easily than the latter. Civilian industry might be reluctant to invest in very 
risky R&D projects. 
One dilemma, perhaps, needs to be looked into, which is whether individual 
firms cannot undertake very costly R&D projects due to the irreversibility of high 
cost involved, it would be the case that military R&D projects might be beneficial 
to civilian economy. 14 Goel et al. (2007) look into effects of disaggregated R&D 
expenditure on growth and conclude that despite the numerous studies claiming 
otherwise, the federal R&D and the defence R&D are of great importance to growth. 
The baseline investment specification used is; 
invit = ßo + ßiinfit + ß2rit + ß39yit-1 + (i + Eit 
(3.5) 
where; 
14The averaged figures of military R&D and non-military R&D from 1981-1999 show that 
the 
US and Russia out of the total budget to R&D, above 30% of it is used 
for military R&D. The 
next with about 20% the UK and Fiance. Canada, Japan, 
Germany and Italy have less than 5% 
of total R&D to military R&D. 
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" `inv' is the share of real investment in real GDP, taken from PWT v 6.1, from 
1960-2000, 
" `inf ' is the inflation rate, taken from WDI; two alternative measures of inflation 
are considered: the annual percentage change in consumer prices, CPI (pi), and 
the annual growth rate of the GDP implicit deflator, (GDPdef), 15 However, 
the results reported here, make use of the GDPde f variable. 
9 `r' is the real interest rate; the lending interest rate adjusted for inflation as 
measured by the GDP deflator, taken from WDI, 
" `gy' is the annual real GDP per capita growth over 1960-2000. The data 
is taken from PWT v 6.1, in constant dollars using a Chain Index. In the 
estimations a one period-lag of "gy" is used, (lgy). 
Firstly, equation (3.5) is estimated using a panel fixed-effects estimator. Then 
based on the findings, the instruments for investment are verified. In what follows, 
there is a system of three-equation model. Essentially, the objective is to re-estimate 
(3.2) using instruments for both milexp and investment variables to account for 
interdependence. The complete 3-equations baseline specifications used are; 
15The GDP implicit deflator is the ratio of GDP in current local currency to GDP in constant 
local currency. 
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9Yit = a0 + a1 mil2, t+ a2 (mil (intthr)i t+ a3 intthri, t+ a4 (mil (extthr)i t 
+a5 extthrr, t+ a6 linigdpz, t+ a7popgr2, t+ a8 invi, t+ a9 tedi, t+ Tu + uit 
irnvit = ßo + ßiin f Zt + 02rit + 039Yit-1 +(+E it (3.6) 
milit = ýYo +'ylNMEZ, t + 7Y2DIWZ, t + ryaDCWZ, t + ry4intthri, t 
-ß---y4extthrj, t +'Y51npoPi, t +` 61ngdpi, t + 77demi, t + µi + vit 
Each equation in (3.6) is estimated separately, the results of the growth and military 
equations are already presented and discussed in section 3.3. In the subsequent 
section the result from the investment equation will be discussed and then the growth 
equation in (3.6) is re-estimated using instruments from investment and military 
equations. 
3.4.2 Empirical Results 
Estimation of parameters of investment equations: 
Table 3.9 shows the results for the determinants of investment defined by equation 
(3.5) with two different specifications. Using a panel fixed-effects model we estimate 
the model of Goel and Ram (2001) to see whether we can obtain their findings with 
the data constructed in this chapter. 
Comparing these results with those obtained by the Goel and Ram (2001) study 
we find parallel results. Column I of table 3.9 depicts results for the first spec- 
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Investment: Panel - Fixed Effects 
Dependent variable: Investment - Method: Panel - Fixed Effect Model I II 
Observations 444 323 
GDPDef -0.02 -0.03 (0.01) (0.01) 
ri -0.03 
(0.02) 
lgr 0.34 0.39 
(0.08) (0.09) 
R2 R 0.79 0.83 
S. e. e 0.04 0.04 
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. 
Table 3.9: Investment - Panel Fixed-effects 
ification; in which the one period-lagged growth variable is positively related to 
investment and the GDP deflator variable has an adverse effect on investment. In 
the second specification the interest rate variable (ri) is included as well, but this 
does not appear to have any significant effect on investment; the results are given 
in column II of table 3.9. 
Growth, Milexp and Investment: 
Table 3.10 gives results for instrumenting both investment and milexp in a growth 
equation. There are seven estimated models in the table. The main motive of instru- 
menting both investment and milexp is to deal with possible endogenity problem. '6 
16Endogeneity test is performed (Durbin-Wu-Hausman test) for both milexp and investment that 
show in both cases the possibility of endogenity are confirmed. Further, investment and milexp 
are also jointly tested for endogenity using first stage residuals. In order to see the significance 
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It is found that investment a has significant positive and milexp has significant neg- 
ative impact throughout the estimations. Also, initial income per capita, education 
and population growth have expected theoretical signs. 17 
External threat is not robust to change in specifications. Beside, it is statistically 
insignificant when estimations include the interaction, (mil) (extthr), as a regressor. 
The interaction term, is also not significant but has expected sign. On the con- 
trary, the specifications V and VII reveal that internal threat and the interaction 
term (mil) (intthr) both are significant with expected sign thus confirming the non- 
linearity hypothesis. 
The net effect of milexp on economic growth is the sum of the direct impact 
on growth which is given with the parameter ctrl in equation (3.6) and the indirect 
impacts through the interaction terms' parameters; a2 and a4. Formally this can 
be calculated at the mean value of internal and external threats; 
a9y 
= al + a2intthr + a4extthr ömil 
(3.7) 
In table 3.10 the external threat variable is not significantly different from 0. 
Thus, in equation (3.7) it is assumed that extthr = 0. Under this assumption one 
can solve equation (3.7) for intthr to acquire the threshold value, which is 2.47, 
(intthr = -al = 1097). Using the minimum and maximum values of 
internal threat 
a2 0.44 
variable, the impact of milexp on growth ranges in between -1.1 and 
2.5. Further, 
of using instruments, results in panel fixed and panel fixed with instrumental variables can 
be 
checked. The results of the latter method show that there are improvement 
in standard errors of 
milexp and investment variables. In fact if there was no endogenity problem 
OLS is more efficient 
but both are consistent estimates under no endogenity. 
17Initial income per capita is significant statistically in all the estimations 
but education and 
population growth show less significant results. In comparing with the other results 
they show an 
improvement in statical significance. 
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Military Expenditure, Threat, Investment and Growth 
Dependent variable: Per capita GDP growth 
Method: Panel Fixed-Effects with TSLS 
Model I II III IV 
Observations 444 444 444 444 
V 
444 
VI 
444 
VII 
444 
constant 0.33 0.28 0.29 0.28 0.32 0.32 0.35 
[0.08] [0.08] [0.08] [0.08] [0.08] [0.08] [0.08] 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
mil -0.668 -0.952 -0.724 -0.906 -1.097 -0.591 -0.785 [0.33] [0.41] [0.41] [0.43] [0.50] [0.34] [0.37] 
(0.05) (0.02) (0.08) (0.03) (0.03) (0.09) (0.03) 
extthr 0.010 0.004 0.010 -0.001 [0.005] [0.006] [0.005] [0.007] 
(0.02) (0.51) (0.03) (0.85) 
milextthr 0.042 0.106 
[0.072] [0.086] 
(0.56) (0.22) 
intthr 0.002 -0.012 0.001 -0.011 
[0.002] [0.005] [0.002] [0.004] 
(0.46) (0.01) (0.67) (0.01) 
milintthr 0.444 0.392 
[0.156] [0.136] 
(0.00) (0.00) 
inv 0.819 0.827 0.858 0.830 0.836 0.830 0.832 
[0.118] [0.120] [0.122] [0.122] [0.127] [0.119] [0.121] 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
linigdp -0.056 -0.049 -0.052 -0.048 -0.053 -0.056 -0.058 
[0.010] [0.011] [0.010] [0.011] [0.011] [0.010] [0.010] 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
popgr -0.580 -0.677 -0.603 -0.674 -0.607 -0.573 -0.598 
[0.371] [0.392] [0.383] [0.391] [0.388] [0.371] [0.378] 
(0.12) (0.08) (0.12) (0.09) (0.12) (0.12) (0.11) 
ted 0.009 0.008 0.010 0.008 0.008 0.010 0.009 
[0.004] [0.005] [0.004] [0.005] [0.005] [0.005] [0.005] 
(0.04) (0.09) (0.02) (0.11) (0.08) (0.04) (0.04) 
Note: "0" standard errors and "()" p-values 
Instrumented: Mil and Inv 
Instruments: diw dcw nme dem lnpop ingdp Igr GDPdef 
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Table 3.10: The milexp-threat-investment-growth approach: Panel Fixed-effects 
with Simultaneous Equations (TSLS) 
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evaluating at the mean value of internal threat, 0.31, it is found to reduce growth 
by 0.96. Finally, when both threat variables are equal to zero the effect of a unit 
rise in milexp causes a reduction in economic growth by about I. I. 
3.4.3 Summary 
In section 3.3, we have looked at the possible linkages between milexp and eco- 
nomic growth by instrumenting milexp using various estimators. In this section it 
is assumed that there is interdependence among milexp, investment and economic 
growth. Therefore, both milexp and investment are required to be instrumented in 
the growth equation. As a result, we first define an equation for both milexp and 
investment, which, together with the growth equation, gives us three equations to 
be estimated. 
Firstly, each equation is independently estimated using panel fixed-effects. In 
particular, a simple investment equation is estimated in which it is found that infla- 
tion and lagged GDP growth are robust determinants of investment. This result is 
then used in the growth equation to control for possible endogenity between milexp, 
investment and growth. 
Secondly, the milexp-growth nexus is re-estimated using instruments for both 
milexp and investment in the growth equation. The results are in favour of a non- 
linear relationship among growth and milexp. Overall, the external threat and the 
interaction term, (mil) (extthr), have expected signs but are statistically insignificant. 
However, internal threat and its interaction term with the milexp, (mil)(intthr); are 
statistically significant and have expected signs. Also, a set of commonly used vari- 
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ables in economic growth regressions is also included and overall, at each stage of 
different econometric estimations they are found to be in line with the theoretical 
predictions, except for population growth, which is found to be statistically insignif- 
icant. 
Thirdly, it should be emphasized that democracy has implicitly a positive effect 
on economic growth. Table 3.16 shows the findings from the first stage estimations 
of the panel fixed effects with instrumental variable approach. The coefficient of 
democracy in the investment equation is positive and significant, thus it could be 
argued that democracy influences growth positively through the investment channel. 
The effect of political regimes and economic development are investigated further in 
the next chapter on institutions. 
We have not looked into more homogenous groups with their additional charac- 
teristics, for instance a group of developed countries can include R&D or a cluster 
of poor countries can incorporate variables that will take into account internal prob- 
lems. Incorporating additional explanatory variables in more homogenous groups 
may allow us to test how sensitive the results we have reported here are. 
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3.5 Conclusions 
This chapter analyses together the issues of milexp, conflict, investment and eco- 
nomic growth in a non-linear empirical model. In particular, the main issues sur- 
rounding milexp are investigated. The main discussion developed in this chapter 
is that the empirical model used to explain the milexp-growth nexus should be de- 
fined to embed threat-security dimensions of milexp. The growth equation, when 
specified this way, would allow for testing the relationship more thoroughly. 
The chapter starts by re-visiting and extending the model proposed by Aizenman 
and Glick (2006), which takes into account the important linkages between milexp, 
threat, and the long-run growth of per capita income. The conclusion of the extended 
model contrasts with the findings of Aizenman and Glick (2006). Then, our preferred 
model is implemented, which is a panel of time-series and cross-section data with 
simultaneous equations for a large sample of developed and developing countries. 
The econometric technique applied allows for testing the hypotheses proposed in 
the literature. These hypotheses are; 
Hypothesis 1 Does milexp have a genuine effect on economic growth? 
Yes. Based on the meta-analysis of milexp-growth studies in the preceding 
chapter this effect is very small. Nevertheless, it should be noted that many 
earlier studies have not controlled for the non-linearities and threats. Con- 
trolling for these, our results suggest that there is a genuine effect of milexp 
on growth and the direction, as Smith (2008) puts it, depends on the threat 
levels and the economy's growth potential. 
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Hypothesis 2 Does one country's level of milexp have any influence on others 
countries' level of milexp? 
Yes. The empirical argument that "one country's milexp pose a threat to 
others" is an established one. Our results are also in agrement with this 
hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 3 Is there a sizeable "peace dividend" by reducing average milexp 
globally? 
Yes. The effort to reduce average world milexp would require long-term com- 
mitments that seem to be difficult to approve among countries. However, it 
is evident that if countries can reduce the threat they pose to each other, 
the average optimal level of milexp can be reduced further. The international 
impediments towards reducing the world average milexp are well laid in the 
literature; see arms races models, for instance Levine and Smith (1995), Levine 
and Smith (1997) and Kagan et al. (2005). However, internal problems have 
become widespread and are more challenging to resolve. As indicated in hy- 
pothesis 2, solutions are difficult to emerge in the short-run, in the long-run 
resolving them should reduce demand for milexp. 
Hypothesis 4 Is there an optimal level of milexp for each nation? 
Yes. The model in this chapter suggests that it is possible to define an opti- 
mal level of milexp given thoroughly defined threat variables. The calculated 
threshold value gives a direction for milexp; whether it should be reduced or 
increased. 
Finally, after the Cold War, average milexp in general followed a downward trend 
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at first. However, recent security issues are perceived the same way by developed and 
developing countries. In what followed, the levels of milexp have started increasing. 
"... the intensification of the `war on terror' has led to military spending levels in some countries (notably the USA) returning to Cold War levels after dropping substantially. Now, 15 years after the fall of the Berlin Wall, it 
is once again rising. Global spending totals have reached $1000bn and are 
climbing. The US government alone is spending over $400bn on military 
programmes with Iraq war costs on top of that. Other countries are following 
the same pattern, in many cases explicitly encouraged to do so by the US and 
the UK. " 
(Archer and Hay-Edie, 2005), [p. 18]. 
The role of military is to protect the existence of its nation; thus, when the risk 
of conflict or war is high it is inevitable to observe an increase in defence spending. 
Detrimental effects of conflict in various forms should be a concern to all of the 
actors alike. Especially, the transformation of domestic conflict into international 
terrorism has become a significant issue in recent years. As a result, there have 
been an increasing trend in global military spending since 2001 and it is mainly 
attributed to this phenomenon. 18 Therefore, the recent global security issues need to 
be integrated in future studies. Above all, further research should look at followings: 
" Considering milexp as the insurance that a nation pays for possible internal 
or external confrontations then the threat variable used here is a very simple 
18The controversy or disagreement over how countries define terrorism, or how an insur- 
gent/rebel/terrorist group in a country is recognized among other countries causes serious problems. 
Especially, when other countries make use of this for their own political gains. Arguably, it will 
not be difficult to see that the country moves towards spending more on its defence; foreseeing this 
as to be a danger against its state security. This point has not been analysed yet and it could be 
included when looking into the main determinants of milexp. However as discussed earlier threat 
to its national security for each country will depend on wide range of characteristics. 
3.5 Conclusions 
106 
proxy. Therefore, a more thorough threat variable should be constructed; for 
instance a threat variable which can corroborate the intensity of war since 
some wars are more destructive than others. 
" Ongoing conflict and its causes: one of the main reasons for high milexp is the 
likelihood of conflict or ongoing conflict. In particular internal conflict that 
is associated mostly with social inequalities, lack of civil rights, poverty etc. 
(See chapter 4 and 5). Policies that aim to lessen these problems should be 
investigated. 
" The executive power of government: Even though democracy is included in 
the regressions to proxy the effect of political regime, it does not distinguish 
between parliamentary and presidential systems of polities. Parliamentary sys- 
tems are often criticised to be less powerful in changing and levying the law or 
implementing tough policies in comparison to presidential systems (Acemoglu, 
2006). 
" The adverse effects of internal threat on investment should be investigated 
further. Especially, if a country increases its milexp due to internal threats 
and finances it by printing money, standard economic theory associates this 
option with higher inflation. However, inflation might directly arise due to an 
internal threat. As many empirical studies have confirmed there is a negative 
significant impact of inflation on investment. Hence it has a knock-on effect 
on growth. 
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Data Sources and Definition of the Variables: 
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The dataset constructed for this chapter comes from many sources. Variables are 
either taken directly from the primary sources or the primary sources are used to 
construct a new variable; among these variables are internal and external threats 
variables and neighbouring countries' milexp. Table 3.11 presents the names of the 
variables, definitions and sources. 
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Variable Description and Notes Data Sources 
dcw Dummy for civil and ethnic wars. COW Intra- Correlates of War (COW) 
State War War type tag as 4 and MEPV Intra-State War and MAJOR dataset are used to construct civil and eth- EPISODES OF POLITICAL 
nic wars variable. Civil war is defined as com- VIOLENCE (MEPV) (1946- 
bat between two armed forces within the same 2002) 
territorial boundaries of a state. Ethnic war is 
define as ethnic-intrastate involving the state 
agent and a distinct ethnic group with mag- 
nitude of societal-systemic impact (Mag) is 
equal or greater than 4. 
dem Democracy. It is an index and ranges from 0 Polity IV 2002 
(full Autocracy) - 10 (full Democracy) 
diw Dummy for international war. COW Milita- COW 
rized Interstate Disputes (COW MID v 3.02) 
is used. If a country takes fatality level as 6 
(which means total dead is 1000 and over and 
the hostility level is 5 which is War and Fatal- 
ity level 6 more than 1000 death available 
extthr External threat. It is constructed using data COW and MEPV 
from COW MID v 3.02. For the panel data 
model, present threat is calcualted from pre- 
vious wars therefore the variable starts from 
1955. 
GDPdef GDP deflator. The annual growth rate of the WDI 
GDP implicit deflator. 
gy Real Growth Rate of GDP PWT 6.1 
intthr Internal threat. It is consructed using data COW and MEPV 
COW Intra-StateWar data and MEPV 
inv The share of real investment in real GDP, from PWT 6.1 
PWT v 6.1. 
lgy Lag of gy PWT 6.1 
linigdp Natural logarithm of initial level of GDP PWT 6.1 
Ingdp Natural logarithm of average GDP PWT 6.1 
lnpop Natural logarithm of population PWT 6.1 
lrir Real interest rate WDI 
mil Military expenditure SIPRI 
(mil) (extthr) Interaction term of milexp and external threat SIPRI, COW MEPV 
(mil) (intthr) Interaction term of milexp and internal threat SIPRI, COW, and MEPV 
nme Average Neighbouring Countries' military ex- SIPRI and COW Contiguity 
penditures. SIPRI milexp and COW Conti- data 
guity data are used to construct the variable. 
Each countrys neighbouring countries milexp 
is summed and divided by their total num- 
ber of neighbours. Based on COW Contigu- 
ity Dyadic data set Iceland and New Zealand 
do not have any neighbour therefore each year 
the world average milexp is used as NCME for 
these two countries. 
popgr The growth rate of population PWT 6.1 
sed Number of years of secondary schooling Barro-Lee 
sedper Percentage of population attendend secondary Barro-Lee 
education 
ted Total number of years of schooling in sec- Barro-Lee 
ondary and higher levels for males and females 
Definition and Data Sources 
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Number of tandard 
Variables Observations Max Min Mean Deviation 
dcw 192 1 0 0.2 0.4 
dem 158 10 0 3.6 3.6 
diw 192 1 0 0.1 0.3 
extthr 192 19 0 0.7 2.5 
gy 153 7.3 -7.5 1.8 2.1 
intthr 192 41 0 2.6 6.5 
inv 153 41.2 2.1 15.2 7.4 
linigdp 116 9.6 5.9 7.7 0.9 
ingdp 153 10 6.3 8.3 1 
lnpop 153 13.8 3.7 8.6 1.9 
lted 108 2.4 -0.9 1.3 0.7 
mil 165 24.9 0 3.5 3.5 
(mil) (extthr) 195 220.2 0 5.4 23.2 
(mil) (intthr) 195 367 0 11.1 39.3 
nme 165 11.8 0.9 3.7 2.1 
popgr 153 4.4 -1.9 1.6 1.2 
ted 108 10.9 0.4 4.4 2.7 
Table 3.12: Summary Statistics: Cross Section Data 
Number of Standard 
Variables Observations Max Min Mean Deviation 
dcw 1536 1 0 0.09 0.28 
dem 1095 10 0 3.64 4.09 
diw 1536 1 0 0.03 0.17 
extthr 1536 6 0 0.09 0.58 
gy 996 22.9 -15.6 1.75 3.58 
intthr 1536 8 0 0.31 1.12 
inv 1012 50.2 1 15.55 8.92 
linigdp 970 10.4 5.8 8.13 1.03 
ingdp 1009 10.6 5.7 8.18 1.04 
Inpop 1012 14 3.7 8.75 1.84 
mil 1022 37.5 0.2 3.57 3.82 
(mil) (extthr) 1022 143.2 0 0.86 7.51 
(mil) (intthr) 1022 105.1 0 1.92 8.34 
nme 1291 16.7 0.2 3.78 2.53 
popgr 998 7.3 -5.1 1.85 1.17 
ted 823 12.2 0 4.65 2.92 
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Table 3.13: Summary Statistics: Panel Data 
3.6 Appendix 
Variables 
Number of 
Observations Max Min Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
dcw 444 1 0 0.09 0.28 
dem 444 10 0 5.4 4.11 
diw 444 1 0 0.03 0.17 
extthr 444 6 0 0.15 0.75 
GDPdef 444 3.9 -0.05 0.18 0.39 
gy 444 0.12 -0.07 0.02 0.03 
intthr 444 8 0 0.31 1.12 
inv 444 0.5 0.02 0.17 0.08 
lgy 444 0.12 -0.07 0.02 0.03 
linigdp 444 10.25 6.12 8.46 0.99 
ingdp 444 10.35 6.36 8.52 1.01 
lnpop 444 13.8 6.32 9.38 1.43 
lrir 323 1.11 -0.8 0.05 0.12 
mil 444 0.29 0.002 0.03 0.03 
(mil) (extthr) 444 1.43 0 0.02 0.11 
(mil) (intthr) 444 0.28 0 0.01 0.04 
nme 444 0.17 0.01 0.04 0.02 
popgr 444 0.06 -0.02 0.02 0.01 
sed 444 6.45 0.04 1.82 1.4 
sedPer 444 0.7 0.004 0.22 0.15 
ted 444 12.25 0.14 5.37 2.91 
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Table 3.14: Summary Statistics: Panel Data Used in Estimations 
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3.6 Appendix 
First-stage within regression 
Military Expenditure 
extthr 
intthr 
(mil) (extthr) 
(mil) (intthr) 
ted 
linigdp 
popgr 
igy 
GDPDef 
diw 
dcw 
nme 
dem 
lnpop 
ingdp 
Constant 
Coefficient Standard Error 
-0.0085 0.0015 
-0.0049 0.0014 
0.1572 0.0089 
0.2035 0.0374 
-0.0039 0.0013 
0.0319 0.0082 
-0.1161 0.1252 
-0.0534 0.0263 
0.0009 0.0019 
-0.0100 0.0048 
0.0051 0.0031 
0.2107 0.0520 
-0.0005 0.0003 
-0.0057 0.0054 
-0.0291 0.0089 
0.0799 0.0602 
Investment 
Coefficient Standard Error 
-0.0074 0.0044 
0.0052 0.0041 
0.0574 0.0267 
-0.1845 0.1129 
-0.0101 0.0038 
-0.1606 0.0249 
1.0058 0.3777 
0.2721 0.0793 
-0.0079 0.0057 
-0.0107 0.0144 
0.0281 0.0093 
0.1046 0.1567 
0.0024 0.0010 
-0.0058 0.0162 
0.1912 0.0268 
-0.0290 0.1816 
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Table 3.16: First-stage within regressions 
Chapter 4 
Institutions and Conflict: A 
Re-Analysis of (In) Stability 
"What gives rise to resentment, in short, is not the existence of economic 
authority, but its responsibility. Freedom is conceived as consisting, not in its 
abolition, but in the establishment of guarantees that it will be used in the 
public interest, and that its relations with those affected by it will be based, 
not on superiority of force, but on consent. 
... an ever-widening area of economic relations shall 
be governed by settled 
rules, based on deliberate decisions as to social expediency, not by the pecu- 
niary self-interest of property-owners and their agents. " 
(Tawney, 1964), [p. 174]. 
114 
4.1 Introduction 
4.1 Introduction 
115 
The economic and political stabilisation effect of well-functioning institutions is a 
widely accepted view. Recently some scholars have argued that large institutional 
differences among countries may well explain the huge variations in income. North 
and Thomas (1973) and North (1990,1991 and 1994) are among the first few to 
argue of the importance of institutions in shaping the economic environment that 
leads to thriving economic conditions for growth to flourish. 
The indirect effects of institutions on growth, especially the investment channel, 
has been the main research hypothesis of earlier studies. These studies, in gen- 
eral, have looked at how to pin down the specific types of institutions that are of 
paramount importance for long-term investment. However, Hibbs (2001) states that 
institutions are the "outside" determinant of growth. In other words, if labour and 
capital, the two tangible factors, with intangible technology are inputs in the neo- 
classical production function, how efficiently these inputs are allocated and used is 
determined by institutions and the institutional environment. 
The transition countries would be a good example of this hypothesis. ' As they 
have gone through enormous institutional changes since 1990s. Although these 
countries had considerable factors of production, they were lacking good regulatory 
and distributional institutions (Tridico, 2007). The transition from "planned" to 
"market" economy has been very costly in some of these countries. Besides this, 
North (1990) argues that the evolution of institutions is a very slow process and 
path-dependent. In other words, new institutions cannot be established overnight 
'Especially the former Soviet Union and Eastern European countries. 
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by making and implementing new laws and policies (Beck and Laeven, 2006). 
Do well-functioning "free market" institutions and institutional decisions bring 
about continuous economic growth? Hall and Jones (1999) present some evidence 
of "social infrastructure" and its importance on productivity and capital accumu- 
lation. They raise two questions: "why do some countries invest more than oth- 
ers? " and "why are some countries more productive than others? " Their analysis 
shows that the differences in physical capital and educational attainment can par- 
tially explain the variation in output per worker. They further indicate that the 
productivity and capital accumulation are mostly influenced by "social infrastruc- 
ture", which is defined as government policies and institutions. In other words, 
investors/entrepreneurs, are reluctant to invest in countries with inefficient institu- 
tions despite the possible high returns. 
There are no direct measures available to quantify institutions and this has forced 
researchers to use survey datasets that mainly rank countries based on various sub- 
jective indicators. Using these surveys, many indices have been constructed that 
have enabled various measures of institutions in recent years. In effect, the use of 
direct and indirect indices resulted in diverse research findings. ' The concern of 
today's research is not to establish the links between economic development and 
institutions, but to investigate which type of institutions are fundamental to "good" 
economic growth. 3 
This chapter aims to revisit the findings of earlier studies and also use some of the 
2Indirect indices are generally instability measures, i. e coups, assassinations, riots and so on. 
3By "good" economic growth we refer to continuous growth that improves average living stan- 
dards of individuals. 
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main variables constructed in chapter 3,4 to assess the implications of institutions on 
economic growth. Also, how institutions are formed or acquired is not the main focus 
but rather whether or not the variation in countries' institutions has any impact on 
the stability of the economy. To do that principal component analysis (PCA) is used 
to construct two aggregate indices: "institutional stability index" (ISI) and "socio- 
political instability index" (SPI). 5 ISI has two components: Economic Institutions 
Index (Ell) and Political Institutions Index (PII). 
The remaining sections of this chapter are organised as follows. Section 4.2 
explores the key studies in the literature and discusses the limitation of these studies. 
Section 4.3 presents the methodology and main issues pertaining to the proxies 
used for institutions. Section 4.4 provides the results of this chapter with a short 
discussion of findings and section 4.5 concludes with a summary of results. 
4.2 Review of Earlier Studies on Institutions 
Notably less developed and developing countries suffer from institutional inefficien- 
cies. The "harmony and consensus" among institutions are the key 
for a stable econ- 
omy and the reasons are many-fold for the failure of coordinations within/between 
economic and/or political institutions. Recent empirical studies of 
Hall and Jones 
(1999) and Rodrik (2000), among others, argue that the fundamental obstacle 
for 
capital investment to shift from developed to developing countries 
is inefficient insti- 
tutions. Besides Rodrik (2000) claims that entrepreneurial initiatives and incentives 
are building blocks of investment. However, traditionally, 
institutions have not 
4Namely international, civil and ethnic wars variables 
'The PCA methodology will be explained briefly later in this chapter. 
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played an active part of economic studies and are treated as "given" (Acemoglu 
et al., 2005). Especially, the work of North has paved the way to a change in this 
perception among economists. Until recently, there have been mainly narrative stud- 
ies that generally look at the historical evolution of institutions and country-case 
studies. More recently empirical studies have become more frequent due to the emer- 
gence of large subjective based datasets. The empirical studies mainly make use of 
cross country analysis to corroborate the effects of institutions on development. 
The problem of how to measure institutions have produced readily available in- 
direct measures of institutions or additive indices of these measures. For example, 
Barro (1991) uses indirect proxies for institutions to elaborate empirically the fun- 
damental effects of institutions on growth. Alesina and Perotti (1996) construct an 
index and establish indirect links between growth channeling through investment 
and political instability. Below, a few major empirical studies are reviewed in detail 
to introduce the main strand of research and its findings. 
Political Instability: 
Alesina and Perotti (1996) instigate this association by the argument that an in- 
crease in the probability of political violence and hence uncertainty about the policy 
objectives for the future affects growth negatively through investment. To reiterate 
their conjecture, income inequality increases the possibility of political instability 
and this in turn reduces investment. In addition, there is a direct channel between 
income inequality and investment. This channel is first argued by (Kaldor, 1956) 
that is inequality can favour capital accumulation. Hence there is a positive effect 
on investment. 
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To define an instability variable Alesina and Perotti (1996) use two proxies: exec- 
utive instability that brings policy uncertainty, i. e. frequent changes in government 
legally or illegally. 6 The other proxy is social-unrest and political violence. Accord- 
ing to Alesina and Perotti (1996), one cannot, a priori, choose one over another. 
but, `joint-endogeneity' is an important issue and in some cases having two choices 
can help to partly overcome this problem. Hence, in their simultaneous equations 
approach they use political violence to proxy political instability using the principal 
component to build the index. The index is constructed using politically motivated 
assassinations (ASSASS); the number of people who died in a riot or other internal 
violence as a fraction of the total population (DEATH); the number of success- 
ful coups (SCOUP); the number of attempted unsuccessful coups (UCOUP); and 
democracy (DEM). Democracy is assigned three values, (1,0.5,0) based on fol- 
lowings: free competitive elections; possible elections but restrictions on political 
rights; and no competitive elections. The value of 1 indicates full democracy, 0.5 
semi-democracy and 0 for dictatorship. In the democracy index the data covers the 
period of 1960-1985 and the quality and availability of the data has been the main 
concern. ASSASS and DEATH are the main variables the former is in absolute terms 
but the latter is per million population. Further, in many developing economies, re- 
strictions in press through censorship have resulted having in a self-censored media, 
which convey very restrictive information. Therefore, to control for this Alesina and 
Perotti (1996) use the DEM variable, aiming to overcome discrepancy in reported 
fatal injuries from violence. 
The socio-political instability index (SPI) calculated by the authors using a prin- 
6Legally: The polity's constitution defines the serving period for a government and the free 
elections are held periodically. Illegally: An attempt to seize incumbent governing elites via coups 
d'etat. 
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cipal component analysis (PCA) is the weighted sums of ASSASS, DEATH, SCOUP, 
UCOUP and DEM. The weights assigned to them are found to be 1.39,1.21,7.58, 
7.23 and -5.45 respectively. PCA is an important tool that reduces the number of 
variables but allows the principal components to retain most of the variation. An- 
other important question has been posited is the degree of redistribution in different 
political systems together with the income inequality phenomenon. 
The interesting remark which emerges from this study with regard to the average 
the SPI over 1960-1985 and income in 1960 is that SPI index for most of the rich 
countries is circa -11 except for Venezuela (SPI is 4.03). Among the poor countries 
especially the average SPI index of Malaysia and Botswana were very close to those 
of rich economies in 1960.7 
Furthermore, since 1970 Botswana had institutions that were almost the same 
as developed countries but income level much lower, see (Acemoglu et al., 2003). 
Although it is a very small country, with 1.5 million population, its economic per- 
formance has been exceptional since its independence in 1966. Stiglitz (2002) claims 
that the development experience of Botswana is attributed to declining Washington 
based-recommendations and implementing alternative policies. ' Botswana is a re- 
source rich African country, like Nigeria, while Nigeria, despite its natural resources, 
has had turmoil in the years since its independence. 9 
7In 1960, average income of Venezuela was among the first 10 richest countries whereas Botswana 
was among the first 10 poorest. 
8In recent years, Botswana has been suffering from HIV/AIDS. A study by Thurlow (2007) 
shows the implications of HIV/AIDS on income growth (growth reduces by 1.6 percent per year) 
and increase in absolute poverty (especially labor-intensive manufacturing sector, which has been 
hit disproportionately). 
9Numerous studies look into the Africa's development problem, counties with rich resources but 
internecine conflict over the control of these resources among the interest groups. These studies 
have produced different remedies but there is still a big gap in the literature towards understanding 
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The average income level and growth are important indicators. As indicated earlier, 
per capita income growth does not always insure improvement in living standards. 
As is widely stated, there are "winners and losers" from economic growth and how 
big the gap among them is depends on, to a certain extent, the institutional struc- 
ture of the country. Unequal distribution of income persists and any improvement 
in the distribution of income can take a long time. Many scholars agree that in- 
come inequality influences internal conflict. Rodrik (2000) suggests that good social 
institutions play a vital role in the event of unanticipated changes in the economy. 
Further, often middle and low income groups are most likely to suffer from changes 
in the economy. In fast growing economies some groups within the economy benefit 
much more than other groups. Hence, without good social institutions, the growth 
may endanger social cohesion as result of a disproportionate change in income among 
different earning groups. 
High income inequality can further lead to problems like poverty and social ten- 
sion. Income inequality and poverty are often used together; in fact they are closely 
linked. The Gini ratio that measures income inequality for each country is a good 
measure (relatively) to show how severe income inequalities are within nations. 10 
Furthermore, high level of variation in income structure subsequently might pro- 
duce unwanted problems. As noted, poverty is the main concern, which refers to 
individuals' income level that is being below a threshold income level. The poverty 
threshold defines the minimum income level that is just enough to have the basic 
the problems and suggesting the correct policies. 
'°Although there is a vast empirical literature on the influence of income inequality on growth, 
the data used has been poor in quality. 
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needs for survival. " There are two main measures; absolute and relative poverty. 
The former is defined to compare living standards between countries, hence it calcu- 
lates the minimum monetary amount necessary for human well-being; whereas the 
latter is a within-country measure. Arguably, in developed countries even though 
some are below the relative poverty level, they might be still better off than their 
counterparts in developing nations. 
Moreover, high income groups have strong political and economic power on the 
related policy issues in a polity. Consequently these might bring about social ten- 
sions. If the government fails to alleviate tension among these groups, low income 
level groups may further consider themselves to be disadvantaged and discriminated 
in every way within a country. Under such circumstances, institutions are crucial, 
especially social ones. Keefer and Knack (2000) proxy social polarization by income 
and land inequality and ethno-linguistic fragmentation. Social differences among 
different homogenous groups could lead to internal wars. The main reason for such 
polarization is unequal income distribution among different ethnic and social groups. 
Besides, the emphasis has been mainly on the former, this can be true in countries 
where the polity is under few hands and only way to gain access to available resources 
or privileges or policies of rival ethnic groups is through pressurizing the governing 
elite or even launching violent attacks. A well-documented example is probably 
Nigeria, where ethnic groups have been fighting over oil-resources and there is still 
an on-going conflict among them. The tension among groups reaches a high level 
when ethnic groups are fairly homogenous within, and heterogenous between, and 
"The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) defines two measures to compare de- 
velopment in living standards: "Human Development Index" (HDI) and "Human Poverty Index" 
(HPI). HDI is a function of life expectancy at birth, school attaintment rate and income level 
and HPI is proportion of population does not reach age of 40, proportion of illiterate adult and 
deprivation index. 
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relatively equal in size (Esteban and Ray, 1994). 
Keefer and Knack (2000) argue that ethnic tension based on the definition of 
Esteban and Ray (1994) could be a good proxy for polarization. However, the most 
commonly used proxy is income inequality. Even though, Keefer and Knack (2000) 
criticize the inequality data for not being responsive to the degree of clustering and 
poor in quality, it is still a preferred proxy in their study as well. The reason is the 
fact that highly unequal societies tend to experience more often social instability in 
the form of protests or discontent about how certain groups have been treated in 
the government as well as in the private sector. 
Furthermore, Keefer and Knack (2000) state that the political environment de- 
termines the quality of private property and enforcement of contractual rights. The 
focus of their study is to examine the link between polarization and property rights. 
Using data from the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) they construct an 
property rights index. This index is the sum of the five-variables; expropriation risk, 
risk of repudiation of contracts by government, rule of law, quality of the bureau- 
cracy, and the corruption in government. 
There are four proxies used for polarization: income inequality, land inequality, 
ethnic tension and ethnic homogeneity. The findings of Keefer and Knack (2000) 
show that polarization jeopardizes the security of property rights. The four proxies 
for polarization influence property rights negatively; among them income inequality 
and ethnic tension are statistically significant. Overall, the results indicate that 
there is a strong inverse relationship between income inequality and ethic tension 
on the constructed property rights index. In checking the robustness of their results 
they includes variables like; revolutions, coups and assassinations. These kind of 
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activities and the type of regime would lead to insecurity of property rights. Because 
of this, democracy is also used as a control variable; democratic nations are inclined 
to more even income distributions and secure property rights. 
The assertion that political instability and inequality of income go hand in hand 
and they hinder economic performance is still debatable. 12 Going by this argument, 
whether income inequality is one of the determinants of social tension, or not, has 
not yet reached a consensus. Keefer and Knack (2000) assert that the problem is the 
specification-driven results, therefore it is hard to draw conclusion on this. However, 
high inequality does not alone permit such a link, but together with the other fac- 
tors such as ethnic fragmentation, social classes and formation of social clustering 
may further play an important role. In addition, Keefer and Knack (2000) suggest 
that when property rights are insufficient there is a direct impact on investment. 
Entrepreneurs would be less willing to invest thus, indirectly, hampering growth. 
One of these examples, is perhaps the creditworthiness; in countries with imper- 
fect private property rights it would be unlikely to find investors to invest without 
necessary government guarantees in these countries. 
In order to test empirically the effects of property rights and polarization on 
economic development Keefer and Knack (2000) further specify a growth equation. 
They use the average annual growth per capita income between 1970-1992, inequality 
variable circa 1970, and their property rights index 1982. Their results produce a 
strong positive coefficient for property rights and negative for income inequality on 
growth; when both are included as a regressors in the analysis, the property rights 
12Figure 4.4.1 illustrates the simple correlation between instability and income inequality, which 
indicates a positive relationship. 
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index is still significant statistically but not income inequality. 13 
Aid: 
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Knack (2000) questions the role of aid during rapid changes in transition countries. 
He defines "a good government" that is predictable, impartial and consistently en- 
forces the rule of law for its citizens. The good government forms coherent institu- 
tions which synchronize a good environment for economic activities. Knack (2000) 
proxies the quality of government using the rule of law, corruption and the bureau- 
cratic quality variables. He asserts that in some cases, the foreign aid can distort 
the quality of government even though it may be given to form, or improve, the 
quality of good institutions to enhance economic development. " 
Knack (2000) further argues that developing countries face many obstacles during 
transition and the foreign aid in general is given to reduce partly the side-effects, 
i. e. reduce tax burden, increase the wage of government officials, use it for training 
purposes, programmes aims to strengthen the legal system, public financial system 
and so on. In short, it can favour and ease the costly reforms taking place by 
providing extra revenue needed for the government to perform these new reforms. 
13The explanatory power in their estimates are very low, adjusted-R2 is circa 0.35. 
"As Knack (2000) puts "quad pro quo natura of aid", type of aid is often used by the developed 
countries. A recent example to this is Burma. In late 2007, the UK government indicates that it is 
ready to consider economic aid to Burma and in return the Burma's authorities will move towards 
democracy. The decision of heightened sanctions or aid conditional upon returning or promoting 
democracy might be crucial for ordinary citizens in the country. However, measurement taken by 
other nations to force a government `A' to end the violence against its citizens and bring democracy 
or introduce new reforms or regulations may further harm the ordinary citizens. How international 
organizations and other nations use these tools to force a government for a specific policy change 
is a very delicate issue; however this issue is not subject matter of this thesis. See for instance 
Alesina and Dollar (2000) and Svensson (1998) for a detailed discussion. 
4.2 Review of Earlier Studies on Institutions 126 
The general argument has been that aid can initiate good institutions, mainly in 
forming developed countries institutional system which can trigger the private sector 
investment. Although this has been pointed out in many studies, Knack (2000) 
addresses this issue thoroughly. 
Conversely, there are claims that aid can actually damage the accountability of 
government to its citizens, since donor countries conditionality on aid may, in effect, 
result in the government having to fulfil the conditions set by the donor countries. 
Also it may affect the country's bureaucratic quality by employing top government 
officials to take part in a specific donor-funded project. There has been a substantial 
effort to analyse the aid-induced corruption. In particular, the fund available to the 
government increases state owned-cooperations and these can reduce opportunities 
for private sector and increase rent-seeking activities. However, private sector may 
engage more in lobbying and political-power struggle to ensure its existing position 
and consequently this leads to a reduction in productive investment whilst spending 
too much resources on unproductive activities. 15 
Corruption: 
Several empirical studies have pointed out to the link between corruption and ineffi- 
cient institutions. Bennedsen et al. (2005) indicate that corruption is a byproduct of 
inefficient institutions. Svensson (1998) attests that the less homogenous countries 
are open more to corruption especially in the phase of the foreign aid. For exam- 
ple, each ethnic group might fight to grip the part of resources or when there are 
15Especially studies like Murphy et al. (1991), Shleifer and Vishny (1993), Murphy et al. (1993), 
and Acemoglu and Verdier (1996) have looked into costly lobbying, political-power struggle and 
rent-seeking activities. 
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trade restrictions these could give rise to bribing the government officials in order 
to gain the license or to lower the tariff on imported goods. Lederman et al. (2005) 
present detail analysis of corruption and political institutions. They study the de- 
terminants of corruption and the role of political institutions in preventing as well 
as encouraging it. 
Robust analysis of Institutions: 
Major studies have looked at the indirect analysis of institutions channeling via 
political instability, inequality, aid, corruption and so forth. Glaeser et al. (2004) 
attest that proxies used are very volatile and some are outcome of inefficient insti- 
tution, in effect they are highly correlated with the level of development and they 
are not suitable for analysis of institutions. In a parallel discussion Acemoglu et al. 
(2001) propose a new instrument to solve endogeneity problem in income-institution 
equation. Initially, they regress income per head against protection against expro- 
priation, taken from International Country Risk Guide, with some other country 
specific variables. Nevertheless, Acemoglu et al. (2001) argue that the estimated 
OLS regression is not satisfactory due to institutional variable being endogenous. 
As to solve this problem the proposed instrument is the settlers' mortality rates in 
ex-European's colonies but this instrument could be used only for countries that 
were once a colony of European countries. Therefore it restricts the analysis to a 
group of countries. 
Furthermore, Acemoglu et al. (2001) examine empirically the creation and evo- 
lution of good institutions in ex-European colonies. They argue that the European 
settlers brought good institutions to colonial countries like Australia, New Zealand, 
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United State and Canada that had a positive effect on these countries development. 
Further, in countries like Sub-Saharan Africa, South Asia, and Central America, 
extractive institutions were established by Europeans, that in turn have had neg- 
ative effect on their development. The adoption of extractive institutions in these 
colonial countries have been persistent, and now they have a very unique institu- 
tional characteristics which have induced a very slow development. They further 
claim that if the Europeans had thought of settling in a country they established 
good institutions, which involved the protection of property rights, enforcement of 
law and order, and constraint on ruling elite. 
In order to test their hypothesis Acemoglu et al. (2001) use settlers' mortal- 
ity rates from Europe: having low mortality rate indicates creation or evolution of 
good institutions, otherwise extractive ones. Acemoglu et al. (2001) proxy institu- 
tions using "protection against expropriation" between 1985-1995. They assume that 
"institutions today" are endogenous within the income equation. Hence, "protection 
against expropriation" using the settler mortality rate faced by European settler as 
an instrument. 
Glaeser et al. (2004) criticise the instrument used by Acemoglu et al. (2001). In 
particular, they assert that European settlers brought their human capital to the 
New World not their institutions. In their empirical study, Glaeser et al. (2004) find 
that the link between institutions, human capital and growth suggests that initial 
level of human capital and the average level of institutions explains the subsequent 
economic growth. However, they claim the positive effect of the average level of 
institutions on growth is due to reverse causality, i. e. growth in income and human 
capital influences development of institutions. In order to prove this they use insti- 
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tutional proxy at the beginning of the period, in which the proxy used is the initial 
period constraints on the executive. Although Glaeser et al. (2004) claim that this 
proxy is an outcome of institutions, it is still used to proxy institutions. As a result 
it is debatable how robust the findings are or the conjecture they test. In addition, 
there are two compelling findings that emerge from their study, first, the initial lev- 
els of constraints on executive is not a good proxy for institutions. Secondly, it is 
likely that a country's positive development causes improvement in its institutions. 
The studies discussed above have suggested that "institutions do matter" for 
economic development. In the light of this literature it is essential to draw a line 
between political and economic institutions, the choice of proxies and other related 
issues surrounding institutions. As a result, the following section re-consider some 
of the key aspects presented in the literature above alongside the issue of instability 
and its determinants. 
4.3 Methodology 
This section first discusses the possible linkages between institutions and social, 
economic, and political instabilities. It then delineates what is meant by institutional 
stability and instability indices and how the available data on different indicators 
of institutions are designed to build a composite index of institutions. In addition, 
using instrumental variables, it is tested to see whether political instabilities measure 
is a good indirect measure for institutions. 
The previous empirical studies have either created a composite index for institu- 
tions, similar to the one in this chapter (but our index is more broader and direct) or 
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used single variable to proxy specific institutions, e. g. democracy, corruption index, 
rules of law and so forth. As Drazen (2000) points out the three frequently used 
proxies for institutions are socio-political instability, (Perotti, 1993) and (Alesina 
and Perotti, 1996); executive instability, (Keefer and Knack, 2000) and (Alesina 
and Perotti, 1994) and the security of property rights, (Mauro, 2002) and (Knack 
and Keefer, 1995). In examining the effect of institutions, the instrumental variables 
(IV) method is mainly applied because of the argument on the direction of causation 
between institutions and development. In fact, the main question is: how good are 
the proxies and instruments used in the literature? As discussed above, the proxies 
and instruments used in extant studies are widely assessed to be unsatisfactory. The 
main problems with institutional proxies are aggregation, not being specific, being 
subjective-based thus increasing the likelihood of measurement errors, and measur- 
ing the outcome of institutions than the institutions themselves. Therefore, our 
strategy is to design empirical specifications to overcome these problems outlined in 
the literature. 
Acemoglu (2005) states an important example to emphasize the danger in using 
specific institutions to proxy other institutions. In the 19th century in Caribbean 
Islands the plantation system and the democratic political institutions did not work 
together. The use of the new technology that characterized the plantation system 
resulted in a more unequal distribution of income. However the underlining political 
system being democratic required equality of power sharing and this brought about 
a clash between political and economic system. 
On the contrary Glaeser et al. (2004) denote that whether the underlining system 
is democracy or dictatorship, economic institutions, especially security of property 
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rights that is argued to be vital for subsequent investment, are nothing but policy 
choices of a governing elite. In line with this argument one could challenge the 
possible clashes between economic and political institutions. In addition, one can 
raise the following question; "Does a nation without good political or economic 
institutions suffer more from economic inequalities? " For instance, Singapore is 
a very small Asian country with an average Gini index of 40.16 The incumbent 
political elite since its independence has been the same family and the country's 
economic performance has been exceptional. 17 Furthermore, the country is seen as 
a partly democratic, "illiberal democracy". It is also claimed that democracies are 
less prone to political violence, but weak in implementing tough policies. In this 
respect, it can be argued that the tough policies of Lee Kuan Yew in 1960's have 
brought Singapore into the developed world, see Neher (1994). 18 Furthermore, like 
Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, India, and Sri Lanka are all seen to be democratic in 
that free and fair elections are held, but at the same time there are also authoritarian 
elements within the government due to internal and external threats. 
Furthermore, Acemoglu (2005) purports that in kleptocratic polities the incum- 
bent's main intention is to remain in power and therefore the strategy is "divide 
and rule". Implementation of these strategies would reflect in policies proposed. 
16The average Gini index for the US is 35. Figure 4.4 in appendix 4.6 illustrates an inverse 
relationship among income per head and income inequality based on Gini index. 
17Lee Kuan Yew family. 
18As quoted in (Neher, 1994), 
"Contrary to what American political commentators say, I do not believe 
that democracy necessarily leads to development. I believe that what a coun- 
try needs to develop is discipline more than democracy. The exuberance of 
democracy leads to undisciplined and disorderly condition. " 
Lee Kuan Yew, 1992. 
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In democratic polities, however, the incumbent elites are accountable for the ac- 
tions and policies implemented. To remain in power would mean that the support 
of median-voters, which in turn suggest that policies implemented would not have 
been to hurt median-voters. Further, the structure of political institutions are a 
very important part of policy changes; in fact any policy change can only take in 
place if it passes through all the levels defined within the polity. 
Clague et al. (1999) indicate another important point about the use of subjective- 
based institutional proxies. In their study they introduce a variable named "Contract 
Intensive Money (CIM)" that is used to proxy enforcement of property rights. CIM 
is defined as to be the ratio of non-currency money to total money. 19 The argument 
is that when an economy is (not) doing well the subjective indices can be biased 
towards favouring (opposing) the variable under consideration. In this respect, as 
indicated previously Glaeser et al. (2004) also criticize the proxies used for political 
institutions that in fact the outcome of political institutions. 20 
4.3.1 Data 
This section provides brief overview of the data used in the literature, some of which 
will be used in the analysis presented later in this chapter. 21 The main data sources 
19CIM 
= 
MM2C 
where M2 is broad money and C is the currency in circulation. 
20These proxies are political constraints on the executive, risk of expropriation by the government 
and government effectiveness. 
21 The other economic indicators used in this chapter are the same as chapter 3. Note that this 
chapter data is constructed over 1980-2000 due to data limitations of institutional data sources. 
At the end of this chapter the variables used in the main analysis are tabulated together with their 
descriptions and sources. 
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1. The International Country Risk Guide (ICRG): This is a list of survey data 
which ranks countries based on their quality. It is based on subjective view of 
experts and especially developed for investors. There are political and financial 
risk variables. This database is used for instance in paper by Knack and Keefer 
(1995), Hall and Jones (1999) and Acemoglu et al. (2001). 
2. The Business Environmental Risk Intelligence (BERI): This is also a list of 
survey data. The survey is conducted among experts in academies, government 
officials, foreign entrepreneurs and bankers. 
3. The Gastil Index: It is developed by Raymond Gastil for Freedom House and 
includes variables on political and economic freedom. 
4. The Index of Economic Freedom: It is the Heritage Foundations indices on 
Economic Freedom. It starts from 1994 and has been looking at the economic 
liberty in general. 
5. The Transparency International: It has a very comprehensive corruption dataset. 
It collects data on corruption from different sources and analyse them to pro- 
duce one index. They collect data from Political and Economic Risk Consul- 
tancy, World Bank, ICRG and so on. 
6. The Polity IV Index: This dataset provides information on regime type and 
its characteristics (Jaggers and Marshall, 2000). 
22These sources are mainly used in the studies we reviewed thus it may not reflect a complete 
list. 
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7. The Cingranelli-Richards (CIRI) is human rights dataset (Cingranelli and 
Richards, 1999). 23 
8. The Political Constraint Index (POLCON): It is mainly used for proxying 
political institutions. There are raw data and an index prepared by Henisz 
(2000). 
9. The Economic Freedom of World Index (EFW index): It is the economic 
freedom index of the Fraser Institute. It starts in 1970 and available in five- 
year periods until 2000. It is available annually since 2000. 
10. The Political Terror Scale: Cornett and Gibney (2003) build "The Political 
Terror Scale" (PTS). It is constructed using information on Human Rights 
reports of Amnesty Internationals and the US State Departments. PTS in a 
way measures citizens perception of government and in effect how much they 
trust the government. The data is annual starting from 1980 and measures 
the "states' human rights record" and use 5-point scaling. It is also used in 
this chapter. 
11. The Database of Political Institutions (DPI) and "Good Governance" : This 
comprehensive dataset contains broad variables on political system of 178 
countries from 1975-1997, it is prepared for the World Bank by Philip Keefer). 
For instance, two widely used proxies for political institutions, Checks2A and 
POLARIZ2A, are taken from DPI. There is another World Bank data which 
defines "good governance" in five main areas: (i) Voice and Accountability; 
(ii) Political Stability; (iii) Government Effectiveness; (iv) Regulatory Qual- 
23It is available from http: //ciri. binghamton. edu. 
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ity; (v) Rule of Law and (vi) Control of Corruption. However, this data only 
covers 1996-2005. 
The main datasets used in this chapter are the items 6 to 11. As noted earlier, 
ICRG and BERI are both private databases and chiefly designed for investors and 
entreprenuers. These datasets are not directly used in construction of the data for 
this chapter. 
CIRI data produces two additive indices. The first one is "Physical Integrity 
Rights Index" (PIRI). The index includes torture, extrajudicial killing, political 
imprisonment, and disappearance indicators. It ranges from 0 to 8; 8 refers to a 
perfect government respect for rights of its citizens. The second additive index 
is "Empowerment Rights Index" (EMPI) that includes the Freedom of Movement, 
Freedom of Speech, Workers Rights, Political Participation, and Freedom of Religion 
indicators. The index is scaled between 0 and 10; 0 refers to that government has 
no respect to these rights and 10 for full respect. 
Political constraint (POLCON) is another political institution dataset taken from 
Henisz (2000). There is an index POLCON which is often used in empirical studies. 
In addition, there are data on legislative fraction (LEGFRA), executive constraints 
(XCONS) and law and order. LEGFRA is that the probability of two random 
draws from legislative chamber will be from the same party. 24 XCONS is executive 
constraints, taking values from 1; unlimited Authority to 7; executive parity or 
24The formula used is 
LEGFRA =1- EN N-1 
i-i 
where n is the number of parties, ni is number of seats held by nth party and N is total number of 
seats in the country. 
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subordination. Law and order measures the willingness of the citizens to adhere the 
legal rules and laws. This variable is taking values between (0,6); value 6 is for a 
strong law and order and 0 for no law and order. 
On political instability, the data by Cornett and Gibney (2003) is used widely. 
The variable has five levels and each level in this data is described as follows; 
Level 1: This is the case when a country is considered to be free; strong rule of 
law , almost no politically-motivated murders or imprisonment, no torture for 
citizens expressing their own view. 
Level 2: For non-violent political activities, torture and beatings are not common. 
Very rare politically-motivated murder cases are possible. 
Level 3: There is common imprisonment for involving in political activities without 
a fair trial. Torture, beating and execution are frequent for those involving in 
political activities. 
Level 4: If level 3 spreads out to a large number of population and torture, disap- 
pearances and murders are common; however these still affects only those who 
are involved in the political battle. 
Level 5: This is the extreme case where the violent attack covers the whole popula- 
tion, it does not segregate those has no involvement in riots or demonstrations 
against the political elite. The incumbent elite repress its citizens for their 
own goals and political agenda. 
As mentioned earlier the datasets are partly survey-based subjective studies and 
this might bring about higher risk of measurement errors. Also some argue that 
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proxies used are likely to be correlated with the level of development. (Glaeser 
et al., 2004). In addition, there may be a risk of biased interpretation of those who 
prepare these indices. 
The data used in this chapter to create each economy's institutional environ- 
ment are mainly drawn from POLCON, PTS, DPI, Economic Freedom Network 
and wars25 variables created in chapter 3. The full description of the formulae for 
both type of political institutions data is available in Henisz (2000) for POLCON 
and Beck et al. (2000) for DPI. Further the data on income inequality is taken from 
the United Nations University-World Institute for Development Economics Research 
(UNU-WIDER), the World Income inequality Database V 2. Ob 2007. The data has 
been compiled from many sources, specially the new data of Deininger and Squire 
from the World Bank, the Luxembourg Income Study and Transmonee. They have 
further defined the quality of each data points in the datasets. Therefore, the data 
is a very comprehensive in comparisons to the other inequality datasets. 
4.3.2 Defining and Measuring Institutions 
Institutions are "rules" that form an environment with shadow boarders. Can we 
do without institutions? Do institutions bring security26 via defining rules, which 
do not favour any organization(s) and/or individual(s). If the set rules bring the 
security and reduces uncertainty and the governing elite has the power to execute 
these rules, where do states start failing? The objective of this section is to consider 
these questions and prepare an index that embodies a major institutional component 
25 International, civil, and ethnic wars. 
26A broad sense of security. 
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defined in this area. We can perhaps divide institutions in three broad categories, 
economic, social and political. There is confusion over the definition of institutions 
in the literature both in theoretical and empirical studies. Here, it is aimed to define 
them broadly, incorporating mainly the formal institutions, in particular economic 
and political ones. 
Some of the hypotheses surrounding institutions and development investigated 
in the literature can be summarized as follows. Why have developing countries had 
a very volatile growth experience over the 50 years? How much of these can be due 
to the lack of improvement or evolution in their institutions? How can developing 
countries sets up institutions that promote the adoption of new technology? What 
are consequences of inefficient institutions? Can the creation of informal economy be 
one of the consequences of inefficient institutions? Why are the creation of market 
economy institutions undermined by some groups? What is the link between in- 
stitutions and the distribution of income? Why are countries with well-functioning 
institutions likely to enjoy equal distribution of income? How can political and 
economic inequalities subvert the adoption of good institutions? Can checks and 
balances placed on executives reduce the risk of ex-post opportunism? Can political 
institutions imply a policy credibility? Do good institutions increase private invest- 
ment? More questions can be added here; however, these questions just show how 
diverse is the research on examining and understanding institutions. This chapter 
aims to review a few of these questions. 
Political institutions define the rules for the polity and politicians that have to 
be obeyed. For instance, in a democratic country, the constitution states the period 
of election, division of power between ruling elite and legislative institutions and so 
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on. Economic institutions are very much linked to political institutions. Economic 
institutions, for instance property rights and regulatory bodies, have a vital role 
on the allocation of resources in an economy. However, political institutions also 
influence the distribution of resources, in effect they are interdependent. Further- 
more, political and economic institutions might not be adequate in dealing with the 
various forms of inequalities in some societies and in order to reduce these there 
are social institutions. Social institutions are necessary to support the individuals 
when they lose a job, or are not having enough income to live. Therefore, as Rodrik 
(2000) defines, they are responsible to provide a "safety net". 
There are three indices constructed using a principal component analysis (PCA), 27 
namely economic and political institutions which represent ISI, and an instability 
index which represents SPI. 28 For both ISI indices it is preferred to use raw data 
instead of already constructed indices in the literature. For instance "POLCON III 
and V" by Henisz (2000), "CHECKS2a and POLARIZATION" by Beck et al. 
(2000) 
are mainly used to proxy political institutions. Besides, "Economic Freedom index" 
by the Fraser Institute could be used to proxy economic institutions. However, in 
our analysis these indices are not used. The main reason is that some of these 
in- 
dices are constructed using variables that can lead to problems like simultaneity in 
our estimations. 29 
27A short description of PCA can be found in the appendix to this chapter. 
28EII, PIT and SPI could be built using equal weights for each variable 
instead of using PCA to 
determine the weights. Statistically, PCA requires more variables, 
however as the results below 
indicate the weights assigned to each variable via PCA are not 
far away from being equal. Also, 
since the PCA method is mainly used in the literature for constructing 
institutional proxies we 
continue with it. 
29Specifically, "Economic Freedom " index includes government, banking and international trade 
indicators. 
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Components of Institutional Stability Index (ISI)): 
Constructing an institutional index is a comprehensive and difficult task and espe- 
cially when some studies emphasize the danger in aggregating them. The aim in this 
chapter is to explore the overall impact of institutions on development. 30 In other 
words, we would like to test the contribution of absolute institutional differences in 
explaining long-run growth, precisely how much institutional differences accounts 
for income differences among countries. It will be inevitable to further delve into 
implications of disaggregated institutions on economic performance. 
Earlier empirical studies, regressing economic growth on physical and human 
capitals to study the income differences phenomenon among countries, have sug- 
gested that the unexplained part is due to technology. Lately, empirical studies 
looking at the effect of institutions on technology transfer have, however, argued 
that the unexplained part in income differences cannot be only due to technology 
but the institutional environment too. 
The economic environment in each country is a function of many variables. As- 
sessing these factors, it is plausible to examine institutional stability index (ISI) 
under two-sub indices: economic (Ell) and political institution index (PII). The set 
of variables used are given and explained below. 
Economic Institution Index (Ell) In the literature reviewed, the quality of in- 
stitutions for a good business environment is related to the judicial system, 
bureaucratic quality, and insurance of contract enforcement. Hence, the eco- 
30It is important to note that we are not concerned which institutions are of prime importance 
to the economic development as this would require a more disaggregated institutional analysis; 
whereas we explore the aggregate effect of institutions on the economy. 
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nomic institutions index (Ell) is a weighted sum of "Regulation of Credit, 
Labor, and Business", "Legal Structure and Security of Property Rights", and 
"Law and Order". For economic institution index, using PCA we have found 
the first principal component to be; 
EII = 0.478Regulation + 0.629Property Rights + 0.614Law&Order (4.1) 
Political Institution Index (PII) It is a weighted sum of "Constraint on Exec- 
utives (XCON) ", "Legislative fraction lower level (LFrac)", "Political System 
(PolSys)", "Military Officer is the Chief Executive (Xmil)" and "democracy 
(DEM)". For political institutions index, using again PCA we have found the 
first principal component to be; 
P11 = 0.534XCON+0.405LFrac+0.375PolSys-0.359Xmil+0.531DEM (4.2) 
These taxonomies of Ell and PH can be challenged. However, in consideration 
of earlier studies that emphasize the importance of property rights and enforce- 
ment of contracts for the smooth economic interactions, one can argue that it is a 
justifiable classification. 31 Besides, Rodrik (2000) defines the following institutions 
to be market-supporting; property rights, regulatory institutions, institutions for 
macroeconomic stabilization, institutions for social insurance and institutions for 
conflict management. Furthermore, the variables often used to proxy institutions, 
that are corruption, bureaucratic qualities, expropriation, black market premium 
and so forth are recently suggested to be the outcome of inefficient institutions. 
Therefore these variables are not included in the ISI indices. 
31Sala-i-Martin (1997) tests the robustness of some of the institutional variables in a growth 
regression and finds strong relationships between growth and "rule of law" . 
4.3 Methodology 142 
Components of Political Instability Index: 
Hibbs (1973) states that in political economics there are two types of conflict: first, 
turmoil or anomic violence, i. e. riots, general strikes, anti-government demonstra- 
tions. Second, internal or revolutionary war, i. e. guerrilla attacks, deaths, and 
assassinations. In the previous studies to construct SPI mainly the former method 
is used. 
Hibbs (1973) evaluate the following hypotheses; 
9 Economic growth could bring about domestic instability, (Olson, 1963) 
9 Domestic instability could reduce economic growth, (Kuznets, 1955) 
He argues that there may not be a one-way causation in either direction of economic 
growth and conflict and he emphases that the variation across nations may not be 
this simple; pre-assuming this relationship and testing via statistical procedures need 
revision. Olson (1963) expresses that during the rapid increase in aggregate income, 
countries often suffer from not having suitable institutions which can mitigate the 
adversities of rapid economic advances. However, in developed economies there 
are welfare institutions which provide care to those disadvantaged from advances 
in the economy. Perhaps, one of the important issue is unemployment during the 
early stage of industrialization, when new technologies opt to produce mass produc- 
tion with less labour requirements; arguably, some may realize reduction in income 
whereas some may lose it completely for a short period of time. The result of this 
can be very harmful when individuals feel discontented and insecure. 
Furthermore, Hibbs (1973) investigates the social mobilization, government per- 
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formance and social welfare to examine the possible linkages with social violence, 
but the results are not conducive. The main conclusions of Hibbs (1973) that he 
draws from these are that imbalance theories alone in a one equation setting is not 
capable of explaining the variation in internal violence across countries. Although 
theoretical findings verify these hypotheses, he attests that they are not supported 
empirically. 
The final index is the socio-political instability index (SPI) and result of this 
additive index is given in equation (4.3). This index makes use of some variables 
constructed for the previous chapter, which are international (IW), civil (CW), and 
ethnic (EW) wars and political terror scale (PTSs) of Gibney et al. (2007). Our 
measure of SPI constructed for this chapter does not include the commonly used 
variables like riots, assassinations, coups and so on. Therefore, our SPI index differs 
from the earlier ones and due to variables used to build it is stronger than other SPI 
indices. 
For SPI, using again PCA we have found the first principal component to be; 
SPI = 0.304IW + 0.589CW + 0.333EW + 0.670PTSs (4.3) 
4.4 Empirical Analysis of Institutions and Results 
This section presents the empirical findings of several different hypotheses that assess 
the links between formal institutions and economic development. Firstly, the pos- 
sible determinants of SPI are empirically investigated and the results are discussed. 
Secondly, various hypotheses discussed in the literature are re-tested employing the 
ISI indices built in the last section. Finally, the role of institutions on economic 
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growth is analysed; in particular whether institutional variations can explain the 
growth experience of countries. 
4.4.1 The Determinants of SPI 
In chapter 3 external and internal threats are used to account for those countries 
with high level of milexp. It is concluded that if there are no threats, the optimal 
level of milexp is lower. This section takes up from that and looks at the main causes 
of socio-political instabilities. In particular, we specify a model, in which the SPI 
index defined above is used as the dependent variable and regressed on income level, 
education, economic and political institutions, income inequality, ethno-linguistic 
fractionalization and empowerment rights index. In the literature some of these 
variables are commonly discussed to be the determinants of socio-political instabil- 
ities. The following equation gives our empirical specification; 
SPIit = co + cllninigdptit + c2lnpopit + c3tedit + c4giniit + c5empinxit 
+c6PIIit + c7EIIit + (i +E it 
Where; 
" `SPI' is the measure of socio-political instability. 
(4.4) 
" `lninigdp' is the natural logarithm of GDP per capita in 1980 for cross-section 
estimations. In panel data estimations: the preceding year at the start of the 
sub-period is taken e. g. 1980 for 1981-1985,1985 for 1986-1990 etc. The data 
is taken from PWTv6.1. 
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" `lnpop' is the natural logarithm of population. In cross-section estimations 
it is the value of 1980 and in panel data it is five-year averages for each `t' 
period. 
" `ted' is the total number of years of schooling. In cross-section estimations, 
we use the initial value of `ted' in 1980, (ted80). In panel data, the sub-period 
averages is used for each period t, (ted). The data is taken from Barro-Lee 
data set. 
" `gini' is the natural logarithm of the Gini index. Gini index is the Gini coef- 
ficient which is expresses as a percentage. Gini coefficient takes values within 
in the (0,1); the value zero represent perfectly equal societies and the value of 
1 perfectly unequal ones. 
" `empinx' is empowerment rights index, which is an additive index and con- 
structed from the Freedom of Movement, Freedom of Speech, Workers Rights, 
Political Participation, and Freedom of Religion indicators. The index is taken 
from CIRI dataset. 
" `PII' is the measure of political environment. 
" `EII' is the measure of economic environment. 
Among these variables income per head and Gini are of particular importance 
for our analysis. In figure 4.1, the average income per head and Gini variables 
are graphed against instability index for a possible association. 32 As expected, the 
simple graphical association indicates that there is an inverse relationship between 
32The graphs are based on average values, that is per a country only one observation. Income is 
the natural logarithm of average GDP per head. 
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average income per head and SPI index and a positive association between income 
inequality and SPI index. 
A Cross-Section Analysis of Determinants of SPI: 
Table 4.1 gives the results for the cross section analysis of socio-political instabilities. 
There are in total 12 different specifications tested. Column (1), (2), (3), (5), (6), 
(7) and (8) report the effects of individual variable's on SPI. All have the expected 
signs and are significant. The explanatory power is below 50%, which is very low. 
Column (4) and (9) are based on the specifications in the Alesina and Perotti 
(1996) study. In column (4) the variables initial income, population and education all 
have expected signs but education is not significant. Inclusion of the Gini coefficient 
in column (9) improves the model but income and education coefficient are both not 
significant. The variables initial population and Gini are both significant at 1% level 
and have the expected signs. This result supports the hypothesis that countries with 
low income level and high income inequality are more prone to the socio-political 
instabilities. 
Furthermore, the inclusion of economic and political institutions, column (11) 
and (12), show that economic institutions (Ell) variable has a significant negative 
impact on SPI. The result for Ell seems to be robust to change in specifications. In 
particular, the estimation output given in column (12) suggests that even though the 
average income per head and political institutions appear to be important initially, 
they are not robust when Ell is included in the estimation. One reason for this 
is that in the initial estimations the average income per head and PH may control 
partly for Ell; the correlation among them is very high, Ell and income is 0.77, and 
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Figure 4.1: Income, GINI and Instability (SPI) 
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Ell and PIT is 0.79. Furthermore, the variables initial level of population, Gini and 
Ell have a significant robust impact on SPI. Besides, the variables education and 
empowerment rights index are not significant in general. 
The explanatory power of specification in column (12) is 56%, that means this 
specification can account for 56% variation in SPI. Hence, this also tells us that 
some important control variables might have been left out. However, it should 
be emphasized that the analysis carried out here particularly concerned with the 
economic causes, thus the results are based on mainly the economic factors that are 
tested with a very simple model. There are other non-economic factors that might 
precede socio-political instabilities, which are not included in our analysis. These 
factors could explain the rest of the variation in SPI, e. g. structural and cultural 
factors in a country. 
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A Panel Analysis of Determinants of SPI: 
Table 4.2 shows empirical findings for the equation (4.4) using panel data estimators. 
There are 12 estimations; odd columns are estimated using panel fixed-effects and 
even columns panel random-effects. Hausman test for testing fixed-effects versus 
random-effects suggests that random-effects model is preferred. Hence the results 
described here are based on the random-effects model, i. e. the results with even 
numbered columns. 
The main finding from these results is that EII is negatively related to SPI and 
statistically significant at 1% level, confirming our cross section results. Also, the 
other main variables tested are statistically insignificant but in terms the direction 
of effects are in line with the cross-section analysis. Looking at the earlier studies, 
it is the cross-country analysis that is mainly employed. Even though, in this panel 
analysis, the most of the variables in column (12) appears to be not significant the 
explanatory power is 0.45, which is not very low for a panel data analysis. However, 
these results suggest the importance of a further exploration of the determinants 
of SPI in the future work. Furthermore, in column (12), population and income 
inequality are positively related to SPI. While, Ell and empowerment rights index 
are negatively as expected, but initial income, education and PIT are positively 
related to SPI. 
The initial income, education and PIT variables are found to have a negative 
effect on SPI. However this finding is not robust as stated above with the inclusion 
of Ell these variables appear to be insignificant statistically and direction of impact 
is positive. In a similar analysis, Hibbs (1973) looks at effects of the level of education 
4.4 Empirical Analysis of Institutions and Results 151 
on his "mass violence index". The hypothesis tested is that countries with high level 
of education and low level of income may experience more deprivation-induced social 
unhappiness and hence a high level of social unrest in comparisons to one with low 
level of education and income. However in our analysis this may require a further 
investigation. 
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4.4.2 Economic Growth and Institutions (Ell and PII) 
In an empirical investigation of institutions Knack and Keefer (1995) conclude that 
more direct measures of economic institutions are necessary to evaluate the direct 
impact of institutions on investment and economic growth . 
Even though, they use 
indices from BERI and ICRG and proxies for political instabilities to account for in- 
stitutions, they attest that these proxies cannot fully explain institutions. Following 
Knack and Keefer (1995), this section therefore re-estimates some of the models pro- 
posed in the literature using the indices built in the preceding section and discusses 
the results. 33 
However, the primary purpose of this section is to look at how income inequality 
and socio-political instabilities influence growth while controlling for institutions. 
Although inequality and socio-political instabilities both are expected to be inversely 
related to investment and economic growth. Some empirical studies suggest that this 
effect might not be always correct; especially, institutions happen to be critical in the 
way these two variables have an effect on economic growth. Keefer and Knack (2000) 
argue that in developed countries, income inequality might not influence economic 
growth much, whereas in developing countries the effect could be harmful especially 
when socio-political instabilities are present as well. Figures 4.2 and 4.3 illustrates 
the simple correlation between average income per head and Gini variables against 
economic and political stability indices respectively. 34 The graphical presentations 
illustrate a positive relation between the economic and political institutions and the 
33The correlation between the proxies used in the literature and the indices constructed in this 
chapter can be found in table 4.5 in the appendix. 
34The graphs are based on average values, that is per a country only one observation. Also note 
that income is natural logarithm of average GDP per head. 
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level of income. Developed countries appear to be more equal and possess better 
institutions. 35 
A very simple model with various specifications is used for analysing impact of 
EII and PIT on economic growth. The model used here is defined: 
9yz=co+xir+zir+ui (4.5) 
where gyj represent the growth rate of GDP per capita. X is a vector of common 
variables used in economic growth literature, which are initial level of income per 
head, ingdpi, 0; total number of years of schooling, tedi; investment, inv2 and popula- 
tion growth rate, POPgri. Z is a vector of variables of interest for this section, which 
are institutional variables Ell and PII; income inequality, Gini and socio-political 
instabilities, SPI. 
A Cross-Country Analysis of Institutions and Development: 
We like to first re-estimate some of the models we have reviewed in the literature, 
which will define our base models. Also, re-estimating some of these models with 
the data constructed in this chapter will allow for comparisons of results. Hence in 
addition to the variables defined in equation (4.5) there are few more variables that 
are tested. In particular, ethno-linguistic fractionalization (ELF) and two interaction 
terms. 36 
The first interaction term is the interaction term for ethnic fractionalization 
35See also the appendix 4.6 for graphical representation of income and income inequality mea- 
sured by the Gini index; in which the figure 4.4 shows an inverse relationship between income per 
head and the Gini index. 
36The cross-country data for ethno-linguistic fractionalization is taken from Andrei Shleifer's 
website: http: //www. economics. harvard. edu/faculty/shleifer/dataset. 
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and political institutions. Following Collier (2000), we also like to test whether 
ethnic fractionalization is harmful to economic performance in dictatorship but not 
in democracies. In consideration of this, an interaction term between ethno-linguistic 
fractionalization (ELF) and PIT index is also included in the growth regression, 
ELF * P11. Collier (2000) proxies political institutions using Gastil index that 
ranges between 0-6, where societies with full democracy are given the value of 0. 
However, in our index higher values indicates better political institutions. Therefore 
the interaction terms is expected to be positively related to economic performance 
in our growth regression. The second interaction term is SPI * Gini. This variable 
is particularly important for our next theoretical chapter. Though it is recognized 
that there is an ambiguity about the impact of the Gini coefficient on economic 
growth, the effect of the interaction term is expected to be a negative one. 
Table 4.3 produces the results for estimating equation (4.5) using various spec- 
ifications. All the regressions in this table are estimated using OLS with robust 
standard errors and the dependent variable is the average growth rate of income per 
capita over 1980-2000. This results are critical for two reasons; 
first it allows for 
assessing the robustness of earlier findings that are discussed 
in section 4.2 and 4.3. 
Secondly, having tested our indices with the earlier hypotheses we can then extend 
on that and test our empirical strategy defined by equation equation 
(4.5) for this 
chapter. 
Columns (1) to (3) of table 4.3 show the base estimations. The model 
(3) is 
the commonly used economic growth specification. In all three models explanatory 
variables have expected signs and significant but with a 
low explanatory power. 
Columns (4) to (6) give findings for the effect of income inequality 
(Gini) and eco- 
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nomic institutions (Ell) on growth. It is found that the Gini coefficient and Ell have 
the expected signs and significant at 1% level. Comparing with base model (1) there 
is an improvement in R-square. The results are in line with the findings of Keefer 
and Knack (2000) and Knack and Keefer (1995). Next, in columns (7) to (10), it is 
tested a relationship between political institutions and ethnic homogeneity and their 
combine effect on economic growth. Although political institutions appears weak 
in estimations, its interaction term with ethnic homogeneity37 is mostly significant 
and has a positive influence on economic growth. In essence, these results confirm 
the hypothesis of Collier (2000), i. e. under good political institutions an economy 
benefits from ethnic diversity. 
Columns (11) to (13) produce findings for the main hypothesis tested for this 
chapter. Column (11) gives results for testing SPI index, Gini coefficient and their 
interaction term, SPI * Gini with other common control variables on economic 
growth. As expected all three variables have a negative effect on economic growth. 
Then, we include institutional stability variables, Ell and PII, both of the variables 
have positive coefficients. SPI, Gini and the interaction terms are still significant 
and have the expected signs. Then finally, ethno- linguistic variable, elf, and its 
interaction term with PIT are added to the regression, the result is in column (12). 
The coefficients of SPI and SPI * Gini have slightly lower values but they are 
negative and significant. In effect, this confirms that high SPI and income inequality 
together can further reduce economic growth. 
37It is measured by ethno-linguistic fractionalization (elf), ranges between 0 to 1, the 
lower values 
mean ethnically more homogeneous societies. This variable is taken from La 
Porta et al. (2004), 
but originally is used in Easterly and Levine (1997) and constructed using 
data from Roberts 
(1962), Atlas Narodov Mira (1964), Muller (1964) and Gunnemark (1992). 
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In this chapter we have confronted the important prediction of empirical and partly 
theoretical issues surrounding conflict, institutions and development. These issues 
are far too wide to address in full, but this defines and encourages a further inquiry 
in this area. Formal institutions are the necessary and legal tools to intervene in 
the event of political or economic instabilities. However, the quality and efficiency 
of institutions can in fact annul the attempt of stabilising, i. e. it can be pro-cyclical 
(Rodrik, 2000). Therefore, policies that initiate a positive change in formal institu- 
tions, which in turn lead to good-practices in well-defined and managed economic 
environment appears to be crucial for development. 
Our empirical strategy in this chapter has been developed in four steps: first 
background discussion has highlighted two broad views on the relationship between 
institutions and growth, i. e. good institutions lead to development and vice versa. 
Secondly, problems of the measurement of institutions has been discussed and PCA 
have been used to build institutional variables. Thirdly, as indicated in chapter 3, in 
developing countries internal conflict has been one of the obstacles for development. 
Therefore, in this chapter the determinants of socio-political instabilities have been 
studied empirically while controlling for the institutional environment. Fourth and 
finally, the empirical analysis of institutions and development shows that economic 
institutions are more important than political ones. 
The empirical investigation has looked at first the determinants of SPI. In the 
analysis of determinants of socio-political instabilities the results show that income 
inequality and economic institutions are important factors. It is shown that countries 
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with good economic institutions are less likely to have socio-political instabilities. 
Although the cross-section analysis of SPI has produced results that are in line with 
the earlier findings, the panel data analysis results are somewhat problematic in 
terms of statistical significance. Therefore, validation of these panel data results 
requires further analysis. 
Finally, in examining the effects of institutions and instabilities on economic 
growth; it is found that when controlling for economic and political institutions the 
effects of socio-political instabilities and income inequality are negative. Also, their 
interaction term, SPI*Gini indicates a further negative effect on economic growth. 
This result indicates that countries, which have both inequality and conflict can do 
worse than the countries have one of them. Furthermore, conceptually, we explore 
this link further in the next chapter (chapter 5). In particular, we will be looking 
at various economic environments with different conflict and inequality levels. 
4.6 Appendix 
4.6.1 Principal Component Analysis (PCA) 
The PCA allows to transform a large set of variables into a lower dimension. It is a 
linear transformation and the first principal component will retain the most of the 
variation in the original set. 
Assume there are N observations and k variables this produces, an Nxk matrix 
4.6 Appendix 
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X, then the first three principal components are derived; 38 
zi = alxl + a2x2 + -- .+ akXk 
Z2 = blxl+b2x2+... +bkxk (4.6) 
Z3 = C1X1+C212+.... +CkXk 
It is indicated that coefficients a's (also b's and c's) have to be chosen so that will 
satisfy the normalization condition; ai +a2+. "" +a2 = 1. This condition will elim- 
inate the possibility of the variance of z's to be increased infinitely. Explicitly, using 
the matrix algebra the eigenvalues and eigenvectors are found. The eigenvectors 
associated with the largest eigenvalue gives us the first principal component. The 
normalization condition is that each eigenvectors length is equal to 1, i. e. the sum 
of squares of the coefficients of x-variables in equation (4.6) is equal to 1 (Maddala, 
2001). 
The first principal component, z1, is used as the index and only this principal com- 
ponent is reported in the main text. If there are no linear dependency among k 
variables then there are as many as k number of principal components. Besides, 
it can be difficult to have any economic interpretation of the principal components 
(Theil, 1971). 
38The first principal component has the highest variance and often it is the first three principal 
components that would account for almost all the variations in the k-variables (Theil, 1971). 
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Countries Gini SPI Ell PII Countries Gini SPI Ell PH 
Switzerland 33.16 -0.95 2.58 2.48 Jordan 39.28 -0.22 -0.13 -1.02 United States 40.66 -0.23 3.08 1.85 Iran 43.45 4.82 -1.76 -1.77 Canada 29.38 -1.47 2.85 2.74 Jamaica 55.71 -0.71 -0.65 2.28 Denmark 32.90 -1.42 2.54 3.39 Botswana 54.65 -1.40 1.31 1.78 Iceland 2.36 Philippines 47.06 4.23 -1.00 -1.02 Luxembourg 24.23 -1.47 2.75 PNG 50.40 0.10 0.34 3.13 
Australia 36.57 -1.47 2.71 2.82 Bolivia 54.40 -0.23 -1.53 -0.19 Sweden 22.66 -1.47 2.20 2.59 Nicaragua 54.89 1.24 -1.50 -1.64 Norway 29.47 -1.39 2.29 2.64 Morocco 42.91 -0.10 -0.59 
Belgium 28.04 -1.47 2.05 2.56 Syrian 1.74 -2.16 -3.27 
France 30.12 -0.89 1.68 2.77 Dominican Republic 47.36 -0.32 0.34 -0.57 
Netherlands 28.02 -1.47 2.49 2.28 Guyana 49.10 -0.73 -0.84 0.63 
Germany 31.25 -0.80 1.95 2.93 Thailand 46.00 1.18 0.60 0.55 
Austria 27.13 -1.42 2.26 2.84 Zimbabwe 64.85 0.78 -1.08 1.44 
Japan 31.90 -1.29 2.11 2.68 Cote d'Ivoire 46.88 -0.73 -0.22 -0.97 
Finland 28.31 -1.28 2.47 2.80 Egypt 35.49 1.25 -0.80 -2.16 
Italy 33.75 -0.79 1.02 2.17 Honduras 54.57 0.07 -1.21 -1.28 
United Kingdom 29.12 -1.26 2.46 2.77 Cameroon 54.30 -0.32 -0.64 -0.88 
New Zealand 37.41 -1.47 2.83 2.39 Romania 26.50 -0.08 -1.18 0.89 
Greece 36.29 -0.69 0.01 1.47 Angola 2.93 -1.56 
Singapore 44.56 -0.73 2.26 0.97 Indonesia 37.62 0.53 -1.27 -2.66 
Spain 31.25 -0.73 1.12 1.53 Mauritania 51.97 -0.40 -2.71 
Israel 39.54 0.99 -0.34 2.48 CAR 64.90 -0.78 -2.05 
Argentina 44.09 -0.07 -0.10 -0.59 Sri Lanka 43.85 2.71 -1.15 1.33 
Barbados 32.61 -1.47 Chad 0.45 -2.13 
Ireland 34.89 -1.41 2.02 3.43 Congo, Rep. -0.32 -1.62 -2.23 
Trinidad and Tobago 42.65 -1.16 0.74 2.54 Senegal 49.05 -0.22 -1.55 -0.72 
Gabon 61.50 -0.63 -0.84 -0.95 Togo -0.48 -1.32 -2.07 
Portugal 36.25 -1.33 1.27 0.70 Lesotho 61.00 -0.55 -0.57 
Hungary 23.62 -0.94 1.06 0.87 Gambia, The 59.30 -0.78 0.28 
Uruguay 42.18 -0.23 0.20 0.31 Kenya 51.74 -0.03 -0.22 -0.26 
South Africa 53.51 0.48 -0.24 1.10 Sierra Leone 56.35 0.37 -0.96 -1.23 
Venezuela 45.58 -0.01 -0.29 -0.10 Zambia 64.22 -0.34 -0.80 -0.28 
Cyprus 29.00 -0.92 0.15 1.17 Nigeria 49.52 -0.32 -1.61 -1.88 
Mexico 52.42 0.04 -0.32 -1.59 Ghana 45.09 -0.44 -1.22 -1.51 
Poland 27.50 -0.63 -0.04 -0.63 India 31.52 0.95 -0.27 
2.89 
Brazil 59.07 0.37 -0.15 -0.52 Pakistan 34.97 0.67 -1.22 0.82 
Taiwan 29.83 -0.67 1.06 0.42 Mozambique 39.40 1.70 -1.03 
Mauritius 40.53 1.88 Niger 46.20 -0.30 -1.09 -1.99 
Chile 54.26 0.07 0.98 -1.51 Haiti 51.20 0.26 -1.76 -1.30 
Costa Rica 46.27 -1.01 0.90 Rwanda 
37.16 0.96 -2.91 
Panama 54.31 -0.44 -0.32 Madagascar 
46.25 -0.56 -1.23 -1.89 
Peru 47.33 2.31 -1.81 -1.49 China 31.53 
1.10 -0.61 -0.60 
Malaysia 48.60 -0.66 1.10 1.94 Benin -0.54 -2.22 
Algeria 37.65 0.49 -2.47 -2.30 Bangladesh 
37.35 0.14 -1.72 -0.65 
Korea, Rep. 35.14 0.95 -0.14 -0.10 Mali 54.80 -0.34 -1.28 -2.06 
Belize -1.47 Nepal 
45.73 -0.04 1.14 
Fiji 43.73 -0.32 0.72 Burkina 
Faso 67.36 -0.70 -2.73 
Paraguay 48.54 0.04 -1.07 -2.01 Burundi 
37.56 0.87 -2.80 
Tunisia 41.75 -0.04 -0.50 -1.69 Congo, 
Dem. Rep. 0.66 -2.47 -3.27 
Colombia 53.27 2.49 -1.68 -0.48 Malawi 
55.75 -0.60 -0.78 -0.03 
Turkey 46.44 0.97 -0.26 1.43 Ethiopia 
41.71 3.66 -2.09 
Ecuador 51.13 -0.13 -0.56 -0.56 
Tanzania 50.43 0.09 -0.65 -0.31 
El Salvador 49.41 2.42 -1.44 -1.28 Guinea-Bissau 
50.00 -0.61 -2.53 -2.40 
Guatemala 55.58 2.07 -1.48 -1.71 Uganda 
50.37 3.48 -1.58 -2.03 
Note 1: Gini is averaged over 1960 to 2000. However, the data is not collected on regular 
basis. 
For instance Rwanda h as two d ata points for w hole period; in 1980, Gini is circ a 
28 and in 1990 Gini is circa 45. 
Note 2: The data is listed descending order bas ed on GDP per head in 1980 
Table 4.4: Gini, Ell, PII, and SPI Data 
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Chapter 5 
Property Rights, Inequality and 
Conflict 
"... rapid economic growth, far from being the source of domestic tranquility 
it is sometimes supposed to be, is rather a disruptive and destabilizing force 
that leads to political instability. This does not mean that rapid economic 
growth is undesirable or that political instability is undesirable. It means, 
rather, that no one should promote the first without bracing to meet the 
second. " 
(Olson, 1963), [p. 552]. 
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5.1 Introduction 
Chapter 4 suggests that institutions are vital in establishing well functioning po- 
litical, legal, and economic systems that ensure perfectly enforced property rights 
of its individual members and reduce appropriative (rent-seeking) behaviour among 
individuals and their associated corporations. Furthermore the link between insti- 
tutions and development appears to be complex. The pursuit of economic growth 
alone might be detrimental to the welfare of a developing economy when institutions 
are weak. This is a claim that has been made by a number of recent studies critically 
analysing the relationship between inequality and weak property rights, based on 
the stylised facts; see Mokyr (2002), Acemoglu et al. (2003), Gonzalez (2005,2007) 
and so forth. Besides, it is posited by development economists that the increased 
inequality which comes with decreased welfare is a key determinant of social con- 
flict. Social conflict, in turn, has the effect of lowering growth; see for instance Bwy 
(1968), Hibbs (1973), Gurr (1993) and Rodrik (2000). 
According to Gonzalez (2004,2007) there are circumstances where increasing 
property rights in society can actually reduce social welfare and hence incremental 
changes are not in people's interest. Improvement in property rights 
depends upon 
the functionality of institutions. Many developing economies undergo the difficulty 
of establishing good economic and political institutions and are unable to enforce 
the 
claims of individual's own property. This may prepare a setting 
for some individuals 
or groups to have exclusive rights in seeking other's' consumables or 
investment. In 
actual fact, a state/ government itself, in some of these economies might 
be expro- 
priating its agents' output; this has been explored widely 
in earlier works, see for 
instance De Soto (1989), Lane and Tornell (1996) and Acemoglu and Verdier 
(1998). 
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This theoretical chapter investigates how agents allocate their resources under 
different institutional environments. Some studies have claimed that weak institu- 
tions encourage agents, who are specialized in skills that are of utmost importance 
in the development of economy, and who are not allowed to adequately practice 
these skills to behave corruptibly; see Murphy et al. (1993), Acemoglu and Verdier 
(1998) and Hall and Jones (1999). Hence, this chapter illustrates that productive 
capital may not be as productive as much as it could be when institutions fail to 
entitle absolute control of resources and consumables of individuals/ agents . 
In a self-enforcing property rights environment, agents are obliged to allocate 
some of their own resources to sustain self-enforcement. ' In Gonzalez (2004,2007), 
he assumes each agent to participate in three activities: productive, defensive and 
offensive. A symmetry assumption assumed by Gozalez forces each agent to be 
homogenous in allocating resources at the equilibrium, despite the fact that some 
individuals basically have nothing to claim/defend. The model we propose here 
relaxes the symmetry assumption that all agents in the economy are involved in 
both appropriation activities. The goal therefore is to show in an equilibrium setting, 
that low productivity agents will specialize in predatory-offensive activities and the 
productive agent will involve in productive and predatory-defence activities of its 
own property. Further, we do not posit, a priori, the way that agents either invest in 
defensive or offensive activities, rather we allow this to be determined endogenously 
within the model; see also Grossman and Kim (1996). 
An interesting question that arises in a state of an insecure economy is the fol- 
lowing: will agents consume more and invest less or vice versa? That is, if agents 
'There is no government to enforce the rule of law or in the case of a government, the enforce- 
ment of property rights is weak. 
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think that they have two choices either they will consume more of what they pro- 
duce2 or continue to invest in productive capital with jointly increasing expenditure 
in defensive capital. The trade off between these two decisions needs to be explored. 
Under such circumstances, Gonzalez (2004,2007) claims that the cost of insecure 
property rights is higher than the cost of their establishment. In his model, con- 
flict3 arises as individuals try to secure their own output and also appropriate the 
average output of the economy. However, the conjecture that rational agents will 
behave both offensively and defensively at the equilibrium may not account for con- 
flict that arises as the low productivity agent may not actually afford to allocate 
their resources to defensive activities. Thus, this chapter primarily aims to address 
this problem and investigates the utility in equilibrium of each agent under various 
economic environments. 
This chapter is organised as follows; first, in section 2 we explore how theory 
of conflict is linked to the theory of production in the literature with a particular 
emphasis on Gonzalez (2004,2007). Then, we set out and extend the Gonzalez 
model in section 3. Section 4 presents and discusses our model. Finally, section 5 
gives summary and conclusions; section 6 provides the appendix to this chapter. 
5.2 The Conflict and Growth Literature 
Hirshleifer (1988,1989,1995, and 2000), provides the foundation of a recent large lit- 
erature on conflict. In Hirshleifer (1988 and 1989), he describes a rational individual, 
2As they know that investing more may not be the rational choice as it is subject to appropri- 
ation. 
3Loosely speaking, the term conflict used here may not necessarily mean militarized conflict, 
it 
can be social unrest, civil conflict, industrial disputes etc. 
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who wants to maximize their utility and has two options to do this, by production 
or by appropriation, the choice of which depends on the economic environment. In 
particular, formal institutions would have a direct effect on the path is taken; for 
instance when the returns are high from appropriating somebody else's output it 
will be beneficial to choose a predatory path when they cannot attain the same level 
of utility solely by their own productive activity. 
Following this work of Hirshleifer, there has been an enormous body of theoretical 
work to model the implication of conflict arising from imperfect property rights on 
economic growth and welfare. Conflict is incorporated into growth and welfare 
models through technology of conflict - contest success functions (CSFs). They 
are used extensively in the conflict literature. ' In basic terms, CSFs, quantifies 
the probability of winning a contest and this probability is dependent on how much 
resources each party is putting aside for the contest and how we define the functional 
form. There are two classes of CSFs; 
9 Ratio Form: The appropriative success (or winning a contest) is determined 
by the ratio of the resources invested in appropriation by each party. 
" Difference (Logistic) Form: The appropriative success is determined 
by the 
Logistic form; this is the difference of the resources invested into appropriative 
activities by each party. 
There are two important parameters in CSFs that we will define in the context of 
this paper; the property rights parameter, which measures the quality of property 
4The next section will discuss the functional forms more in 
detail. See, for example, Anderton 
(2000), Hirshleifer (2000), Skaperdas (1991), Garfinkel and Skaperdas (2000). 
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rights and decisiveness parameter that measures the effectiveness of conflict. 5 These 
parameters will become clearer in the subsequent section. 
The ratio form is heavily used in the work of Grossman; especially see Grossman 
and Kim (1996), and Grossman (2001). In general he models a two-agent framework; 
prey and predator. Grossman and Kim (1996) look at two agents, one of which 
partakes in pure predatory activity, the other is involved in pure defensive activity. 
Technology of conflict is defined using the ratio form and each agent always finds 
it profitable to put some resources into appropriative activity. However, initially 
the prey allows some of their resources to be captured by the predator but at some 
level of remaining resources the prey finds it optimal to defend their property. This 
results in a deterrence effect on the predatory agent which is very costly for the 
prey. Furthermore, the decision of whether to become a pure predator, or predator 
and producer, will depend upon the strength of security of property rights and how 
strong is the prey. If the prey also engages in production and defence together, then 
it is more difficult for the predator to engage in appropriation. 
Gonzalez (2004,2007) makes an important contribution and state that societies 
may not really place too much reliance on the actual growth rate; rather the way this 
growth is distributed is the major issue we should look at. It is in fact very important 
to investigate how to sustain positive economic growth in developing economies 
and what is more important is how this additional income is shared amongst the 
productive agents. s In general, the works of Grossman distinguish between defensive 
5These two parameters directly affect the outcomes for each party as it is shown in next section 
that the allocated resources are important in determining outcome however this is true if these two 
parameters are normalize to 1. For instance, if we restrict decisiveness parameter to be E 
(0,1) 
which determines the diminishing returns to appropriation. Further, more resources are 
diverted 
from productive activity as decisiveness parameter gradually increases within the sequence of 
(0,1). 
6Also Gonzalez (2005) draws attention to the fact that an economic agent may not necessarily 
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and offensive activates and the work of Hirshleifer studies appropriative activities 
in the context of a common-pool. Gonzalez (2004,2007) incorporates these two 
studies in his model and formalizes a model of property rights for an infinitely-lived 
representative agent who wants to maximize their consumption stream in the long 
run. Individuals use offensive investment to appropriate average income for the 
economy, but also invest in defensive activity to protect their own output. Further, 
Gonzalez (2004,2007) also expresses that even when there are some improvements 
in property rights, this may still be harmful to welfare until there is a substantial 
improvement in property rights. 
How do formal institutions play a role in the creation or evolution of perfect 
property rights? The above literature looks into self or private enforcement property 
rights: however, as North (1990) indicates, the nation building factors - the rule of 
law, the risk of expropriating property, bureaucratic quality, infrastructure quality 
and contract enforcement- are factors defined as to be the key in the evolution of 
perfect property rights. North (1990) examines the evolution of formal and informal 
institutions and stresses how well established institutions can reduce transaction 
costs and uncertainty. He exemplifies the contradictory stories of how the change 
and stability of institutions lead to successful and disastrous development stories, 
for instance, in 19th century US and Latin American countries. 
Furthermore, the relevant government policies have a critical role in the estab- 
lishment of good institutions and perfectly enforced property rights. In effect, it 
is these institutions which differ between economies and which account for differ- 
ences in the productivity level among countries. In an empirical investigation of 
find rewarding in adapting superior technologies as the return are not secure. In addition, there is 
a trade off between defensive capital and productive capital. 
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weak institutions and property rights, Hall and Jones (1999) show how the issue 
of poor social infrastructure motivates diversion of resources from productive ac- 
tivity. They indicate that differences in output per worker across countries can be 
explained partly by differences, in social infrastructure across countries. They sug- 
gest that good government policy and institutions which determine the economic 
environment allow and support the accumulation of human capital and innovation. 
Similarly, Mauro (1995) looks at the detrimental effect of corruption on economic 
growth. To find the causes and consequences of corruption and rent seeking he uses 
a panel of 70 countries over the period of 1971 - 1983 and concludes that the quality 
of the bureaucracy of government officials has important implications for growth. 
When there is a lack of enforcement of property rights, especially in economies 
where the government itself is involved in expropriation, individuals do not have 
control over the use of their resources and the distribution of their output or income. 
In such an instance, they will be encouraged to engage more in predatory activities. 
Murphy et al. (1993), and Acemoglu and Verdier (1998), look into these issues and 
posit that skillful individuals find it difficult to deal with the appropriative behaviour 
of government and weak institutions other than adjusting themselves to this. They, 
specially, emphasize that rent-seeking and corruption activities in these countries 
result in a poor allocation of resource as the unproductive activities continue and 
eventually lead to slow growth. 
In a similar vein, Sturzenegger and Tommasi (1994) show that an unequal dis- 
tribution of political power plays an important role on who can gain support from 
government over the innovative projects. Therefore entrepreneurs and private com- 
panies devote their important resources, time and effort, to gain this so that they 
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can be the leader in the next period and achieve monopoly profit. 7 
Expropriating behaviour of government is also discussed by De Soto (1989). In 
a case study of Peru, he claims that public sector expropriation (rent-seeking) is 
more severe as it means that the inception of formal firms is costly and undertaking 
any innovative activity will not be profitable or returns will be very low and these 
may encourage the establishment of a large informal economy. Therefore small and 
medium entrepreneurs are very vulnerable to government expropriation. Arguably 
in such economies there may be a tendency to consume most of their output rather 
than invest for the future. 
5.3 Re-examining and Generalising the Gonzalez 
(2004,2007) Model 
Before setting out our model, in this section, we characterize the Gonzalez (2004, 
2007) model and generalize his findings. To extend his model a more general form 
of utility function (with a risk aversion parameter, a> 1) is used and also it is 
assumed less than full depreciation in capital. The first generalisation proves to be 
a critical one that significantly changes an important result. 
The model consists of a intertemporal optimization problem carried out by a 
representative agent i subject to their resource constraint. The agent at time t=0 
allocates resources across consumption, and investment in productive and unpro- 
'Also in political dimensions of property rights; Lane and Tornell (1996) look at natural resource 
rich countries development performance and assert that resource rich countries experience so-called 
common-pool problem (seeTornell and Velasco (1992), and Tornell 
(1997)) 
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ductive capital over an infinite time horizon so as to maximize 
E, 3, U(Ci(t)) 
c=o 
(5.1) 
where ci(t) is consumption at time t and 3E (0,1) is a discount factor. The utility 
function is a concave and increasing function of consumption, c, u(c) > 0, u"(c) < 0. 
It is assumed that each agent in the economy have similar preferences over the 
consumption sequence. 
The production function: 
yi(t) = Aki(t) 
With A>0, households supply a fixed amount of labour, L, and productive capital 
per head is defined: ki (t) = 
K(). Output is only a function of capital and linear in L 
productive capital, ki(t). 8 The production function has some important characteris- 
tics to note: there is no diminishing returns to capital, (i. e. f"(") <0 is not a valid 
assumption); the marginal product of capital (MPC) is constant and equal to A. 9 
In the absence of appropriative activities a stock of productive capital k2 (t) ac- 
cumulated at time t produces output yZ (t) = Ak(t). With appropriation agent i 
retains only pi (t)Aki (t) where the proportion pi (t) E [0,1] is determined by a contest 
success function (CSF) given below. Agent i can also lay claim to an proportion 
qi(t) of society's average output y(t) = Ak(t) determined by another CSF. 
8Productive capital refers to the capital that is merely used to produce output. 
9Mathematically; limk--ýoo f'(k) =A>0. It is this assumption that allows technology to be 
the engine of continuous economic growth. 
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Contest Success Functions: 
Let xi(t) be the accumulated stock allocated by agent i in defence of his claims to 
property rights against all other agents, and zi (t) allocated to offensive claims to 
others. General forms of the CSF, discussed in Skaperdas (1996), takes the form 
ir. f (xi(t)) 
Pi(t) _- 
ýf (xi(t)) +f (z(t)) 'f'>0 
(5.2) 
qi(t) =f 
(zi(t)) 
(5.3) 
7r. f (xi(t)) + 
.f 
(z(t)) 
where 1< 7r < oo ensures that defence of property claims is more effective than 
the challenge of other agents' claims. In the context of the model here, the value of 
7r =1 would imply that there is no differentiation between defensive and offensive 
activities. By the assumption that 7r > 1, this is ruled out. In other words when 
both appropriative activities, defensive and offensive, have an equal allocation of 
resources among agents, the defence of their claims would be more effective. 10 As 
7r -f oo, pi(t) --* 1 and q2(t) --+ 0 and we approach perfect property rights. 
Two forms of the CSF, discussed in Hirshleifer (2000) at some length, are the ratio 
form (used by Gonzalez) and the difference form. These take the forms respectively 
7r (xi(t))m 
_1 
(5.4) pi lt) - (it(xi(t))m + (z(t))m 1+ z(tt m (xt( 
7 exp (kxi(t)) (5.5) 
pi (t) - 
7r exp (kxi(t)) + exp (kz(t)) 1 +r exp (k(xi(t) - z(t))) 
"Assume that xi(t) = z(t), and 7r =1 then the ratio form of CSF is given: 
m 
pt(t) 
7rXi(t)m + z(t)Tn -2=0.5 
=1ýýý = 1ý 
Therefore, at the steady state having 7r >1 ensures that agents can always retain at 
least 50% of 
their own output. 
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qi (t) _ 
(Zi(t))m 
_ (7r(x(t))m + (z2(t))m 
qi(t) = 
exp (kzi(t)) 
7r exp (kx(t)) + exp (kzi(t)) 
1 
1+ 7r xýt 
m 
zit) 
1 
1+ 7rexp (k(x(t) - zi(t))) 
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(5.6) 
(5.7) 
The parameter m in (5.4) or k in (5.5) are decisiveness parameters scaling the degree 
to which a side's greater strength translates into enhanced appropriation success. 
Below, these two forms of CSFs are graphed. 
As illustrated in figure (5.1) parameters m in the ratio form and k in the dif- 
ference form plays a very important role. To evaluate decisiveness parameters, the 
effectiveness parameter, it, and the average offensive capital, z, are fixed at one and 
250 respectively. Having m<1, agent i can only retain around half of its produc- 
tion, whilst it =1 and having allocated defensive capital, xi, well above the average 
offensive capital, z. " Furthermore, in the ratio form, in particular, if m<1, then 
marginal returns to offensive and defensive activities are decreasing. However, when 
m>1, there are initial increasing marginal returns until the point of inflection that 
occurs at pi = m-1 2m 
Optimization Problem and Equilibrium Analysis of the Generalised Gon- 
zalez (2004,2007) Model: 
Under imperfect property rights, a stock of productive capital, ki(t) produces output, 
Aki(t) and economy's average output, Ak(t) and the net output of agent i is given: 
yi(t) = A(pi(t)ki(t) + gi(t)k(t)) 
"Having it >1 allows agent i to be able to retain more than half of the proportion of their 
output. 
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Figure 5.1: Contest Success Functions 7r =1 
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Assume that A>2, k(O) > 0, x(0) > 0, z(0) >0 and the decisiveness and property 
rights parameters; 0<m<1 and 7r > 1. The output y2 (t) would be equal to 
its value under perfect property rights whenever m -} 0 then pi(t) -- * 1'7r and 
qi (t) -* 1+7r and 7r -ý oo 
then p (t) -> 1 and q1(t) -* 0. In other words, property 
rights are guaranteed and we arrive at a standard economic model. 
Agent i allocates their output among consumption at time t, ci(t) and investment 
in next period's stocks of capital; productive, ki(t + 1), and unproductive, xi(t + 1) 
and zi(t + 1) capital. Assume that the productive, defensive and offensive capital 
depreciate at rates 8k, S., and Sz respectively. 12 The investment at time t for each 
capital is then defined as: (ki(t + 1) - (1 - Sk)k2(t)), (xi(t + 1) - (1 - bx)xi(t)) and 
(zi(t + 1) - (1 - bz)zi(t)). 
Thus, the resource constraint for agent i is given: 
yz(t) = A(pi (t)ki(t) + gz(t)k(t)) 
>c (t) + ki(t + 1) -(1 - 
8k)ki(t) + xi(t + 1) 
(5.8) 
_ (1 - (5x)xi(t) + zi(t + 
1) - (1 - bz)zi(t) 
at time t=0, each agent is endowed with stocks of productive, 
k(0) >0 and 
unproductive capital, x(0) >0 and z(0) > 0. Taking other agents 
decision as 
given, agent i then chooses allocations {li(t)}, {xi(t)} and 
{zi(t)} to maximize (5.1) 
subject to the resource constraint (5.8). The ratio form of the 
CSFs, (5.4) and (5.6) 
are used with given aggregate quantities, k(t), x(t) and z(t). 
To solve the optimization problem of agent i form the 
Lagrangian and let At denote 
12Note Gonzalez (2004,2007) assumes full depreciation; bk = bx = 
ÖZ = 1" 
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the Lagrangian multiplier: 
00 
L=E, 6'[u(ci(t))+Ai(t)(A(pi(t)ki(t)+qi(t)k(t)) 
t-o 
-cz(t) - ki(t + 1) + (1- Sk)ki(t) -x (t + 1) (5.9) 
+`1 - 6x)xi(t) - zi(t + 1) + (1 - az)zi(t))J 
the first-order conditions are: 
cZ(t) . 
au(ci(t)) 
- xi(t) =0 (5.10 aci (t) ) 
ki(t) : 'Yt)(Api(t) + (1 - Sk)) -1 Ai(t - 1) =0 (5.11) 
xi (t) : \i (t) Aa1ýi(t) 
axi (t) 
ki(t) +A 
aagZxz (t) 
k(t) + (1 - Sx) (5.12) 
-1 a 
Ai(t-1)=0 
z2(t) Ai (t) Aýýi(t) 
äzZ (t) 
ki(t) +A 
äýgzzß (t) 
k(t) + (1 - USý, 
) (5.13) 
-1Ai(t-1)=0 a 
Ai (t) A(pi(t)ki(t) + gi(t)k(t)) - [ci(t) + ki(t + 1) (5.14) 
-(1 - bk)ki(t) + xi(t + 1) - (1 - bx)xi(t) + zi(t + 1) - (1 - 6z)zi(t)] =0 
But from the ratio form of the CSF functions we see that agi(t) - 
a"(t) 
= 0. The axe(t) - azi(t) 
Lagrangian multiplier A(t) is equal to the marginal increase in u(ci(t)) by reducing 
the constraint at time t. In what follows, the first expression in the first order 
condition means that along the optimal path the marginal utility of consumption at 
any point in time is equal to the shadow price of capital; that is the )(t). Hence, the 
extra utility from additional unit of consumption "today" is the opportunity cost of 
forgone productive or defensive or offensive capital. 
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Furthermore assuming a constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) form of the 
instantaneous utility function: 
-Q - u(c) _ 
cl 1; 
or > 0, a1 1-a 
= log(c); a=1, (1'Hopital's Rule) (5.15) 
and the coefficient of CRRA13 is given by; 
CRRA - 
cu"(c) 
_ is (c) 
Now, re-writing these first order conditions that yield, 
ci(t)-o' = Ai(t) (5.16) 
/3(Api(t) +1- 8k) _ 
A2(t - 1) (5.17) 
A (t) 
ß Aapi(t) k (t) + 1- s. _ 
Ai(t -1) (5.18) öxi(t) A (t) 
agi(t) Ai(t - 1) ß Aazz(t)(t) + 1- bz = Ai(t) (5.19) 
yi(t) = A(pi(t)ki(t) + gi(t)k(t)) (5.20) 
= ci(t) + ki(t + I)- (1 - Sk)ki(t) + xi(t + 1) (5.21) 
-(1 - Sý)xi(t) + zi(t + 1) - (1 - bz)zi(t) 
Setting 8k = J,; = b, z =1 and a=1 and combining expressions 
in the first order 
conditions we arrive at Euler equations (5)-(7) in Gonzalez (2004). 
13Note that CRRA measures the curvature of the utility function with respect to change in 
consumption, in other words, it is the elasticity of marginal utility. Also note that this class 
of utility functions is known as constant intertemporal elasticity of substitution 
(CIES) utility 
function (see Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004)) and the reciprocal of CIES between one period to 
future periods, o,, which is the coefficient of CRRA. 
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The left hand sides of the equations (5.17), (5.17) and (5.19) indicate the marginal 
product of each capital minus the depreciation plus 1. Using equation (5.16), the La- 
grangian multipliers are eliminated and we obtain three Euler equations. Especially, 
from (5.16) and (5.17) we have 
ýz(t+1) or 
L ci(t) 
]=ß(APi(t+1)+1_6k) 
(5.22) 
and note that ci(t+lý _ c2(tý -y 
+ 1, hence the long-run endogenous growth rate is now 
1'=[ß(Ap(7r)+1-6k)]° -1 (5.23) 
If b=1 and o=1, the growth rate becomes, , 3p(7r)A - 1, which is the growth 
rate in Gonzalez (2004,2007). Since p>2, the sufficient condition for positive 
growth is that ßA > 2, this also the condition in the extended model. Further, in 
equation (5.23) whenever p(7r) =1 we arrive at growth rate under perfect property 
rights-a standard endogenous growth model outcome. If 7r >1 and 2< p(7r) < 1, 
the growth rate under imperfect property rights is always less than the growth rate 
under perfect property rights. 
In a symmetric equilibrium, a long-run balanced growth path requires that 
c(t+l) _ 
k(t+1) 
_ 
tß-1 
=z 
t+1) 
k(t) x(t) z(t) 
From (5.17), (5.18) and (5.19) we have 
Api(t) +1- bk 
=1 (5.24) 
Aa` (t)ki(t)+1-bx axi (t) 
Api(t) +1- bk 
=1 (5.25) 
Aava(t)k(t)+1-bz azi (t) 
Note that the model uses the ratio form of CSFs hence the partial derivative of ratio 
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form with respect to xi (t) and zi (t) are 
äpi 
_m 
lrxm zm m 
"` + zm 7rxm + zm x 
pi(1 - pi) (5.26) äxi xi 7fxi 
ai 
äqi 
_m 
zz"' 7rxm 
_m Özi zi 7fxm + z''' 7fxm +m 
qi(1 - Qi) 
(5.27) 
z zi zi 
Hence in a symmetric equilibrium with li(t) = k(t), xi(t) = x(t) and z2(t) = z(t), 
we can write (5.24) and (5.25) as 
f [x(t), k(t), z(t)] =1 (5.28) 
[x (t), k(t), z(t)] =1 (5.29) 
For a symmetric equilibrium note also the followings; 
1. pi(t) + qi(t) =1 this ensues from xi(t) _ x(t), zi(t) = z(t) and S, = Sz. To 
prove it write 1- pi (t) and substitute xi (t) = x(t) and zi (t) = z(t) to reach 
qz(t). 
2. Using (5.18) and (5.19) and again assuming b., =& and ki(t) = k(t) it is found 
that x (t) = zi (t) 
Proof: 
ape (t) 
k . (t) = 
aq2 (t) 
k (t) 
axi (t) azý (t) 
pi(t)(1 - pi(t))ki(t) _ xi (t) 
m 
gi(t)(1 - gi(t))k(t) zi(t) 
1 
pz(t)(1 - pz(t)) =1 gz(t)(1 - qz(t)) 
xi (t) zz(t) 
xi (t) 
=A 
(t)(1 - pi (t)) 
zi(t) gi(t)(1 - qi(t)) 
x(t) = z(t) 
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3. x(t) = z(t) = m(1 - p(7r))k(t) 
Proof: Use equations (5.17) and (5.18), and assume bk =dx= 6Z and then 
substitute xi(t) _ x(t) and zi(t) = z(t) one can verify that 
x(t) = z(t) _ 
mp(7r)k(t) 
= m(1 - p(ir))k(t) (5.30) 7r 
The right hand side of the expression is the same as equation (11) in Gonzalez 
(2004). 14 
Using (5.28) and (5.29) we can eliminate x(t) and z(t) and then the resource con- 
straint and the symmetric form of the Euler equation (5.22) can now be set up as 
a2x2 difference system as a function of {ci(t), ki(t)}. To find the equilibrium ex- 
pressions for c(t) and k(t) first use (5.30) to simplify the resource equation (5.8) and 
together with the (5.22) it solves for c(t) and k(t). Assuming that 5k = bx = ýx =b 
the resource constraint now is written only as the function of {c(t), k(t)}: 
c(t) = [A - (1 + 2m(1 - p(ir)))('y + 6)]k(t) (5.31) 
1 
where 'y = [ß(Ap(7r) +1- bk)] - 1. 
It is easily verified that if a=1 and b=1 the expression (5.31) reduces to that 
of equation (14) in Gonzalez (2004). 
14Note that p(t) =p= p(7r) = 1+, r and 
dividing both side by 7r gives; 
P(7r) 
=1=1- p(7r) =q 1 +ir 
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Proof of Proposition 1 in Gonzalez (2004): 
Gonzalez (2004,2007) asserts that a gradual piecemeal increment in property rights 
(7r) does not always improve welfare. Formally, for relatively very high values of m 
and ß there exists a sequence (a, b), and 7r E (a, b) C [1, oo) such that even though 
property rights are improving and positive growth is assured, the utility of agent i 
declines for 7E (a, b). 
In order to analyse this claim under the extended model the utility function is 
re-examined; 
U=1 CMI-a 
i-ý -1 
(5.32) 
(1 0, ) Li - ß(1 +'Y) 1 
Take the partial derivative of (5.32) with respect to parameter it and note that c(O) 
and ry are given by (5.31) and (5.23) respectively: 
au au op(7r) 
a7r - Op(7r) a7r 
Where aä( 'r) >0V it E [1, oo). Hence, considering ap7r) will suffice. 
1 c(0)1-O 
_1 
op (7r) Op(7r) _o 
if and only if 
(1 + ý, )ý(1 _ ß(1 +, ý)i-ý) 
ac(o) 
+ c(0)Oc(0)i-, o >0 (5.33) ap(-ir) ap(F) 
and further rearranging equation (5.33) 
[(1 + -')o, - ß(1 + 'Y)] 
8c(0) 
ap(p) 
+ ßc(0) 
ap(p) 
>0 (5.34) 
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Evaluate this at a=1 and 6=1 to reach at proposition 1 in Gonzalez (2004,2007). 
Note that 
ac(0) 
- 2m(-y + b) -Q [1 + 2m(1 - p(ý))](ßp(ý)A +1- 6)1J Op (ir) 
°ßA 
a7 
_ ßA 
1 
ap (7r) 
{ß(p(7F)A +1- b)] 1 ýa 
U 
and evaluate these at a=1 and 6=1 
äc(0) 
= 2m(OAP(7r)) - [1 + 2m(1 - p(7r))]OA a 7r 
I 
a-1, s=1 
a- I= ßA ö 7r i =1,5=1 pý ) 
Substituting these into (5.34) and assuming a=1 and 6=1, the Gonzalez (2004, 
2007) proposition (1) is verified by solving the following expression: 
p(ir)[l + 2m(1 - (2 - ß)p(ir))} <1 
The left hand side is quadratic in p(7r) and for the roots to exists; 
(1+2m)2-8m(2-ß) >0 or 
(1 + 2m)2 
8m > 
2-ß 
which completes the proof. As Gonzalez (2004,2007) states this proposition defines 
sequence in which there exist an interior equilibrium, for all it E [1, oo) but for some 
it utility is decreasing. Figure 5.2 re-produce the Gonzalez (2004,2007) graphs and 
the case where a=1.5. 
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A simple extensions of the Gonzalez model suggests that the Gonzalez (2004, 
2007) findings do not hold for `d a>1. For a=1.5, figure 5.2 indicates that a 
small increment in property rights has a positive effect on utility throughout. The 
Gonzalez result in other words is dependent on the assumption if a logarithmic 
utility function in consumption. 
Furthermore, one of the main drawbacks of the Gonzalez model is the assump- 
tion that each agent at the equilibrium finds it optimal to allocate resources to the 
both appropriative activities. The subsequent section 5.4 addresses this issue by 
introducing agents with heterogenous ability to produce. In doing so an alternative 
production function is used, that is strictly concave and satisfies the "Inada con- 
ditions". The alternative production function is necessary in order to unsure that 
the model provides results that are supported by "stylized facts. " That is to say, 
assuming heterogenous ability to produce and using AK-production function results 
output differentials between agents to grow exponentially. 
5.4 The Model 
Our model consists of an intertemporal optimization problem carried out by het- 
erogenous agents subject to their resource constraint defined below. Agent i at time 
t=0 allocates resources across consumption, c2, and investment in three capital 
stocks, ki, xi, and z2, over an infinite time horizon to maximize their utility given by 
5.1. Each individual differs in terms of their resource constraints. In what follows, 
they have identical production functions but different productivity level that intro- 
duces heterogeneity amongst them. The production function for agent i is given 
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by; 
yi(t) = Aiki(t)a 
where aE (0,1). 
189 
(5.35) 
A stock of capital k2(t) is allocated at every time t to produce output, yi(t) = 
Aiki(t)a. In this model we also assume imperfect property rights. Hence agent i 
claims over their output are insecure. As a result, agent i can claim only pi(t)Aiki(t)a 
where the proportion p2 (t) E [0,1] is determined by a ratio form of CSF defined by 
equation (5.4). Agent i can also lay claim to an proportion qi(t) of the society's 
average output y(t) = Aka(t) determined by another ratio form of CSF, defined by 
equation (5.6). The resource constraint for agent i is now defined as; 
yz(t) = Pi(t)Azki(t)a + gz(t)A%(t)a (5.36) 
= C2(t) + kz(t + 1) - (1 - 5k)ki(t) + xi (t + 1) - (1 - bx)xi(t) + zi(t + 1) - (1 - 6z)zz(t) 
Note that if a=1 the production function is AK as in Gonzalez (2004,2007). Agent 
i then chooses allocations {ki(t)}, {x2(t)} and {zi(t)} to maximize (5.1) subject to 
the resource constraint (5.36), the form of the CSFs (5.4) and (5.6), and given the 
economy's average quantities Ak(t), x(t) and z(t). 
Further, as before the utility function is given by; 
u(c) =; o>1, 1-a 
= log(o); a=1 (5.37) 
For agent i the Lagrangian is set out as; 
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00 
L= EO'[u(ci(t))+, \i(t)(pi(t)Aik"(t)+qi(t)Ak"(t) 
t=o 
-ci(t) - ki(t + 1) + (1 - 8k)ki(t) - xi(t + 1) (5.38) 
+(I - 
6x)xi(t) 
- z2(t + 1) + (i - bx), zi(t))) 
Where Xi is the lagrangian multiplier and 6 is depreciation rate for each capital 
stock. The first-order conditions for an interior solution are: 
c (t) Ai(t) = Ci(t)-o' (5.39) 
ki(t) : Ai(t) (aAipi(t)ka -1(t) +1- bk) _I \i(t - 1) (5.40) i 
13 
xi(t) :A (t) 
1Ai api(t) 
ka(t) +1- Jx =1 Ai (t - 1) (5.41) axi (t) ,3 
zi(t) Ai(t) A 3z zi (t) 
ka(t) +1- bz =1 Ai (t - 1) (5.42) 
This system determines the reaction functions for an interior solution, i. e. ki(t) > 0, 
xi (t) > 0, and zi (t) > 0. Besides this the reaction functions show how choices 
of agent i depend on the decisions of all others, that are given by the aggregate 
variables; Ak(t)", x(t) and z(t). 
Steady State: The first order condition for an interior solution with a zero- 
growth steady state; ca (t) = ci(t-1) = ci, ki(t) = ki(t-1) = ki, xi (t) = xi(t-1) = xi 
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and zi(t) = zi(t - 1) = zi; 
Ai=cia (5.43) 
0 (Aiapi(t)ki(t)a-' +1- 6k) =1 (5.44) 
ß Ai 
ýPZ(t)ki(t)a+l-bx 
axi (t) (5.45) 
ß 
Oz(ai(t)a() i (t) 
+1-6, z =1 (5.46) 
yi = piAik + giAka (5.47) 
Ci + 8kki + 6xxi + 8xzi (5.48) 
As in Gonzalez model, our model also employs the ratio form of CSFs with 0< 
m<1 to ensure decreasing returns to appropriative activities throughout. Also, 
note that the partial derivative of ratio form with respect to x2(t) and zi(t) are given 
by; 
äpi m (Z)MP2 (5.49) i axi 7TXi Xi 
äqi m7r (\\mqi 2 (5.50) 
(9zi zi zi 
To solve the model for each agent substitute equations (5.49) and (5.50) into Euler 
equations (5.44) - (5.48). At the steady state each agent's decisions are functions 
of Ai and aggregate variables, that is ki = ki (Ai, y, x, z), xi = xi (Ai, y, x, z), and 
zi = zi(Az, y, x, z). 
The average variables for n, (n > 2), agents economy; 
1nn 
y= Ak(t)' =E yZ = 
1: Aika (5.51) 
nn ii 
1n1n 
x(t) =-E xi and z(t) =-nE zi n ii 
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We now solve for ci, ki, xi, zi, and yZ for i=1,. .., n using 
(5.43)-(5.48) and 
defining averages by (5.51). Recursively, the behavioural equations, (5.44)-(5.46), 
and the averages solve for lei, xi, and zi for i=1,... , n. 
Then, finally, (5.47) gives 
y2 and (5.48) gives ci. 
For two agents, i and j, it is easy to see from equation (5.44) that the relative 
capital stocks depends on productivity and the ability to retain their own output; 
1-a 
Aipika-1 
= Ajpjk -1 = 
ki Ai pi (5.52) 
(kj) 
A7 P. 7 
5.4.1 Symmetric Equilibrium in the Extended Ramsey Model 
In this section we compare the model proposed here with the Gonzalez model. 15 
Hence, we assume that agents are identical in their productivity level, Ai = A, 
and there is full depreciation, 6k = 6x = 6, =1, as in the Gonzalez model we solve 
Euler equations (5.43)- (5.46) for a symmetric equilibrium. A symmetric equilibrium 
necessitates that pi + q2 = 1, which implies ki(t) = k(t), xi(t) = x(t) and zi(t) = z(t) 
and for 0< Sx = bz <1 then one can show that x(t) = z(t). 
Using two first order conditions for k and x or k and z when 0<6=b, = 6k < 1, 
the association between each capital is found to be, 
x(t) = z(t) = mý(ý) COT k(t) 
This is equal to equation (5.30) with a=1. Finally, these results are used to solve 
"We have generalised Gonzalez (2004,2007) by considering a>1 and 
less than full depreciation 
in capital. 
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for the steady state expressions of k, c, x and z that are given by: 
k= (ßAap(ir))1I1-« (5.53) 
= Z= 1ý (5.54) 
air 
y= C+Skk+S., x+Szz (5.55) 
U= 11 
1-ß 1- (5.56) 
To analyse the implication of the model on utility, we evaluate the CIES utility 
function at the steady state with zero growth rate, c(t) = c(t - 1) =c and u>1,16 
ßt c(t)i-ý v= 
CO 
1-a 
t-o 
1 1cl-ý -1 
1-, Q 1-a 
Figure 5.3 uses results from this symmetric equilibrium and illustrates the be- 
haviour of utility when property rights are emerging. For a low level of conflict, i. e. 
m=0.1, a small increment in property rights affects utility everywhere positively. 
However, when the returns from conflict is relatively high, i. e. m=0.97, prop- 
erty rights become welfare improving only after p>0.5; i. e. agents retain at least 
50% of their output. However, it is important to point out that Gonzalez (2004, 
2007) 17 assumes 7r > 1; therefore, we can claim that any small increment in property 
rights affect each agent's utility positively regardless of the conflict level under the 
symmetric equilibrium in extended Ramsey model. 
16In a similar way for u=1 the summation becomes; 
00 
U=E, 6' log(c(t)) =1 log c 
t-o 
I -p 
"Gonzalez (2004,2007) claims that under high level conflict small increment in property rights 
can harm welfare. 
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5.4.2 A Numerical Solution for Asymmetric Equilibrium 
To solve numerically the model for two and three agents we first define the main 
parameters; 
Technology parameter (A) : To allow for inequality in output amongst agents 
we introduce "average technology parameter", A, to represent the average tech- 
nology in the economy. The productivity of each agent is represented by AZ; 
A=n 
Lei 1 
AZ 
and we define the dispersion of the technology parameter, 
n 
dispersionA =- 
E(Aj 
- A)2 n 
For the calculation in this chapter we use A=2 and Ai E [1,3]; that is the 
less productive agent's technology parameter varies between [1,2] and more 
productive agent's [2,3]. Hence, when the dispersion of A=0, this indicates 
that there is no difference in skills between agents and with increase dispersion 
one agent become less and less productive while other becomes more and more 
productive. 
Property rights parameter (7) : It takes values between [1, oo), when it is suf- 
ficiently high suggests that the agent is able retain relatively big proportion of 
their output. By restricting 7r below at 1 will ensure each agent to retain at 
least 50% of their own output. 
Decisiveness of conflict parameter (m) : It takes values between (0,1), when 
the value is close to 1 indicates that the gain from conflict is higher. 
We have assessed the model under four economic environments; 
5.4 The Model 196 
9 Economic Environment 1 (EE1): Low property rights and low returns 
to conflict. This scenario assesses when property rights are weak and returns 
from conflict is low. The defining parameters of this environment are 7r =2 
and m=0.1. 
" Economic Environment 2 (EE2): Low property rights and high returns to 
conflict. The defining parameters of this environment are 7r =2 and m=0.9. 
This is "the worst economic environment". 
" Economic Environment 3 (EE3) : High property rights and high returns to 
conflict. The defining parameters of this environment are 7r =9 and m=0.9. 
9 Economic Environment 4 (EE4) : High property rights and low return to 
conflict. The defining parameters of this environment are 7r =9 and m=0.1. 
This is "the best economic environment" 
Also the other parameter values used in all scenarios: a=0.5,0 = 0.9, o=2, 
5=0.1, andA=2. 
Analysis of Findings from Numerical Solution: 
We assume that there are low, high and average productive agents/groups, i. e. a 3- 
agent model. '8 Under each scenario agents start with the same level of productivity, 
i. e. dispersion among agents' ability is zero initially. With dispersion gradually 
increasing from 0 to 0.5, we look at how rational agents react and what will be the 
18We have also solve the model for 2-agent, low and high productivity agents. 
The results are 
not reported here. 
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impact of these decisions on the average level of output under each environment 
described above. '9 
The initial findings support the idea that the less productive agent increases its 
offensive capital, zi, and decreases its defensive capital, xi, whereas the more produc- 
tive agent increases both unproductive capitals. However, the degree to which each 
agent allocates their endowments to these activities is determined by the choice of 
parameters; 7r and m. Further, this strategic decision of each agent has implications 
for the average output of the economy and utility of each agent. 
Figures 5.5 to 5.8 indicate the numerical solution of each economic environment 
for a 3-agent model. Each figure has four graphs; the top left and right show utility 
and output versus dispersion in technology (A), respectively for each agent. The 
bottom left and right show the ratios of consumption to output, (y and appro- 
priative capital (the sum of defensive and offensive capital) to productive capital, 
(xi± zi ), against dispersion in technology (A), respectively for each agent. 
When assessing the model for 3-agents/groups2° the average productive agent's 
response to other agents has important implications. In 3-agents/groups model, we 
assume that one of the agents/groups to have an average productivity level which 
is the average productivity of the other 2-agents/groups and it is constant. That is 
to say the average technology parameter is fixed and equal to 2, i. e. A3 =A=2. 
This implies that; Al E [1,2], A2 E [2,3] and A3 = 2. Hence the full range for the 
dispersion is; 
2 
0<1 
3(12 + 
12 + 02) <30.8 
19Numerical solution is performed using MATLAB. 
20Groups here refers to a society, in which the society may be divided into three sub-groups 
based on their productivity levels: low, average and high productive groups. 
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Figure 5.9 and 5.10 show utility of each agents and economy's average output. In 
EE2 and EE3 economy's average output is gradually falling with inequality. Further, 
the implications of how economic environments affect agents/groups as the economy 
becomes more unequal can be assessed by looking at the behaviour of the average 
agent, since their productivity level is constant and equal to economy's average. 
Dispersion in productivity among agents results in a reduction in the average agent's 
output and together with high conflict the average agent's utility also falls. The 
average agent shows also important implications in terms of the consumption to 
output ratio and the unproductive to productive ratio. We pose the question: under 
imperfect property rights and high inequality will, on average, agents start consuming 
more? The answer to this question is given in figure 5.5 to 5.8, the average agent's 
consumption to output ratio, in overall, increases with inequality. 
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Figure 5.4: Output Relative to EE4 Output 
Figure (5.4) graphs the output in each economic environment relative to output in 
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EE4 against dispersion in A. EE4 is the best economic environment with very low 
returns from conflict and high level of property rights. There are two important 
observations in this graph. First, high property rights with low returns from conflict 
environment EE4 with dispersion in A has the highest average output. Second, the 
lowest average output is found in EE2, in which the property rights are very weak 
and there are high returns to conflict. 
Finally, a close examination of figure 5.9 and 5.10 show that as dispersion gradu- 
ally increasing from 0 to 0.5 the economy's average output reduces by 13.8% in EE2 
and 13.3% in EE3 and increases by 5.3% in EE1 and 4.6% in EE4; so inequality can 
increase output if the returns to conflict are low. 
5.5 Summary and Conclusions 
This chapter seeks to identify how inequality and weak property rights impact upon 
the utility of agents and the average output of an economy. We model these issues 
in an extended Ramsey model with heterogenous agents, who aim to maximize 
their utility subject to their resource constraint. This augmented model differs from 
traditional treatment in two respects; first, the agent's claims over their output are 
not secure and this is formalised by using `contest success functions', and second, 
agents are heterogenous in their skills to produce output and this is formalised with 
introduction of agent-specific technology levels. 
The main results show that the relatively less productive agent may be better off 
under a low conflict and low property rights environment, that is EEI; nevertheless, 
increased dispersion in productivity results in their utility falling under all economic 
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environments, which is anticipated. Conversely, the relatively high productive agent 
is better off under good property rights and low conflict environment, that is EE4. 
The utility of the average agent falls gradually with inequality under EE2 and EE3, 
this decline depends upon the governing parameters of economic environment, 7r and 
m. 
In fact, one can anticipate that under perfect property rights, that is when 
7r -* oo, with average productivity level 
fixed, dispersion among productivity levels 
of agents should only have opposing effects on each agent's output level. Besides, 
the economy average output is not expected to change. Under predetermined eco- 
nomic environments, we, however, find that inequality in productivity has a negative 
effect on the economy's average output when property rights are relatively poor and 
returns from conflict are high. Relatively high property rights and low returns to 
conflict produce a slightly positive effect of dispersion on the economy's average 
output. 
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5.6.1 Constant Intertemporal Elasticity of Substitutions (CIES) 
Utility Function 
Evaluating CIES utility function in AK growth model: 
The steady state growth is -y, 
c(t) = (1 + 7)ß(t -1) = (1 + -y)tc(O) 
a _1 and with u>1 the Consider a general iso-elastic utility function; u(c) = Cl- 1-0, 
summation becomes; 
U= 
00 
ßt 
t=o 
00 
1-ý 
>f3t 
[((1 +'Y)tc(0))i-° 
1 or 
t=o 
1 C(0)1-or 
(1-0-) 1-0(1+7)1-01 
1 
1-0 
1 
1-Q 
This holds if and only if , 
Q(1 +<1. 
For a>1 this will hold if a>1 and 0<1 since the condition 
is ,Q< 
(1 + -y)°-1 
and the RHS > 1. Therefore, when it is evaluated graphically we take the 
following 
parameter values; 0.6 <p<1, k(0) = 1, o=2,0 = 0.9 and 
A=2.3. 
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Apply L'Hopital's rule to evaluate at a= 1(Gonzalez Case); 
00 
Ot 
(1 +'Y)tc(o)i-O, 
-1=1 
c(O)1-0, 
-1 1-Q (1-a) 1-3(l+ 
t=o 
---l1--- 
c(0)1-01 
1-u2 
(-ß(- log(' + 'Y))) 1 (1 +'Y) ( log(c(O))) (1 Ni +'Y) ) a=1 
=1 log(c(0)) + 
)3 
2 
log(l + -y) 
1-13 (1-, Q) 
Evaluating CIES utility function in Ramsey Growth model: 
The steady state growth is zero, therefore, c(t) = c(t - 1) =c 
00 
U=Z at 
c(t)i-or -1 
1-0, 
c=o 
_ ot 1-ý 
t=o 
1 c1-T-1 
1-0 1-0, 
In a similar way for a=1 the summation becomes; 
00 1 
U= ý3t 1og(c(t)) =1_0 log c 
t=o 
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Utility and Average Economy Output with High Returns from Conflict m=0.9 
Utility vs Oispersior in Technology (A) Ecoron"ys Average Output 
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Figure 5.9: 3-Agent Model: Utility and Average Output with High Returns to 
conflict 
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Utility and Average Economy Output with Low Returns from Conflict m=0.1 
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Figure 5.10: 3-Agent Model: Utility and Average Output with Low Returns to 
Conflict 
Chapter 6 
Epilogue 
This chapter provides conclusions to the thesis. It aims to explain what are the main 
findings and the main contributions to the areas studied. In particular, this thesis 
considers the effects of military expenditure on the economy, re-analyses political 
and economic institutions and finally assesses the effect of conflict and inequality on 
output and utility. 
6.1 Summary of the Main Results 
As indicated above, the thesis has focused on military expenditure among other 
spendings of government, formal institutions, and conflicts in general. However, 
instability is one of the main concerns for the entrepreneurs and investors, whereas 
investment is one of the key determinants of growth. In order to examine the eco- 
nomic development of a country, its economic, political and social factors have been 
taken into account in each chapter. Overall, the main contributions of this thesis 
are that in chapter 2a meta-analysis is conducted to quantify the findings of the 
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military expenditure-growth literature; this suggests a very small positive effect of 
military expenditure on growth. Chapter 3 looks at the military expenditure-growth 
nexus considering the likelihood of internal and external conflict, which places con- 
straints on countries to keep their military expenditure at a certain level. Chapter 
4 examines how vital institutions are in the state of conflict and development by 
building two new additive indices. Finally, Chapter 5 looks into agents' decisions 
over time to investigate productivity differentials and the economic environment. 
The validation of the findings of this chapter awaits further empirical investigation. 
Chapter 2: 
In chapter 2, we discuss the diverse empirical findings of the military expenditure - 
growth literature. To reach an overall unbiased conclusion in a large body of military 
expenditure and economic growth literature a method of meta-analysis is employed. 
Meta-analysis allows one to contemplate and integrate the findings of extant studies 
in a statically comparable metric form. In applying this statistical method the 
earlier studies are methodically reviewed to elucidate a more accurate conclusion. 
Our results show that there are serious shortcomings in the military expenditure 
and economic growth literature; but also that there exists a genuine effect. 
This 
effect is small and negative under a fixed-effects model and very small and positive 
under a random-effects model. 
Chapter 3: 
Having considered the findings of chapter 2, chapter 3 re-explores a robust rela- 
tionship between economic growth and military expenditure while controlling 
for 
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threat. If there is such link we then determine its magnitude and sign. Even though 
earlier studies emphasize a negative effect, it has not been confirmed significant. 
Conditioning on security this link has been established and found to be robust. Our 
empirical models investigated the trade-off between military expenditure and invest- 
ment while accounting for the security dimension. The empirical model is defined 
by three equations: economic growth, military expenditure and investment. Then 
a simultaneous-equations approach is employed with a panel fixed-effects model. 
Under the highest levels of internal and external threats to the security of a na- 
tion, military expenditure shows a positive effect on growth, otherwise the effect is 
negative. 
Moreover, the chapter reveals that in the absence of threat, a rise in military 
expenditure influences growth negatively. Conversely, in the presence of threat, a 
higher military expenditure could affect growth positively. This suggests, that based 
on the internal and external threat levels, there is an optimal level of military ex- 
penditure. However, our results do not suggest that increasing military expenditure 
would reduce an internal threat; but rather that solving internal problems in the 
long-run could considerably reduce the need for military expenditure and bring a 
substantial "peace dividend" for countries. 
The main determinants of military expenditure are also empirically explored. 
The level of military expenditure depends on the neighbouring countries' military 
expenditure (a potential threat), external and internal wars and the level of democ- 
racy. These findings support earlier studies' findings. Furthermore, the democracy 
level has a significant negative impact on military expenditure; in other words as 
countries move towards democracy there is an observable reduction in military ex- 
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penditure. However, neighbouring countries military expenditure has a significant 
positive effect on military expenditure. This confirms the existence of arms races 
between countries; that is, countries see other countries' military expenditure as a 
threat and thus they respond by increasing their military expenditure. 
Chapter 4: 
The main contribution of chapter 4 is the construction of indices that define the 
economic environment in each economy: socio-political instability (SPI), economic 
(Ell) and political (PII) stability indices. This chapter suggests that neglecting the 
creation of good institutions in developing economies would put their development 
at risk. 
The existence of institutions is related to the stability of a strong economy in 
which everyday exchange can take place without any "fear". In chapter 3 the effect 
of an internal threat on economic growth is analysed together with military expendi- 
ture. In this chapter (chapter 4), this link is extended; first the determinants of the 
socio-political instability index (SPI) are investigated. Secondly, using institutional 
stability indices the effect of economic inequality (Gini) and SPI on economic growth 
is examined. It is shown that institutions are an important feature to consider when 
looking at the effects of SPI and Gini on growth. The results indicate that good 
institutions, in particular Ell, are important devices for long-run economic growth. 
In effect, economies with a low economic institutions index (Ell) but high economic 
inequality (Gini) and SPI experience low economic growth. In addition, in ethnically 
less homogenous countries the political institutions are key for the ethnic diversity 
to influence economic growth positively. 
6.1 Summary of the Main Results 
Chapter 5: 
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Chapter 5 looks at the micro-foundation of conflict, unproductive activity and role of 
institutions on agents. In chapter 4 the empirical findings of interaction term SPI * 
Gini on economic growth is negative but weak. In chapter 5 this link theoretically 
seems to be robust. In the presence of a high conflict environment, a rise in income 
dispersion reduces average output. 
Our theoretical model shows that there are circumstances where increased in- 
equality between agents causes the lowering of average output in a high conflict 
environment. Furthermore, even though, the productivity level of an average agent 
is constant, in the presence of high inequality and high conflict their utility de- 
creases. Furthermore, the three-agent model is solved numerically, which shows a 
relatively less productive agent might be better off under a low conflict and low 
property rights environment, although increased dispersion in productivity causes 
their utility to fall in all environments. By contrast, the relatively high productive 
agent is better off under good property rights and low conflict. Even though the 
utility of the average agent falls gradually with inequality regardless of the economic 
environment, the drop still depends upon the governing parameters of economic en- 
vironment, it and m. In fact, it should be anticipated that under perfect property 
rights we would not expect any rise in average output. However it is found that the 
relationship between inequality and the economy's average output is a complex one 
and does depend on the economic environment. Inequality reduces average output 
when protection of property rights are low and there is a high gain from conflict, 
otherwise the effect is negligible. 
6.2 
Future 
Research 
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The purpose of this section is to briefly mention potential areas/issues for future 
work. Some areas we have covered in this thesis are broadly investigated, i. e. eco- 
nomic growth and military expenditure. However, empirical and theoretical analysis 
of institutions and their impact on the economy is still new. The main limitations 
and extensions to the models used here provide us with the first step for the future 
research. The second step concerns the issues that we have not looked into. 
Meta analysis conducted in chapter 2 represents a preliminary study of the extant 
literature on military expenditure and economic growth. This preliminary study 
has to be extended to include all the studies in this area. Mainly the supply-side 
studies, i. e. Feder-type models, are excluded. Although these models are argued to 
be methodically flawed in terms of other analysis of effect of military expenditure 
on economic growth and have a serious problem of simultaneity bias, their findings 
should not be ignored. In fact, many review studies have drawn conclusions ignoring 
supply-side effects due to the problems specified above. Hence, it is necessary to 
either revise the model specifications to re-analyse supply side effects, or find a new 
model that will allow this analysis. 
There are critical findings that are emerged from chapter 3: the importance of 
neighbouring countries' military expenditure and the level of democracy. There- 
fore, international and regional armaments are a major impediment for reduction 
in military expenditure. There has to be an agreement to reduce it. The desir- 
ability of reducing world average military spendings seems to be the main policy 
challenge. In addition, military expenditure is not only related to the security but 
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also to a country's position in the world arena; i. e. the strategic positioning of a 
nation. These must be further explored in future work to produce results that find 
viable avenues for policy makers. The other issue that needs further attention is the 
threat variable. This is particularly important, not only in the analysis of effects 
of military expenditure on economic growth but also for the general stability of the 
economy. The threat variable could be defined in detail for each country and then 
conducting a time-series analysis could give a better insight to the true level of mil- 
itary expenditure for individual countries. Finally, as Aizenman and Glick (2006) 
also suggested, the composition of military expenditure and negative externalities, 
especially the environmental issue related to military training, are the areas that 
more research is required. The composition of military expenditure is certainly dif- 
ferent between arms importing and exporting countries. Intuitively, one may expect 
a contradictory effects among different group of countries. 
In chapter 4 our empirical results needs investigation for stability and robustness. 
In the cross-section analysis of socio-political instabilities (SPI) we have found results 
that confirms earlier studies' findings. However, in the panel data analysis the results 
are rather weak. Also, the analysis of effects of Ell and PIT on economic growth 
considered using a cross-country analysis, the important extension is an expansion 
of the time-frame and panel data analysis. However, as this area has not been 
investigated until recently, there is no widely accepted structural model. A general 
framework is necessary, as highlighted, the ambiguity of whether the direction of 
effect is from institution to development or vice versa indicates the potential for 
further research. If there is a problem of "feedback" effects; which some studies 
have found to be the case between level of income per head and political institution 
(Acemoglu et al., 2001), then statistically it could be solved but practically there is 
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a problem of finding valid instruments. Also, the role of institution on technology 
diffusion or transfer especially needs to be considered in the future work. 
The important extensions of our model in chapter 5 are first to consider the 
introduction of taxation in the model. This extension could produce interesting 
outcomes, if taxation is seen as further diverting productive capital from produc- 
tion then one might expect a further reduction in average output. However, the 
introduction of government in the model could be more complicated. A high level 
fiscal redistribution could ease inequality among agents and this might increase the 
average output level. Nevertheless, this may arguably create economic inefficiencies. 
The Second extension is to use the difference form of the context success function, 
as in chapter 5 only the ratio form of the contest success function is used in the 
model. 
Finally, there is a potential link to be made between chapter 4 and 5. In particu- 
lar, the economic environments defined in chapter 5 could help us to group countries 
and then we could assign the appropriate weights to the income level of individual 
countries and then test for cross country differentials. 
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